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Summary
Constitutional review is a central feature of liberal democracy. However, with neither
the power of the purse nor the sword, the mere presence of constitutional courts does
not automatically imply the effective exercise of judicial authority. Courts must rely on
elected officials for the implementation of their rulings. The ability of a court to ensure
that government officials faithfully comply with judicial decisions critically depends
on the existence of sufficient public support for the court and the public’s ability to
monitor legislative responses to judicial decisions.
In this dissertation, I study the importance of public support for the relationship
between court-government and court-public. I draw on the judicial politics literature
on separation of powers, public support and legislative noncompliance and extend
existing theory in two regards. First, I argue that not all courts possess the sufficient
level of public support necessary to ensure legislative compliance. Varying degrees
of public support strongly affect the leverage that courts possess in judicial-legislative
and judicial-public interactions. Second, I argue that courts actively take measures
in the form of the institutional tools at their disposal when they expect legislative
noncompliance. One such tool is decision language, whose strategic usage allows
judges to pressure the government or hide likely noncompliance from public view, if
necessary.
I test these arguments empirically by combining classical inferential methods such as
survey experiments with novel data on court decision-making and methodologies from
the field of machine learning and computational linguistic. Throughout all chapters, I
employ a comparative perspective and test my arguments using data on the German
Federal Constitutional Court, a court with strong and robust levels of public support,
and the less popular French Conseil Constitutionnel.
My empirical evidence shows that considering varying degrees of public support and
the institutional tools of judges indeed helps to generate a more accurate picture of how
Summary
judges behave in judicial-legislative and judicial-public interactions. Three conclusions
are drawn. First, court decisions can legitimize public policies, albeit only if the court
itself is perceived as a legitimate institution. Second, courts are more attentive to the
political environment of a decision than previously thought: depending on their degree
of public support, they actively adapt the language of their decisions as a function of
the risk of noncompliance and their institutional support. Third, public support and
other political context factors are important for judicial decision-making not only from
an inferential but also from a predictive perspective.
The results of my analyses confirm that public support plays a crucial role for courts’
ability to effectively exercise constitutional review, as well as highlighting the benefits
of increased differentiation of constitutional courts institutional tools and their diffuse
support from a comparative view. Therefore, my results have implications for the
growing literature on strategic courts using their institutional tools to address potential
noncompliance and the general awareness of judges for their institutional reputation.
Overall, this project offers new perspectives on the most important resource of judges –
their public support – and has important implications not only for research on judicial
politics but also for the efficacy of constitutional review in a constitutional state, and
thus the sustainability of liberal democracy.
vi
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
On July 5, 2018, a headline in the New York Times claimed that the “Polish Crisis
Deepens as Judges Condemn Their Own Court”.1 What has happened in this country
which was once considered a role model for democratic transition following the
constitutional revolutions in post-communist Europe? Beginning in 2015, Poland’s
ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) adopted several legal amendments to reshape the
judicial frame work in Poland. These amendments sent 40% of the Supreme Court
judges in retirement overnight and allowed the PiS to appoint their own judges instead.
The Polish Constitutional Tribunal declared these developments and the amendments
on which they were based as unconstitutional, although nothing happened and the PiS
continued with their judicial reforms. The result of these events is a serious, persisting
constitutional crisis in the heart of Central Europe, where judges condemn their own
court and its output as politicized and unfree.
Similar developments are also observable in other countries. Viktor Orban’s gov-
ernment in Hungary eludes court decisions by incorporating laws that have been
declared as unconstitutional directly into the constitution. In addition, the Hungarian
Government continues to curtail the rights and competences of the constitutional court,
which is now only allowed to examine the formal but not substantive constitutionality
of a law. Moreover, court crises are not unique to Europe; in the United States, the
1https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/world/europe/poland-court-crisis-constitutional-
tribunal.html (Santora, 2018), accessed 24.04.2019.
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controversial appointment of the Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh caused an
erosion of trust in the Supreme Court according to polls from Gallup.2
Although such open noncompliance as shown by the Polish and Hungarian govern-
ments is rare, and the Supreme Court’s popularity typically recovers after some time,
these developments shed light on a general problem: what are judges supposed to do
in times of a crisis of the constitutional state where governments can openly ignore
judicial rulings, and the legitimacy of courts begins to erode? Constitutional review is
a central feature of Western-style democracy. However, with neither the power of the
purse nor the sword, the mere presence of constitutional courts does not automatically
imply the effective exercise of judicial authority. Courts must rely on elected officials
for the implementation of their rulings. The ability of a court to ensure that government
officials faithfully comply with judicial decisions decisively depends on the existence of
sufficient public support for the court, and thus its institutional legitimacy, as well as
the public’s ability to monitor legislative responses to judicial decisions.
These events demonstrate that the question of how courts can effectively exercise
constitutional review holds crucial relevance. I therefore take the opportunity to
study the relationship between the court, the government and the public in this dissertation.
In particular, I am interested in studying the importance of public support for the
relationship between court-government and court-public. I draw on the comparative
judicial politics literature on separation of powers, public awareness and legislative
noncompliance and extend existing theory in two regards. First, I argue that not all courts
possess the sufficient level of public support necessary to ensure legislative compliance.
The degree of public support strongly affects the leverage that courts possess in
judicial-legislative and judicial-public relations, where less popular courts have a much
lower institutional legitimacy and thus leverage. Second, I argue that courts actively
take measures in the form of the institutional tools at their disposal to counter legislative
noncompliance. One such tool is decision language, whose strategic usage allows judges
to pressure the government or hide likely noncompliance from public view, if necessary.
I test these arguments empirically by combining classical inferential methods such as
survey experiments with novel data on court decision-making and methodologies from
the field of machine learning and computational linguistics. Throughout the majority
of the chapters, I employ a comparative perspective and test my arguments using data
on the German Federal Constitutional Court, a court with strong and robust levels of
public support, and the less popular French Conseil Constitutionnel.
My empirical evidence shows that considering varying degrees of public support
and the institutional tools of judges is beneficial for obtaining a more accurate picture
of how judges behave in judicial-legislative and judicial-public interactions. I draw
2https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-facing-a-legitimacy-
crisis/ (De-Veaux and Roeder, 2018), accessed 03.05.2019.
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three main conclusions. First, court decisions can legitimize public policies, albeit
only if the court itself is perceived as a legitimate institution. Second, courts are more
attentive to the political environment of a decision than previously thought: depending
on their degree of public support, they actively adapt the language of their decisions as
a function of the risk of noncompliance and their institutional support. Third, public
support and other political context factors are important for judicial decision-making
not only from an inferential, but also from a predictive perspective.
The results of my analyses confirm that public support plays a crucial role for
courts’ ability to effectively exercise constitutional review, as well as highlighting the
benefits of a greater differentiation of constitutional courts’ institutional tools and
public support from a comparative view. My findings therefore hold implications for
the growing literature on strategic courts that use their available institutional tools
to address potential noncompliance as well as the general awareness of judges for
their institutional reputation. Overall, this project offers new perspectives on the most
important resource of judges – their public support – and is relevant not only for
research on judicial politics, but also for the efficacy of constitutional review in a
constitutional state, and thus the sustainability of liberal democracy.
1.2 General Framework: Constitutional Review, Legislative Non-
compliance and the Importance of the Public
The general framework of this dissertation is the relationship between the court, the
government and the public. I place a particular emphasis on the court-government
(judicial-legislative) and court-public (judicial-public) interaction. In what follows,
I provide an overview concerning the meaning of constitutional review for liberal
democracy, the problem of legislative noncompliance of judicial decisions and the
importance of the public as the most important resource of courts in this regard. I
conclude that although formally constitutional review is a powerful mean for courts
to control legislative majorities, in reality this power is often limited and ultimately
depends on whether the public supports a court or not.
1.2.1 The Power of Constitutional Review
The power of constitutional review is a central feature of Western democracies. Defined
as “the formal power of a judicial body to set aside or strike legislative or administrative
acts for incompatibility with the national constitution” (Vanberg, 2005, 1), many highest
courts are empowered to protect constitutional rights and to oversee the political process.
Constitutional review is widely spread: by 2011, 83% of the world’s constitutions
empowered the judicial branch with the authority of constitutional review (Ginsburg
and Versteeg, 2014, 2).
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These courts play a pivotal role in the political system and democratic politics. They
solve conflicts between the legislative majority and the opposition, protect the basic
rights and liberties of citizens, and monitor whether legislative actions are consistent
with the constitution. With their ability to review and invalidate legislation, courts
can serve to constrain governing majorities and constitute an important part of the
system of checks and balances in Western democratic political systems. While these
“guardians of the constitution” thus play a pivotal role in democratic politics, the (lack
of) formal empowerment of constitutional courts does not guarantee that they can
effectively exercise their authority and constrain the legislature.
1.2.2 Legislative Noncompliance
“The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court shall be binding upon the constitu-
tional organs of the Federation and of the Laender, as well as on all courts and those
with public authority”3 (§ 31,1 Act on the Federal Constitutional Court). This sentence
of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court illustrates that other institutions and
political actors are formally constrained and tied by German constitutional court’s
decisions. In reality, however, the potency of constitutional review is limited.
With the words of Alexander Hamilton’s often-quoted phrase, constitutional courts
are the “least dangerous branch of government” because in contrast to the legislature
and the executive, they neither control the “purse” nor the “sword” (Hamilton 1788,
Federalist No. 78) . Therefore, in contrast to government officials or other policy-makers,
the judiciary possess little formal power to enforce or implement their rulings. Instead,
how and whether a judicial decision is implemented depends on the willingness of the
branches of the government to faithfully comply with a ruling. In cases where a court
decision corresponds to the interests of the government, the institutional weakness of
courts is not problematic, since governments have no reason to not comply. However,
this changes if the outcome of a ruling is not in line with the government’s preferences.
In such a case, court decisions are often an unwelcome constraint to a government’s
power and a threat to the legislative agenda of the elected officials. In such a case,
the implementation of a court ruling is then in the hand of actors who have a strong
interest that the court’s ruling will not be implemented. This non-implementation of
court decisions is generally referred to as legislative noncompliance.
The possibility of legislative noncompliance is not simply academic. In order to
illustrate that even powerful courts face a real threat of noncompliance, I provide three
short case studies of occasions where legislative noncompliance occurred in the context
of decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereafter referred to as the
GFCC).
3German original: “Die Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts binden die Verfassungsorgane
des Bundes und der Länder sowie alle Gerichte und Behörden”.
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Example 1: The Crucifix decision
In August 1995, the GFCC ruled on the constitutionality of a Bavarian school ordinance
on displaying a crucifix in public elementary school classrooms.4 The German judges
decided that displaying a cross or crucifix in class rooms is unconstitutional. This
provoked harsh critique and public protests, and Church leaders, but also politicians
(mostly of the Christian Democrats) took public position against the ruling. Edmund
Stoiber, the former Bavarian prime minister, officially vowed that crucifixes would
remain in the classrooms. With respect to the implementation of the court’s decision,
he deemed, subtly but unequivocally, that “the crucifix decision will be respected, but
never accepted”.5 As a reaction to the decision, the Bavarian parliament passed a
revision of the school ordinance where not displaying the crucifix is only possible in
rare, atypical cases after all other means are exhausted and no compromise between
the different interests is possible. Constitutional scholars, therefore, evaluate that the
crucifix decision of the GFCC had no practical consequences overall (Schaal, 2007). In
fact, a judge of the GFCC later said during a lecture that “there are more crucifixes
hanging in Bavarian school rooms now than before the decision.” (Vanberg, 2005, 4).
Example 2: The inheritance tax decision
In a landmark decision on inheritance tax in Germany in 2014, the GFCC declared
the existing inheritance tax law with respect to family-owned companies as uncon-
stitutional.6 In their ruling, the judges instructed the federal legislature to revise the
law and set a deadline. The court’s decision received harsh critique by governmental
officials. In an anonymous interview, government officials commented on the decision,
stating that “what Karlsruhe brought to us is indescribable. The decision is written in
a way that shows that the judges just write what comes to mind in their professorial
delusion. And we are facing the trouble afterwards because it is ill-conceived”.7
The Bundestag instituted a committee to study revisions of the inheritance tax code,
although no legislation was initiated. After two years, the deadline expired without a
legislative response. This lead the President of the First Senate of the German court to
write an open letter to the German legislators, highlighting that the court felt obliged to
deal with this matter again.8 It was only after this threat that the government (hastily)
adopted a law revision, which is currently discussed to be appealed to the GFCC again
by the opposition.
4Reference number: BVerfGE 93, 1.
5 http://www.bpb.de/apuz/33164/regiert-karlsruhe-mit-das-bundesverfassungs-gericht-
zwischen-recht-und-politik?, accessed 26.04.2019.
6Reference number: 1 BvL 21/12.
7https://www.zeit.de/zeit-magazin/2016/12/andreas-vosskuhle-bundesverfassungsgericht-
verfassung-praesident/seite-2 (Wefing, 2016), accessed 24.04.2019.
8https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/bvg16-
041.html, accessed 12.04.2019.
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Example 3: The NPD campaign event provisional order
In March 2018, the third chamber9 of the first Senate of the GFCC ruled in a provisional
order that the National Democratic Party of Germany (German: Nationaldemokratische
Partei Deutschlands, NPD) is allowed to host an election campaign event in the city
hall of Wetzlar, a city in Hesse.10 Prior this decision, the city of Wetzlar had attempted
to prohibit the event for formal reasons. The NPD appealed against the prohibition
to an administrative court, and won. The responsible administrative court ruled in a
provisional order that the city of Wetzlar must confer the right to use the city hall to
the NPD. Because the city of Wetzlar ignored the provisional order, the NPD appealed
to the GFCC. In a provisional order, the GFCC decided that the city of Wetzlar must
respect the administrative court ruling and that the NPD is explicitly allowed to host
an election campaign in the city hall.
In the following, the city of Wetzlar also ignored the decision of the GFCC, whereby
ultimately the election campaign event did not take place in the city hall. The court
condemned the actions of the city of Wetzlar with unusual sharp words in a press
release, stating that “it will inform the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and
the mayor of Wetzlar to elucidate the incidents which lead to ignoring the court
order”.11 In a follow-up statement, the court reports that the city of Wetzlar has
clarified the circumstances that led to ignoring the decision, whereby there were
“misconceptions about the binding power of judicial decisions and the remaining scope
for own actions”. However, there was nothing the court could do but “encourage
the municipal supervision to ensure that judicial decisions will be respected in the
future”.12
In the light of these events, Andreas Vosskuhle, the sitting President of the German
Federal Constitutional Court, stated in a recent interview that:
“Judicial decisions, be they of first-instance courts or of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court, must be respected and implemented by other public authorities.
Otherwise, it is a violation of the lawful promise that we have given each
other in the Federal Republic. A violation that cannot be tolerated.”13
9Chambers are panels of three judges that assist the GFCC to make timely decisions for a large number
of cases that are deemed to be not sufficiently important or controversial to be deliberated among all
judges on the bench.
10Reference number: 1 BvQ 18/18.
11https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2018/bvg18-
016.html, accessed 26.04.2019.
12https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2018/bvg18-
026.html, accessed 26.04.2019.
13German original: “Gerichtliche Entscheidungen, seien sie von erstinstanzlichen Gerichten oder vom
Bundesverfassungsgericht, sind von anderen Hoheitsträgern zu respektieren und umzusetzen. Andernfalls
ist es ein Verstoß gegen das rechtsstaatliche Versprechen, das wir uns gegenseitig in der Bundesrepublik
gegeben haben. Ein Verstoß, der nicht zu tolerieren ist”. https://www.das-parlament.de/2018/40_41/
im_blickpunkt/571052-571052 (Dolderer, 2018), accessed 20.04.2019.
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Although these examples are all from Germany, case studies of legislative noncom-
pliance in other political systems are also available, e.g. in Italy (Volcansek, 1991),
Russia (Trochev, 2002, 2008), or the United States (Vanberg, 2005). The occasional use
of noncompliance is also documented in other contexts (Staton, 2006, 2010; Carrubba,
Gabel and Hankla, 2008; Carrubba and Zorn, 2010). All of these episodes underscore
that the mere presence of a constitutional court does not ensure that it can effectively
exercise constitutional review and control the other branches of government. Ignoring
judicial decisions is a viable option for politicians if they are not satisfied with judicial
outputs.
1.2.3 The Efficacy of Constitutional Review and Public Support
Overcoming the threat of legislative noncompliance is a fundamental challenge of
judicial decision-making. Previous judicial scholarship has identified public support for
courts as one solution to this challenge. Public support is also called diffuse support
and is generally defined as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps
members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of
which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton, 1965, 273). With respect to courts,
diffuse support is understood here as the “support for maintenance of the institution”
(Caldeira and Gibson, 1992, 638), namely the public support for the court as a legitimate
institution and central feature of a constitutional state and the rule of law.14
With respect to the importance of public support for courts, the linchpin of the
argument is that with sufficient public support, legislative attempts of noncompliance
will result in a public backlash which is electorally costly, whereby the legislative thinks
twice before it evades a decision. Therefore, public support is the most important
weapon that judges have in the judicial-legislative relations when they expect govern-
mental resistance, and thus the public plays a major role for the efficacy of constitutional
review. In this regard, public support is like a “reservoir of good-will” that courts can
rely on. Consequently, courts have a strong interest in maintaining this support and are
“with limited institutional resources, [...] uncommonly dependent upon the goodwill of
their constituents for both support and compliance” (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998,
343).
If public support alone were sufficient to achieve legislative compliance, then decisions
of courts with such diffuse support would never be evaded. However, as previously
outlined, legislative noncompliance is an empirical reality. To explain this, Vanberg
(2001, 2005) argues that public support can only effectively help judges to constrain
governments if the public awareness for a decision is sufficiently high. Only if the citizens
are aware of a judicial decision and the legislative response, they can successfully
14Diffuse support is different to specific support because it describes the support for a court although
the court makes unpopular decisions from time to time.
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monitor compliance, and eventually punish the government for noncompliance. I
will outline in the next section that several possibilities exist for courts to increase the
probability that the public will catch governmental attempts of evasion.
1.3 Approach of this Dissertation
In this dissertation, I draw on the comparative judicial politics literature on the sepa-
ration of powers, public support and legislative noncompliance and extend existing
theory in two regards. First, in line with an emerging strand of literature, I understand
judges as “active” actors who can strategically resort to institutional tools at the court’s
disposal to increase the likelihood of legislative compliance. Second, I argue that not all
courts possess the sufficient level of public support necessary to effectively constrain
the government. Varying degrees of public support strongly affect the leverage that
courts posses in the judicial-legislative and judicial-public relationship.
Courts as Active Actors
Existing studies often assume that constitutional courts are “passive” actors. With
respect to the interplay between courts, governments and the public, this means that
the public awareness for a given decision is assumed to be exogenous. For instance, a
key argument in Vanberg’s (2005) formal model is that courts rule differently in cases
where the necessary public attention for a decision is given compared with cases where
it is not.
However, an emerging strand of literature demonstrates that courts are more “active”
than previously thought and not entirely helpless when governmental resistance is
likely. In context of the Mexican Supreme Court, Staton (2006, 2010) shows that courts
strategically issue press releases announcing the result of a decision. Krehbiel (2016)
finds evidence that the GFCC uses oral hearings to raise public awareness of a case, and
that the German judges strategically time decisions based on the temporal proximity
of the next election (Krehbiel, 2019). In the same line, Engst (2018) shows that judges
strategically use directives as a way of requesting political actions depending on the
costs for the government to comply with decisions. All of these findings suggest
that courts actively use the institutional means at their disposal in an attempt to
strategically raise public awareness when they expect legislative noncompliance or to
make compliance more likely in other regards.
This has severe consequences for the amount of self-restraint that judges face. When
courts are assumed to be “passive” actors, every threat of legislative noncompliance
without sufficient public awareness for a case must lead to judicial self-constraint.
This means that if it is not sufficiently likely that citizens become aware of an evasion
attempt, the court has no other choice than to restrain itself. However, if courts can
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manipulate the public awareness for a decision, they are in a much more powerful
position because self-restraint is no longer necessary.
In this dissertation, I follow the emerging strand of literature and understand judges
as “active” actors who can strategically resort to institutional tools at the court’s disposal
to increase the likelihood of legislative compliance. Instead of press releases, oral
hearings or the timing of a decision, I look at another means that judges have at their
disposal: decision language. Put simply, decision language offers courts a mechanism
to either increase the pressure on the legislature for compliance or hide legislative
noncompliance from public view (Staton and Vanberg, 2008). It can be therefore used
as a tool to control the public awareness surrounding a decision, and thus it has stark
implications for the effectiveness of constitutional review in judicial-legislative relations.
I will further elaborate on this argument in Chapter 4.
Courts With Varying Degrees of Public Support
High diffuse support for constitutional court is the center piece of many studies on the
interaction between courts, governments and the public. While it is acknowledged that
the diffuse support for court experiences some ebbs and flows in response to popular
and unpopular rulings (Durr, Martin and Wolbrecht, 2000; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth,
2011), a central assumption in many studies is that diffuse support is permanently high.
Many formal models of judicial decision-making in the context of noncompliance rely
on the assumption that all courts enjoy a sufficient and high level of public support.
These model’s central implications only hold as long as the court’s diffuse public
support is sufficiently large (e.g. Vanberg, 2001, 2005; Staton, 2006; Krehbiel, 2016,
2019). For instance, Vanberg (2001, 2005) argues that public support for the German
constitutional court itself is permanently high, whereas the public awareness of a case is
not always guaranteed (Vanberg, 2005, 21). Thus, observing legislative noncompliance
in some cases but not in others is dependent on the likelihood that the public will take
notice of the evasion. In the same line, Krehbiel (2016) assumes that “the court enjoys a
high level of public support such that the government is always punished when the
public observes noncompliance” (Krehbiel, 2016, 992).
This assumption does not account for the empirical reality. The notion that courts
substantially differ in their diffuse support is already documented early in survey
research on mass attitudes towards constitutional courts and supreme courts in ad-
vanced democracies (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998). While it is true that courts
in general are highly-respected institutions in many countries, there is considerable
cross-national variation in the level of public support. As Gibson, Caldeira and Baird
(1998) note, “national high courts vary enormously in the degree to which they have
achieved institutional legitimacy” (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998, 356). In Chapter 2,
I support this claim with evidence from a cross-national survey conducted in Germany
and France.
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The reasons for low institutional legitimacy are manifold. Some courts, such as those
newly installed during the third wave of democratization, have had little opportunity to
build institutional trust compared with long-established courts such as the US Supreme
Court or courts installed after the Second World War (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998,
350). The legitimacy of other courts such as the French Conseil Constitutionnel suffers
from a highly politicized appointment process (Hönnige, 2009) and the notion that
it has only received the power of protecting citizens’ rights rather recently (Brouard,
2009).
Given that public support is the most powerful weapon that judges possess when
dealing with governmental resistance, and thus it directly affects their leverage in the
judicial-legislative interaction, varying levels of public support also imply varying levels
of leverage. Courts without robust and high levels of public support must behave differently
than courts with strong foundations of public support. Those who enjoy reasonably high
public support can use this resource against the government in the way outlined above.
However, courts that enjoy much lower levels of public support do not have this
leverage.
Unfortunately, there is little comparative work that systematically accounts for vary-
ing degrees of public support across countries empirically and theoretically. In this
dissertation, I therefore incorporate the variation in diffuse support in my theoretical
treatments and empirical analyses. In particular, I explore how varying degrees of public
support affect the possibility of courts to force governmental compliance and the legitimacy-
conferring capacity of these courts.
1.4 Research questions
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between constitutional courts, legislative
majorities and the public, devoting particular attention to the intersection between
court-government and court-public. I extend previous work in two regards. First, I
follow the emerging strand of literature and understand judges as “active” actors
who can strategically resort to institutional tools at the court’s disposal to increase the
likelihood of legislative compliance, namely decision language. Second, I explore how
varying degrees of public support affect the possibility of courts to force governmental
compliance and the legitimacy-conferring capacity of these courts. Figure 1.1 shows
the basic structure of the relationships analyzed in this study. The figure shows the
importance of public support for the relationship between the court and government
(indirect effect) and between the court and public (direct effect).
To start with, public support has a direct effect on the court-public relation because
courts are “with limited institutional resources, [...] uncommonly dependent upon the
goodwill of their constituents” (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998, 343). Because diffuse
support and specific support are often viewed as being linked (Caldeira and Gibson,
10
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Figure 1.1 – Relationships Analyzed in this Study
Government
c
Court Public Support
a
Public
b
c
indirect
direct
a
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1992; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998; Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2003a), judges
need to be sensitive to public opinion. If judges too often make unpopular decisions
and repeatedly issue deviant rulings, they risk losing their “reservoir of good will”
and therefore their diffuse support in the long run. In other words, judges have to
adjust their rulings to the prevailing public opinion. This relationship is denoted with
a) in Figure 1.1. The judge’s sensitivity to public mood can also be illustrated with a
statement of a personal interview conducted with a GFCC judge in Vanberg’s (2005)
book:
“There cannot be a long-running divergence between the views of the public
at large and the jurisprudence of the court. The court must be carried by a
consensus of the citizens...it is important to take care that a decision does
not hit on a weak spot in public consensus [...] The decisions have to be
understandable and acceptable.” (J8,6) (Vanberg, 2005, 126)
This direct effect of public opinion on judicial decision-making has already been
investigated in various studies with respect to the US Supreme Court (e.g. Gibson,
Caldeira and Spence, 2003b; Giles, Blackstone and Vining, 2008; McGuire and Stimson,
2008; Casillas, Enns and Wohlfarth, 2011; Hall, 2014; Clark and Kastellec, 2015), and
sporadically with evidence from European constitutional courts (Sieberer, 2006; Stern-
berg et al., 2015). I build on this work but analyze the importance of public opinion
on court decision-making from a predictive rather than an inferential perspective. I use a
machine learning algorithm to evaluate the contribution of public opinion and other
political aspects of judicial decisions for predicting the decision-making of the GFCC.
My first research question is thus:
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To what extent do political context factors (including public opinion) contribute to the predic-
tion of court decision-making?
While the question above explores the consequences of public opinion for judicial
decision-making, in the next question I reverse the causal arrow and analyze how
judicial decisions affect public opinion on specific issues. This is denoted with b) in
Figure 1.1. Whereas this effect is already studied with respect to the US Supreme
Court (Hoekstra, 1995; Clawson and Kegler, 2001; Bartels and Mutz, 2009; Marshall,
1987; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel and Allen, 2006), I extend previous work by
looking at two European constitutional courts (the German Federal Constitutional
Court and the French Conseil Constitutionnel) in a comparative perspective. I expect to
find systematic differences between the legitimacy-conferring capacity of these courts
because the two courts substantially differ in their level of public support. In particular,
I am interested in whether public opinion on a governmental policy moves in response
to a court’s decision output. My second research question is thus:
Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy?
The next question explores the indirect effect of public support on the court-government
relationship, denoted by c) in Figure 1.1. The effect is only indirect because public
support does not directly affect the behavior of the court, but indirectly through its
function as a pressuring tool. In the judicial-legislative relation, previous literature
mainly treats public support and public awareness for a given case as an exogenous
factor. Courts are understood here as “helpless” actors that have no possibility to
influence how the public thinks about a case or whether citizens even take notice of
a decision. I challenge this view and follow the emerging literature highlighting the
ability of judges to strategically use the institutional tools at their disposal to control
the public awareness of a case, and thus understanding judges as active actors. I argue
that vague language is yet another tool that judges can use to promote compliance
(Staton and Vanberg, 2008). My first research question concerns measuring vagueness in
judicial texts across different languages. Because most of the work on the measurement
of vagueness in political texts still has a lot of development potential, I raise the question:
How can we automatically measure vague language in written court decisions?
My final research questions assesses the value of vague language for judges. I conduct
an empirical test of the implications of a game-theoretic model developed by Staton
and Vanberg (2008). This model argues that courts use vague language strategically
as a function of their (limited) policy expertise, the preference divergence with the
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legislator and the public support of the court. Varying degrees of public support affect
the decision of courts to either use decision language to apply pressure to the govern-
ment or hide likely noncompliance from public view. Again, I employ a comparative
perspective using the French and German constitutional courts. With respect to the
strategic usage of language by judges, my final research question simply asks:
Why do courts craft vague decisions?
Having provided a summary of the research questions that I will answer in this
dissertation, I will subsequently discuss the key innovations and contributions of my
study.
1.5 Key Innovations and Contributions
In the following section, I outline the specific innovations of my work and highlight the
relevant contributions for the field of judicial politics and political science in general.
Text As Data: a Novel Measure for Judicial Vagueness
Automated methods for content analysis are a common approach to extract information
from political texts. These automated methods such as dictionary methods, supervised
methods for classification or unsupervised methods for clustering promise to over-
come researchers’ need to manually read through massive collections of documents or
hire expensive human coders to undertake this task. Such methods are also increas-
ingly used in the context of judicial decisions (e.g. Owens and Wedeking, 2011, 2012;
Cross and Pennebaker, 2014; Black et al., 2016b; Wedeking and Zilis, 2018). Current
researchers exhaustively rely on dictionary methods. Dictionaries use the frequency
of the occurrence of key words in a text to classify documents into categories. Such
dictionaries are used, for instance, to measure the “cognitive complexity” of Supreme
Court justice’s opinions (Owens and Wedeking, 2012), the “legal clarity” of Supreme
Court decisions (Owens and Wedeking, 2011) or the “textual readability” of Supreme
Court rulings (Black et al., 2016b, Chapter 3).
These dictionaries should be used with caution or at least with detailed validation,
because serious error can occur when dictionaries from one domain are applied to
another (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 275). Unfortunately, this is not always the case
when e.g. dictionaries originating from the field of psychology are applied to judicial
decision texts. The consequence is that most of these analyses are built on “shaky
foundations” (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 275).
In this dissertation, I overcome this problematic practice by providing two different
measurement strategies to automatically detect vague language in judicial decisions. I
rely on recent advances in computational linguistic to a) demonstrate how a general
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dictionary can be expanded to a specific domain using word embeddings and b) how
to develop and benchmark state-of-the-art supervised machine learning classifiers for
this task. I also provide an exhaustive validation of the proposed measures.
Three contributions are made. First, the construction of these measurement ap-
proaches is not unique to judicial texts but can also be applied to other problems.
Accordingly, my approaches can work as a blueprint for any other application where
scholars are interested in automatically identifying a latent concept in large collections
of text. Second, these measurements are not developed for the sake of creating a
new textual measure; rather, the clear focus is on application, whereby I use these
measures to test a game-theoretic model in a subsequent chapter. Finally, recent trends
in judicial politics stress the importance of more closely accounting for content-specific
characteristics of judicial decisions rather than simply coding them in binary outcomes
(Staton and Vanberg, 2008; Clark and Lauderdale, 2010; Engst, 2018). This dissertation
is therefore a step forward to close the gap between legal scholarship and quantitative
judicial politics by considering the actual content of court decisions.
The Value of Predictive Modeling for the Field of Social Science
Social scientists traditionally prioritize inferential methods over other methodologies
to draw causal inferences. This often includes strong assumptions about the data
generating process, the development and testing of carefully designed theories and
the formulation of testable observable implications. By contrast, predictive modeling,
namely “the use of the available data to produce the best possible predictions of the
outcome variable” (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017, 146), is still relatively rarely used.
This also applies to research on judicial politics.
This is unfortunate, given that predictive modeling and artificial intelligence (AI)
play an increasingly important role in law. Estonia plans to replace human judges with
an “AI judge” in the summer of 2019 to settle conflicts in private law based on an
algorithm.15 Daniel Martin Katz, a legal scholar working on the intersection between
law and computer science (computational legal studies), states that quantitative legal
prediction will replace human assessment in many instances of typical legal work,
a “law’s information revolution” that he calls the “data driven future of the legal
service industry” (Katz, 2013) (see also Surden (2014) for a discussion of the general
relationship between machine learning and law).
In this dissertation, I argue that as social scientists we can also learn a lot from
predictive models. Predictive modeling offers an excellent possibility to compare
competing theories that examine the same outcome (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017,
149) (see also Shmueli (2010) for an in-depth discussion of causal versus predictive
15https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/digitalisierung-ki-richter-in-estland-
faellt-urteile-per-algorithmus, accessed 20.04.2019.
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approaches). In particular, focusing on the prediction of a phenomenon is a simple
mean to verify the extent to which “theoretically informed models anticipate reality,
and which among those models does a better job of it” (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017,
149).
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I follow such a predictive approach and test the
predictive contribution of legal and political context for the forecast of GFCC decision-
making in a machine learning application. I offer three distinct innovations. First,
predictive modeling allows me to test whether variables associated with the legal context
of a decision are sufficient to predict court decision-making, and whether political
context adds to the prediction. This in turn has implications for our understanding of
the predictability of judicial decision-making. Second, I show that machine learning
methods are helpful to detect non-linearities in the data that conventional regression
models most likely would not have detected. Third, the combined results of the first
two points prompt new research questions that require novel or refined theories, and
allow me to create the first benchmark of predictive accuracy for decisions of the
GFCC. While I do not argue that machine learning will replace conventional statistical
social science methods, algorithmic procedures will become increasingly common as a
supplementary tool in the tool box of quantitative social scientists to tackle research
questions from different perspectives.
Beyond the US Supreme Court: A Comparative Perspective on Germany and France
In 2011, Hönnige (2011) stated that we need more comparative research regarding
European constitutional courts, especially compared with the US Supreme Court,
which has been at the center of scholarly attention for decades. The extent of research
on the US Supreme Court strongly differs from that on European constitutional courts,
and is fairly well developed. To illustrate, whereas US scholars have recently used the
level of emotional arousal in Supreme Court justices’ voices during oral arguments to
predict the voting behavior of these justices (Dietrich, Enos and Sen, 2018), European
scholars still face a severe lack of available data and common measures that are critical
to analyze judicial behavior (e.g. measures of ideology or public mood). These obstacles
are even more prevalent in comparative research.
These problems are also reflected in the amount of scholarly work on these courts. In
an analysis of scholarly literature from 1995 to 2008, Hönnige (2011) shows that more
work has been published on the US Supreme Court in the American Journal of Political
Science alone than on other courts in six comparative and two national journals together.
In Table 1.1, I provide a similar count of the number of articles in two US journals
(American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review), two European
comparative journals (European Journal of Political Research, West European Politics) and
two national outlets (the German Politische Vierteljahresschrift and the French Revue
Française de Science Politique) spanning from 2011 to 2019. I searched for all articles
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Table 1.1 – Number of articles concerned with courts in selected journals
Journal/Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Sum
American Journal of Political Science 1 3 2 6 5 3 1 19
American Political Science Review 2 1 1 1 1 6
European Journal of Political Research 2 1 3
West European Politics 3 2 2 3 10
Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1 1 2
Revue Française de Science Politique 0
that either deal with the US Supreme Court or another US Court (such as state courts)
and all articles concerning European national high courts and the European Court of
Justice. My brief analysis reaches a similar conclusion to Hönnige (2011): even eight
years after his call for more (comparative) research on European constitutional courts,
the US Supreme Court still dominates the literature on judicial politics. Again, the
American Journal of Political Science published more (19) articles on courts than all
European outlets together (15).
In order to move beyond the focus on the US Supreme Court and to follow the call of
Hönnige (2011), this dissertation offers a comparative perspective on the relationship
between the court, government and the public by employing a comparative research
design throughout the chapters. I systematically compare the decision-making of
two European constitutional courts: the German Federal Constitutional Court and
the French Conseil Constitutionnel (hereafter CC). The countries are selected because
they share many institutional features but substantially differ in one aspect central to
this dissertation: their diffuse support. I elaborate more on this point and provide
a more substantial discussion of my case selection in Chapter 2.3. Put briefly, both
courts are established constitutional courts, both have the right of constitutional review
and often they have to deal with political questions of major societal significance in
their rulings. However, as previously outlined, in this dissertation I want to carve
out the implications that varying levels of diffuse support hold for judicial decision-
making. The approximation of these variation via the case selection is an elegant way
to overcome the lack of cross-national survey data on the diffuse support of courts over
time.
Using a comparative approach is associated with in increased effort compared with
analyzing a single court, given that the data must be collected or be available for the
two countries, comparable measurements must be created, and the validation of these
measures must be undertaken in a comparative manner. In Chapter 3, for instance, I
must show that my vague language measure is not an artifact of the language in which
it is written in, but rather that it is comparable across countries.
Nonetheless, the comparative approach also has several advantages. First, it allows
me to approximate the varying degrees of institutional public support via the case
selection instead of relying on only rarely and not comparably appearing cross-national
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surveys. Second, the external validity of comparative studies is higher than that of
single-country studies (see e.g. Newton and Van Deth, 2012, 2-5). Third, my work is a
step forward towards promoting more comparative research on European constitutional
courts, which remain heavily under-researched. This is particularly important with
respect to the generalization of the findings of this study. The new courts in Eastern
Europe, for instance, are mainly modeled along the lines of the German Federal
Constitutional Court, and thus my results also have implications for these types of
courts.
1.6 Plan of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I directly investigate the relationship between courts and the public
by asking whether constitutional courts can shape public opinion on a governmental
policy? In a nutshell, I argue that the institutional legitimacy of courts allows them to
move public opinion on public policies into the direction of their rulings. I test this using
a comparative survey experiment conducted in Germany and France by confronting
citizens with different court endorsements on a public policy. I find evidence that public
opinion, even amongst those with strong prior attitudes, is shifted towards the court’s
ruling. However, and this is the novelty presented in this chapter and the connection to
my theoretical arguments, I demonstrate that this only holds for courts who possess
about sufficient institutional legitimacy.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the measurement of vague language in court decisions.
I argue that currently used measurement approaches are insufficient because they
ignore the peculiarities of judicial texts. To overcome the limitation of existing work, I
develop the concept of judicial policy implementation vagueness as a particular form
of vagueness unique to judicial decisions. Based on recent advances in computational
linguistics, I show that this concept can be measured with a dictionary-based approach
using word embeddings and a machine learning classifier trained and benchmarked on
a novel self-collected data set. Because both measurements are tailored to the judicial
domain, they outperform existing measures of vague language.
In Chapter 4, I analyze why courts craft vague decisions and explore the decision
language of the German and French constitutional court in a comparative study. I
use the judicial policy implementation vagueness scores from Chapter 3 to test the
implications of a game-theoretic model of Staton and Vanberg (2008). This model
argues that courts use vague language strategically as a function of their (limited)
policy expertise, the preference divergence with the legislator and the public support
of the court. I find support for most of the central implications of the formal model.
Most importantly, my results show that the level of public support of a court is crucial
for explaining whether courts use decision language to strategically pressure the
government of to hide likely noncompliance from the public.
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Chapter 5 leaves behind the field of traditional inferential statistics and enters the
world of predictive modeling. I evaluate whether it is feasible to correctly forecast the
decision-making of the GFCC using a machine learning algorithm. I find that it is
possible to correctly predict three out of four outcomes of over 2,900 proceedings of
the GFCC decided between 1972 and 2010, just using information that are available in
advance of a proceeding. What is more, I explicitly tease out the predictive contribution
of legal and political context in the forecasting framework. While legal context itself
already provides a reasonable baseline for a forecast, I demonstrate that the predictive
performance is considerably improved when the political context of a proceeding is
considered, too. This chapter not only supports the view of a multifaceted decision-
making of constitutional courts which is best characterized by the ensemble of legal
and political context. It also demonstrates the value of predictive modeling for the field
social science as a fruitful complement to traditional causal inference approaches.
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Constitutional Courts as Opinion Leaders: Evidence
From a Comparative Survey Experiment
2.1 Introduction
Can constitutional court decisions shape public opinion on a governmental policy? In
this chapter, I explore the relationship between the court and the public by examining
the extent to which courts can influence public opinion. Put simply, I argue that the
public support for courts allows them to move public opinion on public policies into
the direction of their rulings. However, and this is the novelty presented in this chapter,
I show that this only holds for courts that possess sufficient institutional legitimacy.
Therefore, this chapter tests the theoretical argument raised in the introduction whether
varying degrees of public support lead to systematic differences in the judicial-public
relationship.
Legitimacy is perceived to be the major source of power of constitutional courts
as they have no formal means to ensure compliance with their decisions. As such,
legitimacy has been the subject of decades of scholarly attention. Most of the work
focuses on the question of whether the court’s legitimacy suffers when it releases
unpopular decisions (e.g. Caldeira and Gibson, 1992; Gibson and Caldeira, 2009; Bartels
and Johnston, 2013; Gibson and Nelson, 2015). Another strand asks whether courts can
draw on their institutional legitimacy to move public opinion on public policies in the
direction of their ruling. This is called the “legitimacy-conferring capacity” of courts. The
evidence, mostly from the US Supreme Court, of such a legitimacy-conferring capacity
of courts is mixed. Most observational studies (e.g. Marshall, 1987; Stoutenborough,
Haider-Markel and Allen, 2006) find no sign for such a legitimating power of courts.
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By contrast, experimental studies (Hoekstra, 1995; Bartels and Mutz, 2009) find that the
Supreme Court is able to move public opinion in the direction of the public policy that
it endorses.
In order to advance our understanding of European constitutional courts and their
importance as a “legitimizer” of public policy, I improve existing work in two directions.
First, previous studies exclusively focus on the US Supreme Court, whereas not a
single study analyzes the legitimacy-conferring capacity of courts such as European
constitutional courts. Therefore, it is unclear whether the (mixed) findings from the US
Supreme Court can be generalized to other court types such as European constitutional
courts. Second, prior work constantly assumes that courts belong among the most
trusted branches of the government. However, this does not hold empirically given the
varying degrees of public support for national high courts worldwide (Gibson, Caldeira
and Baird, 1998). Consequently, the legitimacy-conferring capacity of courts also varies:
very popular courts are expected to have a higher legitimacy-conferring capacity than
unpopular courts. Despite the simplicity of this argument, it has never previously been
tested in a comparative scenario.
I put this theory to the test by comparing the legitimacy-conferring capacity of two
European constitutional courts, namely the French Conseil Constitutionnel (a rather
unpopular court) and the German Federal Constitutional Court (a prime example of a
very popular court). Using several survey experiments in a unique, cross-institutional
comparative design embedded in large, representative surveys in both countries, I find
that the German court can move public opinion into the direction of its decision by
placing its stamp of approval or disapproval on public policies. This effect is sufficiently
strong to even shape the opinions of those who have strong pre-existing attitudes
towards the issue. I attribute this to the broad institutional support for the German
court. By contrast, I find no such legitimacy-conferring capacity for the French Conseil.
The findings of this chapter thus have implications for both our understanding of the
role of constitutional courts in democratic politics and for public opinion formation in
general.
2.2 Court Decisions, Governmental Policy and Legitimacy
Legitimacy is perceived to be the major source of power of courts. While much of the
existing research on court legitimacy focuses on whether citizens agree or disagree
with court decisions and what this implies for the court’s popularity and reputation,
it is also important to consider the reversed causal direction: what effects do judicial
opinions have on public opinion?
Courts are often among the most popular (political) institutions in Western democ-
racies, and they are generally perceived as highly legitimate (Caldeira and Gibson,
1992; Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998; Gibson and Nelson, 2014, 2015). One of the
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consequences of this property is the ability of courts to pass their legitimacy to public
policies. This argument dates back to Dahl (1957), who argues that the US Supreme
Court is a “legitimizer” of majority coalition’s policies. Dahl (1957) argues that this
power stems from the Supreme Courts function as the sole legitimate interpreter and
protector of the constitution (Dahl, 1957, 293). Supreme Court decisions are, therefore,
viewed as credible, legitimate and rightful. This phenomenon is called the “legitimacy-
conferring capacity” of courts. In other words, courts are able to use their diffuse support,
or their “reservoir of goodwill”(Easton, 1965), to induce public (non)-acceptance of
governmental policies via their rulings. This mechanism of changing public opinion
in the direction of an institution’s endorsement is generally known as an “endorsement
effect”. Following Zaller (1992), an endorsement effect is defined as an increase or
decrease in support for a policy that occurs when people learn that a trusted source
supports or does not support the policy (Zaller, 1992, 33). Such an endorsement effect
may manifest either in a “whole” or “soft” opinion change. A “whole” opinion change
occurs when people either change from opposing to favoring a policy, or vice versa,
whereas a “soft” opinion change is only a shift in the degrees of favoring or opposing.
Extensive empirical literature exists on the legitimacy-conferring capacity of the US
Supreme Court and accompanying endorsement effects using different measures and
methods, overall with mixed evidence. Unfortunately, the findings of these studies
depend, at least to some extent, on the nature of the research design. Experimental
studies tend to find relative consistent endorsement effects of Supreme Court decisions
(Hoekstra, 1995; Clawson and Kegler, 2001; Bartels and Mutz, 2009). For instance,
Bartels and Mutz (2009) use a survey experiment to compare the Supreme Court and
the US Congress’s ability to move opinion and find that the court is more influential
than the congress in using its institutional credibility to shape mass opinion. By contrast,
observational studies mostly find no evidence of a legitimacy-conferring capacity of
the Supreme Court (Marshall, 1987; Stoutenborough, Haider-Markel and Allen, 2006;
Hanley, 2008), although sometimes decisions can polarize public opinion (Hoekstra
and Segal, 1996; Johnson and Martin, 1998; Brickman and Peterson, 2006). To further
complicate matters, other observational studies find that Supreme Court decisions only
induce changes in public opinion under certain conditions, such as salient decisions or
salient issues (Christenson and Glick, 2015; Tankard and Paluck, 2017; Christenson and
Glick, 2018; Zilis, 2014), media coverage (Linos and Twist, 2016) or the legitimacy of
lower courts (Gibson and Nelson, 2018).
When looking at other court types such as European “Kelsenian” constitutional
courts, we must recognize that little to nothing is known about the interplay between
court legitimacy and public opinion with respect to these courts. If at all, scholars
have examined the role of public support for constitutional court decision-making in a
separation-of-powers framework (Vanberg, 2001, 2005; Sieberer, 2006; Staton and Van-
berg, 2008; Brouard, 2009; Sternberg et al., 2015). In these studies, the authors examine
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whether constitutional courts have to adjust their decision-making in accordance with
public opinion. They do not investigate the effect of court decisions on public opinion.
Only a few studies explicitly investigate court legitimacy and diffuse support in the
European court context. However, most of these studies are rather descriptive. For
instance, with respect to the GFCC, Vorländer and Schaal (2002) find that the diffuse
support of the GFCC remains constantly high, independent of individual decisions that
might have been against the public will. The outstanding diffuse support of the GFCC,
its strong legitimacy and the resulting role of the GFCC as an “interpretative authority”
of the constitution is also documented in other studies (Vorländer and Brodocz, 2006),
albeit mostly using only anecdotal evidence (Vorländer, 2006). No existing work has
directly tested the legitimacy-conferring capacity of any European constitutional court.
In order to advance our understanding of European constitutional courts and their
importance as a “legitimizer” of public policy, I improve existing work in two directions.
First, to the best of my knowledge, no study exists that analyzes the effect of court
decisions on public opinion outside the US. Therefore, it is unclear whether the (mixed)
findings from the US Supreme Court can be generalized to other court types such as
European constitutional courts. Second, previous studies work under the assumption
that courts enjoy consistently high public support. While this might be true, at least
to some extent, for the Supreme Court (Gibson and Nelson, 2014, 2015), it does not
hold empirically given the varying degrees of public support for national high courts
worldwide (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998). In this chapter, I therefore approach
the question of whether courts can move public opinion from a different angle than
previous studies. The novelty lies in the fact that I do not argue for different conditions
under which changes in public opinion could be induced by court decisions, but instead
I look at a “counter-factual” scenario: what happens to public opinion if a court with
high diffuse support decides on public policy compared with a court with low diffuse
support deciding on the same issue?
My central theoretical claim is the same as in previous studies: constitutional courts
receive their legitimacy-conferring capacity from their perception as the only legitimate
and credible interpreter of the constitution. This legitimacy is therefore grounded in
their diffuse support, and it allows them to move public opinion into their direction by
institutional endorsement. However, I argue that this does not hold ultimately for all
constitutional courts. As Gibson, Caldeira and Baird (1998) note, “national high courts
vary enormously in the degree to which they have achieved institutional legitimacy”
(Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998, 356). These varying degrees of public support (for
an empirical overview, see Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998) should also be considered
theoretically.
For instance, the German court enjoys consistently high public confidence and its
public support often exceeds that of other political institutions (Vanberg, 2005; Vorländer
and Brodocz, 2006). By contrast, there are constitutional courts such as the one of
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Russia or Bulgaria that possesses much lower levels of public support (see Gibson,
Caldeira and Baird (1998), Trochev (2008), and Staton and Vanberg (2008)). The reasons
for such a low institutional legitimacy are manifold. Some courts, for instance those
newly installed during the third wave of democratization, have had little opportunity
to build institutional trust compared to long-established courts such as the US Supreme
Court or courts installed after the Second World War (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998,
345). The legitimacy of other courts, such as the French Constitutional Court, suffers
from a purely politicized appointment process (Hönnige, 2009) and the fact that it
received the power of protecting citizens’ rights rather lately (Brouard, 2009).
If the central argument that the legitimacy-conferring capacity of courts roots in
their legitimacy is correct, then unpopular courts are expected to have a much lower
legitimacy-conferring capacity than popular courts. Therefore, we should be able to
observe endorsement effects, namely people moving in the direction of the institution-
alist endorsement in the context of constitutional courts with high diffuse support, but
not in the context of constitutional courts with low public support. The observable
implication for a popular court is then as follows:
Observable Implication 1: If a constitutional court is popular, then we should observe an
endorsement effect of court decisions, whereby public opinion concerning a governmental policy
should move in the direction of a popular court’s ruling.
Given that it is the institutional legitimacy of courts that gives them their legitimacy-
conferring capacity, there should be no endorsement effect observable in systems with
a court with low diffuse support. The observable implication for such an unpopular
court is then as follows:
Observable Implication 2: If a constitutional court is unpopular, then we should not observe
an endorsement effect of court decisions, whereby public opinion concerning a governmental
policy should not move in the direction of a popular court’s ruling.
Im summary, I improve previous research by considering that not all constitutional
courts possess the same high level of diffuse support. Instead, I argue that the varying
degrees of diffuse support for constitutional courts affect their legitimacy-conferring
capacity, such that courts with high public support are able to change public opinion
while unpopular courts are not.
2.3 Research Design
In this section, I introduce an experimental research design that allows me to test the
two competing observable implications in a comparative setting.
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2.3.1 Case Selection
The case selection of the two constitutional courts in this comparative study is motivated
by the most different system design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, 34). The previous
section outlined that the legitimacy-conferring capacity of constitutional courts depends
on their diffuse support. The implication is that a court with high diffuse support
should have a larger legitimating capacity than a court that is viewed rather negatively
by the public. Therefore, in order to test these two observable implications, the two
courts have to meet the following requirements. First, both constitutional courts must
possess the right of judicial review, because otherwise courts cannot decide about
governmental policies, and the logic of the legitimacy-conferring capacity could not
be applied. Second, and more important, the theoretical argument requires two courts
that considerably vary in their degrees of public support.
For my comparative design I chose the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC)
and the French Conseil Constitutionnel (CC). Both courts have the right to exercise
judicial review (Hönnige, 2009; Brouard and Hönnige, 2017), and thus meet the first
condition. Moreover, the GFCC is a prime example of a constitutional court which
enjoys high public confidence. The GFCC plays an important role in the German
political system, and repeatedly finds itself in the middle of controversial political
conflicts. Its prominence and reputation as the “guardian of the constitution” (Rudzio,
2006, 282) has made it one of the most recognized and respected institutions in German
politics. Indeed, the German court enjoys extremely high support vis-à-vis other
institutions, and its public support consistently exceeds that of the other major German
political institutions (Vanberg, 2005; Vorländer and Brodocz, 2006).
By contrast, the French CC is one of the few constitutional courts in Western Europe
which cannot rely on broad public support as other courts can do. This is mainly due
to three historic reasons. First, the preeminence of parliamentary sovereignty in France
forbade judicial review in the country for a long period (Stone, 1992). It was only
1959 when the CC was effectively set up as the last institution to be created, which
symbolizes its second order status for the designers of the Fifth Republic (Brouard,
2009). Second, the CC was initially thought to limit parliamentary power, not to
protect individual rights.1 This only changed rather lately. As until 2010, any type of
constitutional complaint was not allowed, and therefore citizens were kept at bay from
1Charles Eisenmann, a contemporary law scholar who was very critical of the 1958 constitution, said in
a famous quote that the CC is thought as a “canon pointed on the parliament”. This substantially changed
after the enlargement of the initiation process of constitutional review to Members of the Parliament,
so that the CC had a significant impact on the regulation of the French political system (Brouard and
Hönnige, 2017).
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Figure 2.1 – Comparison of the Institutional Trust in the Constitutional Courts of Germany
and France
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judicial review. Last but not least, the Conseil’s alleged politicization induced by the
appointment process has always hampered its legitimacy(Brouard, 2008).2
Recent numbers confirm this difference in public support. Figure 2.1 shows the
percentage of the mean trust rating of respondents of representative surveys in both
Germany and France on the Y-axis over the range of institutional trust3 on the X-axis.
It is evident that the GFCC enjoys a much higher public support than the CC: the
percentage of respondents at the higher trust levels in Germany is always above the
percentage of respondents in France, and vice versa. In Germany, for instance, every
second respondent (50%) has high or very high trust in the GFCC, while only 28%
have the same trust in the CC. Moreover, while in France more than every fifth (22%)
respondent has no or no trust at all in the CC, only 6% have the same low levels of
2The political appointment process of French constitutional court judges is unique in Europe: “The only
major country without any restrictions to a purely politicized appointment process is France” (Tsebelis,
2002).
3Respondents were asked about their perceived trust in the institutions. See Appendix A.1 for the
exact wording of the trust questions in both surveys and supporting information.
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trust in Germany. These numbers also correspond to the findings of previous studies
(Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998; Vanberg, 2005; Vorländer and Brodocz, 2006).
Moreover, the GFCC is also perceived as significantly more trustworthy compared
with other institutions such as the government (GFCC mean 5.24 compared with
government mean 3.47, p < .01). The level of trust in the CC is also significantly higher
compared to other institutions such as the parliament, but this difference is comparably
smaller (CC mean 4.16 compared with parliament mean 3.68, p < 0.01).
2.3.2 Experimental Design
In order to investigate whether constitutional courts can move mass public opinion,
I use an experimental design embedded in two national, representative surveys in
Germany and France. The exact same experiment was implemented in both countries.
In Germany, the experiment was implemented as part of Wave 26 (November 2016) and
Wave 27 (January 2017) of the German Internet Panel (hereafter GIP). The GIP collects
information on political attitudes and preferences of respondents through bimonthly
longitudinal online panel surveys. Although administered online, all surveys are based
on a random probability sample of face-to-face recruited households from the German
population, which were provided with access to Internet and special computers if
necessary (Blom, Gathmann and Krieger, 2015). Wave 26 and Wave 27 include N =
2,867 registered participants4 and are representative of both the online and offline
population aged 16-75 in Germany.
In France, the experiment was embedded in Wave 16 (July 2017) and Wave 17
(November 2017) of the French National Election Study 2017 (l’enquête électorale française,
hereafter ENEF). ENEF 2017 was a panel survey conducted online by IPSOS. As with
almost all surveys in France, sampling is conducted with a quota method based on
age, gender, occupation, region and type of residential area.5 The experiments were
allocated to a random sub-sample of N = 2, 661 respondents in Wave 16.
In the experimental design, I compare the legitimacy-conferring capacity of the GFCC
and the CC with other political actors. I employ a survey priming experiment where
respondents are provided with a (hypothetical) public policy issue. The proposed
policy in the experiment is a “school security law”. According to this (hypothetical)
school security law, private security companies can equip armed security forces that
are allowed to search students and their lockers. The measure is said to be justified to
prevent the increasing school violence. This issue was chosen for two reasons. First, it is
an issue that could credibly be addressed by the constitutional courts and other political
4For both surveys, respondents who refused to answer or had no opinions on the relevant issues were
eliminated from the sample. These were 9.1% in the GIP and 3.6% in the ENEF.
5See https://www.enef.fr/données-et-résultats/ for more information (accessed 02.05.2019).
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institutions. Second, it is an issue where enough polarization across the respondents
can be expected. This ensures sufficient variation in the outcome variable.
Along with the issue, respondents were randomly assigned to an institutional en-
dorsement manipulation. This manipulation occurred in the form of different political
institutions/actors either stating that they approve or disapprove the school security law.
Overall, I used three different institutions/actors in Germany and two in France. Ac-
cordingly, I am able to compare the legitimacy-conferring capacity of these institutions
vis-à-vis the constitutional courts. In France, I used the CC and a high organizational
school committee called the “Haut Conseil de l’Éducation”. In Germany, I employed,
in line with the French survey, the GFCC and the German equivalent to the school
committee called the “Conference of the Ministers of Education”. Both committees
have consultative character regarding essential knowledge and educational questions,
and could thus credibly express their opinion on a school security law as presented
in the experimental issue. Additionally, the German survey experiment additionally
used the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (in
short, the Data Security Official) in the second wave. A control group received no
endorsement manipulation at all. Overall, the survey experiments thus contains seven
experimental conditions in Germany (3 sources [GFCC, Conference of the Ministers of
Education, and Data Security Official] × 2 arguments [approves or disapproves] + 1
control group = 7) and five experimental conditions in the French survey experiment
(2 sources [CC,Haut Conseil de l’Éducation] × 2 arguments [approves or disapproves]
+ 1 control group = 5). Appendix A.2 includes further details about the wording of
the endorsement manipulations and measurement of variables. After the experimental
manipulation, respondents were asked to give their opinion on such a school security
law on a five-point scale, ranging from “fully disagree” to “fully agree”.
The chosen experimental design provides several methodological strengths for as-
sessing the legitimacy-conferring capacity of the different institutions. First, because
it contains a true control group which did not receive any institutional endorsement
manipulation, I have a reasonable baseline for comparison. Any systematic shift in
opinion away from the control group can be attributed to the legitimacy-conferring
capacity of either institutional source. This is an advantage compared with some of the
existing experimental studies (e.g. Hoekstra, 1995; Clawson and Kegler, 2001), which
did not include a control group. Second, the data quality and size of the survey ex-
periments are superior to other experimental studies, which mainly rely on laboratory
studies involving student samples (Baas and Thomas, 1984; Hoekstra, 1995). Having
the same experimental design administered in national representative mass surveys
in two countries increases the external validity of my study, while internal validity
remains high. Moreover, the panel design of both surveys in Germany and France
enables me to add additional variables ex post if required; for instance about certain
attitudes or issue preferences asked in earlier or later waves.
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2.4 Results of the Survey Experiments
Due to the categorical, ordered nature of the dependent variable, I use an ordered probit
model to analyze the experimental data.6 In order to ease the result presentation and
further analyses, the originally five-point scale dependent variable was recoded into
a three-point scale variable with three ordered categories, namely disagree, indifferent
and agree.7 For the German analysis, I aggregate both GIP waves into one data set
to increase computational efficiency. Because the respondent’s answers are then no
longer independent, the standard errors are clustered by respondents in the German
analysis. In the robustness section later, a variety of alternative models is estimated
to demonstrate that the results also hold when the original five-point scale dependent
variable is used or when the German data is not aggregated. A detailed outline of
the estimation strategy is available in Appendix A.4. In Appendix A.3, I also give a
descriptive overview about the distribution of attitudes towards the school security
law across German and French respondents. The main differences between the two
countries is that the majority of the German respondents opposes the proposed school
security law (57%), whereas the majority of French respondents supports it (48%).
For both countries, I estimate a simple ordered probit model with the three-point
scale ordered respondent’s opinion on the school security law as the dependent variable
and each experimental treatment group as a dummy independent variable. The control
group is used as the reference category. The simplicity of the model derives from the
experimental design with the random assignment of the respondents to the treatment
groups.
Figure 2.2 reports the ordered probit results from both countries. The respective
regression tables are in Appendix A.5. For Germany, there is a statistically significant
effect8 of both GFCC endorsements. This means that compared with the control
group, the GFCC approving or disapproving the school security law leads to a positive
or negative, statistically significant change in public opinion. This is exactly what
Observable Implication 1 predicts: due to its reputation as a credible and legitimate
interpreter of the constitution, the GFCC is able to confer legitimacy by placing its
stamp of approval or disapproval on the governmental policy.
The German national expert bodies do not have the same legitimacy-conferring capac-
ity as the GFCC. If the Data Security Official approves or disapproves the governmental
policy, we observe a shift of public opinion in the corresponding direction, but these
6Ordered probit models require the proportional odds assumption. A likelihood-ratio test of whether
the coefficients are equal across categories shows that this assumption is not violated.
7The two highest (agree and fully agree) and the two lowest (fully disagree and agree) categories are
summarized into agree and disagree, respectively.
8Statistically significant indicates a statistically significant effect on the conventional levels of statistical
significance (p < 0.05, two-sided test) through the following section, if not stated otherwise.
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effects are not statistically significant. With respect to the Conference of the Ministers
of Education, we see that both coefficients are negative, indicating that independent
of whether the Minister of Education approves or disapproves the school security
law, respondents dislike this policy. However, only the coefficient for the Minister of
Education disapproving the law is statistically significant. In summary, the survey
experiment in Germany shows that an endorsement by the GFCC indeed leads public
opinion to move in the corresponding direction.
In the analysis of the French experiment, both CC treatment coefficients show the
expected direction (a positive effect for the CC approving and a negative effect for the
CC disapproving the governmental policy), but both coefficients are not statistically
significant (p > 0.10). This means that in contrast to its German counter-part, the
French constitutional court does not possess about the same legitimacy-conferring
capacity. Therefore, an endorsement of the CC does not lead to a change in public
opinion in either direction. Again, this is exactly what Observable Implication 2 predicts:
if a constitutional court is unpopular (such as the CC), then we should not observe
public opinion moving into the direction of this unpopular court’s ruling, and thus
there are no endorsement effects. With respect to the Haut Conseil de l’Éducation,
there is a statistically significant positive effect for the Haut Conseil approving the
school security law, but no significant effect for the Haut Conseil disapproving a law.
This is an interesting finding, as it suggests that the Haut Conseil at least partially
occupies a larger legitimacy-conferring capacity than the CC. In summary, the survey
experiment in France shows that the French constitutional court does not possess the
same legitimacy-conferring capacity as the GFCC.
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Figure 2.2 – Ordered Probit Regression Results of Survey Experiments in Germany and France
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(a) Results for Germany
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(b) Results for France
Note: This figure shows the estimates of the ordered probit regression for the survey experiment in both Germany and France. The points represent the ordered probit point
estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The intercepts (cut points) are omitted. Standard errors for coefficients are clustered by
respondents in the German analysis. See Appendix A.5 for the corresponding regression tables.
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In order to evaluate the substantive relevance of the results, I calculate quantities
of interests using simulations9 (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). This allows me to
provide substantial interpretations of the effect magnitudes.10 I only present results
for the German analysis. The simulations using the French data confirmed that
there is no statistically significant legitimacy-conferring effect of the CC. Because
the presentation of simulation outcomes of ordered probit models is not as straight
forward as it is for standard probit models, I use so-called “parallel coordinate plots”
to visualize the simulation results. Parallel coordinate plots allow me to visualize the
probabilities of all three response categories simultaneously. This is important, because
in ordered probit models the probabilities of each outcome are not independent. An
alternative visualization using more commonly employed ”ternary plots” (King, Tomz
and Wittenberg, 2000, 358) is available in Appendix A.6.
The parallel coordinate plot on the left side of Figure 2.3 shows 1,000 simulated ex-
pected values for a respondent in the control group (black lines) and a respondent who
received the endorsement that the GFCC approves the school security law (grey lines).
The expected values are predicted probabilities across the three outcome categories
(which sum to one). Each line in the plot corresponds to one draw of the simulation,
whereby the spread of these lines represents the uncertainty of the estimates. For the
simulations, only the respective experimental dummy (control group, GFCC approve
treatment) is set to one and all other dummies of the model are set to zero.
The simulation results show that even if respondents receive the treatment that the
GFCC approves the school security law, the probability of disagreeing remains relatively
high (because the black and gray lines are still closely located on the upper end of the
scale). However, we can also observe an decrease in the probability of disagreeing, as
the gray lines are located below the black control group lines for the disagree category
and the other way around for the agree category. To illustrate, respondents in the
control group have, on average, a 57% predicted probability of disagreeing with the
school security law, a 9% probability of being indifferent and a 34% probability of
agreeing. By contrast, respondents who received the GFCC approves endorsement
have on average a probability of 52% of disagreeing, 9% of being indifferent and 39%
of agreeing.
In order to better understand this relationship, I plot the corresponding first difference
between the predicted probabilities of the control group and the GFCC approves
endorsement group on the right side of Figure 2.3. The first difference shows that
9Simulations for France were carried out using the Zelig ordered probit implementation (Venables and
Ripley, 2011). For Germany, an own implementation was used because to date, Zelig does not include an
option for clustered standard errors.
10Note that using the experimental data, you obtain the same results independent of using the “observed
value” or “average case” approach. This is because for the simulations, just the experimental dummy
variables are varied (set to either zero or one). There is no need to fix other covariates at their mean or
another arbitrary value.
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when switching from the control group to the group where respondents received
the treatment that the GFCC approves the law, the probability of agreeing with the
school security law increases by about 5 (±.2) percentage points on average, while the
probability of disagreeing decreases by about 5 (±.2) percentage points. It also becomes
more likely to be indifferent. All first differences of these effects are significantly
different from zero at the 95% level.
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Figure 2.3 – Predicted Probabilities and First Difference of Control Group and GFCC Approves Endorsement
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Note: Parallel coordinate plot of the simulated predicted probabilities for the school security law. N of simulation = 1, 000. The probabilities are calculated by setting the respective
dummy (control group and GFCC approves) of the model to one and all other dummies to zero. Each line represents one draw of the simulations. Simulations are based on the
ordered probit model of Table A.1 in Appendix A.5.
Right side: First differences between the predicted probabilities of the control group and the GFCC approves treatment group from the same simulation. The points represent the
first difference point estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals.33
2.4. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY EXPERIMENTS
Figure 2.4 plots the simulation results for the difference between the control group
(black lines) and the group which received the GFCC disapproves endorsement (gray
lines). Looking at the parallel coordinate plot on the left side of the figure, we see that
the predicted probabilities of the simulated outcomes for respondents who received
the GFCC disapproves endorsement are located above the outcomes of the control
group for the disagree category and below for the agree category. This means that
respondents who received the GFCC disapproves endorsement have a higher predicted
probability of disagreeing with the school security law than respondents of the control
group. In fact, the probability of disagreeing of respondents in the treatment group
is 63%, compared with 57% in the control group. The right side of Figure 2.4 shows
that this difference is also statistically significant at the 95% level. Switching from
the control group to the group where respondents received the treatment that the
GFCC disapproves the law increases the probability of disagreeing by a about 5 (± .1)
percentage points on average, while the probability of agreeing decreases by about 5
±.2) percentage points.
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Figure 2.4 – Predicted Probabilities and First Differences of Control and GFCC Disapproves Treatment
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Note: Left Side: Parallel coordinate plot of the simulated predicted probabilities for the school security law. N of simulation = 1, 000. Expected values are calculated by setting
the respective dummy (control group and GFCC disapproves) of the model to one and all other dummies to zero. Each line represents one draw of the simulations. Simulations
based on the ordered probit model of Table A.1 in Appendix A.5.
Right side: First differences between the predicted probabilities of the control group and the GFCC approves treatment group from the same simulation. The points represent the
first difference point estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals.35
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Are these substantial changes, given that the GFCC endorsements “only” lead to a five
percentage points change in the predicted probability of either agreeing or disagreeing
with the school security law? I argue that there are nonetheless at least three reasons
to consider this a substantial effect. First, although the absolute change seems small,
it should be considered that this is the aggregate change in opinion. Previous studies
demonstrate that it is difficult to detect an aggregate change in opinion, because issue
polarization can lead different sub-groups of the sample to move in different directions.
This, in turn, can cancel out observable opinion change effects on the aggregate-level
(e.g. see Christenson and Glick, 2015). Second, most of the German respondents rather
disagree with the school security law. This makes it a hard-case scenario to test the
legitimacy-conferring capacity of the GFCC, and the found endorsement effects are
rather conservative estimates. Finally, my experimental manipulations only comprise
one added sentence to the described case context. Other studies might find larger
effects, but also employ more profound endorsement manipulations. Some authors
provide, for instance, detailed court reasonings and arguments against or in favor of the
governmental policies (Hoekstra, 1995; Bartels and Mutz, 2009), while others offer news
storylines that include counter-narratives to the court’s ruling (Zilis, 2014). Moreover,
the observed “soft” change in public opinion corresponds with the findings of previous
studies. Using a similar survey experiment, Bartels and Mutz (2009) e.g. find that
“the institutional endorsements generally soften respondents’ existing positions in the
direction of the institution’s decision, but do not often wholly change them from
opposition to advocacy” (Bartels and Mutz, 2009, 259).
2.4.1 Pre-existing attitudes and the Court’s Legitimacy-conferring Capacity
The previous analyses show that the GFCC as a popular constitutional court is capable
of moving public opinion in the direction of its decision at the aggregate level due to
its legitimacy-conferring capacity, while the CC is unable to do so. However, do these
effects also hold at the individual level, and how strong are they? In this section, I
therefore seek to investigate whether constitutional courts have the power to overcome
preexisting attitudes and induce opinion change even among those who are initially
either strongly in favor or against the governmental policy.
Individuals do not form their opinion in a vacuum. Instead, they have pre-existing
attitudes which might lead them to support – or not support – a policy’s goal. It is
widely accepted that people develop their policy preferences using their party identifi-
cation as a heuristic (Downs, 1957; Campbell et al., 1960; Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 2002).
In the early work of Campbell et al. (1960), for instance, they note that “identification
with a party raises a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what
is favorable to his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960, 133). Later work in this
area confirms that partisan attitudes are powerful cues for citizens to evaluate which
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candidate or party they should support (Lodge and Hamill, 1986; Rahn, 1995; Bartels,
2002).
I use the existence of these pre-existing attitudes to investigate whether the GFCC’s
legitimacy-conferring capacity is sufficiently strong to even change the opinion of those
who hold strong prior attitudes with respect to the school security law. I expect that the
very popular German Federal Constitutional Court is able to confer legitimacy to the
school security law, namely to induce at least a “soft” opinion change among those who
either strongly support or oppose the governmental policy. In the same line, I expect
that the French CC, a court that is viewed rather negatively by the public, should not
be able to induce such an opinion change.
I approximate the pre-existing attitudes of the respondents towards the school security
law via their party affiliation.11 Figure 2.5 plots the distribution of the respondents
opinion on the school security law over different party affiliations in Germany and
France. Only the respondents in the control group are analyzed, so that their opinion
is “honest” and not manipulated by the endorsements. When looking at the German
respondents, we observe that partisans of the right-wing party Alternative for Germany
(AfD) are supportive towards the proposed school security law, while, for instance,
members of the Greens strongly oppose such a law. Therefore, I use members of the
AfD and members of the Greens to test the legitimacy-conferring capacity of the GFCC
at the individual level. If the GFCC is truly perceived as a highly legitimate institution,
then the endorsement of the GFCC disapproving the law should shift AfD-partisans
(who initially support, namely agree with such a law) towards more disagreement, and
vice versa for the Greens. This would be additional evidence in favor of the outstanding
legitimating power of the GFCC.
When looking at the French respondents, we observe that partisans of the right-wing
Front National12 (National Front) and the Republicans (Les Républicains) exhibit strong
support for the school security law, while, for instance, members of the Socialist Party
(Parti Socialiste) oppose such a policy. However, in contrast to the GFCC, I do not
expect that an endorsement by the CC leads these party members to shift their opinion
in direction of the CC’s endorsement. This is due to the low public support and
institutional legitimacy of the CC.
In order to test these implications, I run additional ordered probit models where I
include an interaction between the experimental groups and the party affiliation. Four
separate models are run: one for AfD-partisans and one for Green-partisans using
11The party affiliation of respondents is measured via an opinion poll on their voting preferences. For
German respondents, this information is included in the core study of the GIP in Wave 25 (September
2016). The information about the party affiliation of the French respondents is taken from Wave 15 of the
ENEF (June 2017).
12The party changed its name to National Rally (Rassemblement National) in June 2018. The time the
French survey was conducted it was still named Front National, which is why I stick to this name in the
text.
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Figure 2.5 – Support for the School Security Law over Party Affiliations in Germany and France
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Note: This figure shows the distribution of the support for the school security law over party identification in
Germany and France. Each point represents a single respondent (in each cell, little random noise is added to
improve the visualization). N = 1, 039 in Germany, N = 521 in France. The evaluation is based on the control
groups to avoid that institutional endorsement effects bias the respondent’s opinion. Jitter inside each cell is
randomly added for a better visualization.
the German sample, and one for Socialist Party partisans and one for National Rally
partisans using the French data. Party affiliation is incorporated via a dummy which
indicates whether someone is affiliated to the corresponding party (= 1) or not (= 0).
Appendix A.7 provides the corresponding regression tables.
Simulations are used again to provide a substantial interpretation of the results. The
left side of Figure 2.6 plots the first differences of the predicted probabilities for Green
partisans in the control group and Green partisans who received the GFCC approves
endorsement.13 I find that Greens have a 20 percentage points higher probability to
disagree with the school security law than non-Green partisans, just looking at the
results of the baseline model (not included in the graph). Nonetheless, Green partisans’
opinions are affected by the court’s ruling. A Green partisan in the control group has
an 80% (±.4) probability of disagreeing with the school security law. However, this
probability decreases by about 8 (±.8) percentage points on average when a Green
partisan receives the endorsement that the GFCC approves the school security law. This
first difference is statistically significant at the 90% level.
13For the simulation scenarios, this means that the control group dummy and the Green partisan
dummy are set to one and all other dummies to zero. For the second scenario, all dummies but the GFCC
disapproves dummy and the Green partisan dummy are set to 0.
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Figure 2.6 – Effect of GFCC Endorsement on Partisans of the AfD and Greens
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(a) FD Green-partisans
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(b) FD AfD-partisans
Note: This figure shows the effect of GFCC endorsement on partisans of the Greens and the AfD. The first differences are calculated based on a simulation with N = 1, 000
draws. The first difference on the left is the difference in the predicted probabilities of a Green partisan in the control group and the GFCC approves treatment group.
The first difference on the right is the difference between an AfD partisan in the control group and the GFCC disapproves treatment group. The points represent the first
difference point estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The corresponding regression tables are in Appendix A.7.
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Figure 2.7 – Effect of CC Endorsement on Partisans of the Socialist Party and the Front National
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(a) FD Socialist Party-partisans
l
l
l
−0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
Probability of 
 agreeing
Probability of 
 being indifferent
Probability of 
 disagreeing
FD Front National−Partisans 
 Control Group/CC Disapproves
(b) FD Front National-partisans
Note: This figure shows the effect of GFCC endorsement on partisans of the Socialist Party and the Front National. The first differences are calculated based on a simulation
with N = 1, 000 draws. The first difference on the left is the difference in the predicted probabilities of a Socialist Party-supporter in the control group and the CC approves
treatment group. The first difference on the right is the difference between a Front National-supporter in the control group and the CC disapproves treatment group. The
points represent the first difference point estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The corresponding regression tables are in
Appendix A.7.
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The same effect is also observable for AfD partisans, albeit in the opposite direction
(right side of Figure 2.6). An AfD partisan in the control group has a 65% (±.5)
probability of agreeing with the school security law. However, this changes when
AfD partisans are exposed to the treatment where the GFCC disapproves the law.
When receiving the treatment that the GFCC disapproves the law, the probability of
disagreeing with the school security law increases by about 15 (±.7) percentage points
on average. This first difference is statistically significant at the 95% level.
I conduct a similar analysis for the CC looking at respondents who are affiliated
to the National Rally and the Socialists. The results are displayed in Figure 2.7. As
expected, neither partisans of the Socialist Party nor of the National Rally are affected
by the institutional endorsement of the CC. This means that in contrast to the GFCC,
the French constitutional court does not possess sufficient legitimating power to move
respondents with strong prior attitudes in the direction of its decisions.
My analyses show that the legitimacy-conferring capacity of the GFCC is sufficiently
strong to even overcome strong pre-existing attitudes of individuals on the micro-
level. The German court is capable of shifting individuals’ positions in the direction
of its decision, even if these initially have diverging preferences. This is particular
strong evidence in favor of the perception of the GFCC and its judges as an extremely
legitimate institution. In Appendix A.8.1, I further elaborate on both the GFCC’s
and the CC’s diffuse support across different party affiliations. In short, whereas the
majority of the French respondents, independent of their party affiliation, hold rather
indifferent or even more negative views towards the CC, the GFCC enjoys substantial
support across the entire political spectrum. This is additional evidence in favor of the
outstanding popularity of the GFCC and its distinguished role in the political system
of Germany. Especially the findings concerning the AfD partisans are remarkable,
as the party leadership of the AfD recently started to verbally attack the GFCC after
it has rejected an AfD’s application against the refugee policy of the government as
inadmissible.14 This offers an promising initial point for follow-up studies which
should investigate why individuals who intend to vote for the AfD nevertheless trust
the GFCC sufficiently to follow its opinion leadership.
2.4.2 Institutional Trust and the Court’s Legitimacy-Conferring Capacity
I have argued that the observed differences in the legitimacy-conferring capacity
of the German and the French constitutional courts are due to varying degrees of
public support. I documented the different levels of public support by means of the
institutional trust of respondents in Figure 2.1, and showed that the GFCC is in fact
14See https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2018/
bvg18-087.html;jsessionid=9B4059135C36B058F13BCA005CB00895.2_cid394, accessed 02.05.2019, for
more information on the decision.
41
2.4. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY EXPERIMENTS
considerably more trusted than the French CC. Following this argument, I develop an
additional observable implication that aims to disentangle the relationship of public
support and the court’s legitimacy-conferring capacity in further detail.
If the differences in the legitimacy-conferring capacity between the two courts are
due to different levels of trust, respondents with low levels of institutional trusts should
not perceive the respective court as a legitimate actor. Therefore, the institutional
endorsement should not or only weakly affect such respondents, independent of
whether the endorsing institution is the French or the German court. By contrast,
someone who trusts the court also perceives it as legitimate and is therefore expected
to be affected by the institutional endorsement. The observable implication is thus as
follows: if it is truly institutional trust and resulting legitimacy that decides about the
efficiency of court endorsement effects, then respondents with a high level of trust in
the respective court should have a higher probability to follow the court endorsement
than those with only low levels of trust, independent of whether they are German or
French. In other words, if two respondents, one with a high level of trust and one with
a low level of trust, are endorsed, then the endorsement should affect the respondent
with high trust more strongly than the respondent with low trust.
This argument is tested by looking at the treatment groups which received the dis-
agreement endorsements comparing respondents with low levels of trust to respondents
with high levels of trust in these groups.15 If trust plays an important role, we should
observe significant differences between the two groups. In particular, respondents with
high levels of trust should have a higher probability of disagreeing with the school
security law (because this is the direction of the endorsement) than those who do not
trust the court at all. This should hold true in both countries.
15This was tested using simulations again (N = 1, 000). In order to calculate the quantity of interests, I
include an interaction between the experimental groups and the trust variable. In order to compute the
first differences, I set the dummy for the disagreement endorsement to one and all other experimental
group dummies to zero, and varied the trust level between very low levels of trust (= 1) and very high
levels of trust (= 7). See Appendix A.8 for more details.
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Figure 2.8 – First differences between Low Trust/High Trust Respondents in Germany and France, Disapproval Endorsement
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Note: Left Side: First Difference (FD) between French respondents with low trust and high trust who received the CC disapproves endorsement. N of simulation = 1, 000.
First Differences are calculated by setting the respective endorsement dummy to one and all other dummies to zero. Trust was varied between low (= 1) and high (= 7).
Simulations based on an ordered probit model including the interaction of the experimental treatment groups and respondent’s trust (Appendix A.8). The points represent
the first difference point estimates and the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals.
Right side: First Difference (FD) between German respondents with low trust and high trust who received the GFCC disapproves endorsement. The simulation is carried
out following the same logic than in the French case.
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Figure 2.8 shows the first differences between respondents with high and low trust
levels who received the CC or GFCC disapproval endorsement. With respect to the
French court (left side), we observe that respondents who have high trust in the court,
and thus potentially perceive it as a legitimate actor, have an about 12 percentage points
higher probability of disagreeing with the school security law than respondents who
have only a very low trust in the court. Thus, the endorsement effect is considerably
stronger among those who have confidence in the court than among those who have not.
This is a remarkable change: respondents with low levels of trust have a 50% probability
to agree with the school security law and only a 35% probability of disagreeing,
although they received the endorsement that the CC disapproves the law. Thus, for
these respondents the most likely outcome is to agree, and the treatment does not seem
to work. A change of 12 percentage points means that with high levels of trust, the
most likely choice of the respondents is now to disagree (47% probability to disagree,
38% probability to agree), which is in line the CC endorsement. This difference is
statistically significant at the 90% level.
We observe the same pattern, but even stronger when looking at the German court
(on the right side of the figure). Respondents who have high trust in the GFCC have a
36 percentage points higher probability of disagreeing with the school security law than
those with only low levels of trust. This is a strong effect: respondents who do not trust
the court have a probability of 53% of agreeing (and only 38% of disagreeing) with the
school security. Thus, they behave in the opposite direction as the court endorsement
suggests. Perceiving the court as legitimate leads respondents to entirely change their
mind about the school security law, as the probability of disagreeing is now 74% (and
only 20% for agreeing).
The analysis of the interaction between court endorsement and varying levels of
trust confirms that institutional trust plays an important role in the perception of
courts as legitimate actors. Even in the French data, where there is no evidence of a
legitimacy-conferring effect of the CC on the aggregate level, I find that those who
perceive the CC as legitimate react to the CC’s endorsement.
2.4.3 Test of Model Assumptions and Robustness Checks
In this section I report five different robustness and diagnostic tests. In the first
robustness test, I check whether the joint estimation of both GIP waves (in November
2016 and January 2017) affects the results (see Table A.10 and Table A.11 in the
Appendix). Using only the data of Wave 26, the coefficient for the GFCC disapproves
endorsement is barely not statistically significant (p = .14, two-sided test), and in Wave
27 the FCC approves endorsement is just not significant (p = .11). All other effects are
similar to the aggregated analysis.
For the second diagnostic test, I explore the effect of potential individual heterogene-
ity. Previous research shows that with respect to an individual’s legitimacy perception,
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knowledge about the constitutional court can introduce heterogeneity (e.g. Hoekstra,
2000; Sen, 2017). If the legitimating power of the constitutional courts systematically
differs depending on how knowledgeable respondents are, then an individual’s knowl-
edge should be taken into account. In order to test this, I use two questions in the
surveys which measure the respondent’s knowledge about the courts. I find the same
patterns than in the main analysis, independent of how knowledgeable respondents
are (see Appendix A.9.4 for more details).
In the third robustness check, I assess whether the school security law as governmental
policy presented in the experiment might alter the results. Respondents have (in both
Germany and France) a rather negative opinion towards such a policy. In order to test
whether the findings are dependent on the choice of governmental policy, a similar
experiment was implemented in Wave 16 of the ENEF again, but this time another
governmental policy issue was chosen (a potential increase of the retirement age). Using
this data, I am able to replicate my findings from the initial experiments: even when
considering a different policy, the French CC has no legitimacy-conferring capacity.
In the fourth robustness test, I replicate the main analyses again but this time I use
the original five-point scale of the respondent’s opinion on the school security law as
dependent variable instead of the recoded three-point scale (Table A.13 and A.12 in the
Appendix). Using the original five-point scale does not alter the results. In fact, in the
German analysis the effects become more profound.
In the fifth and last robustness check, I evaluate whether the people’s trust in court
rating might be affected by the treatment group they received. This could be possible
because the trust rating in the GIP was asked after the experimental manipulation in
the form of the institutional endorsement. If the treatment and the trust-rating are not
independent, then the previous analyses would suffer from the problem of endogeneity.
However, t-tests of the trust rating individuals in each experimental group provide
insignificant results. This shows that there are no statistically significant differences in
the trust ratings of respondents receiving different institutional endorsements.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have tackled the question of whether constitutional courts can change
public opinion by endorsing a certain policy position. Scholars have long debated
whether courts have a legitimacy-conferring capacity and can move public opinion by
placing their stamp of approval or disapproval on a certain public policy. The answer
to this question is yes, but my results show that specifying the conditions under which
one should expect opinion changes is more complex than previously thought. My
comparative analysis of respondents in Germany and France demonstrates that the
legitimacy-conferring capacity of constitutional courts is highly depended on their
institutional reputation and thus, their legitimacy. The GFCC, a court that enjoys
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considerably high public support, is capable of moving public opinion in the direction
of its decisions. This effect is so powerful that even respondents with strong pre-existing
attitudes are affected. By contrast, the French CC, a rather unpopular court, does not
possess the same legitimacy-conferring capacities. Regardless of whether it approves or
disapproves a public policy, I find no evidence of a shift in respondent’s opinion.
These findings have important implications at large for both our understanding of
the role of constitutional courts in democratic politics and for public opinion formation
in general. What is known from the US Supreme Court does not hold unconditionally
for all European constitutional courts. The legitimacy-conferring capacity of courts is
highly dependent on their institutional legitimacy and thus, their diffuse support. This
aspect should be considered within the concept of comparative politics.
My work also opens up new avenues for further research. Because survey experiments
are often criticized with respect to their external validity, it is necessary that additional
studies confirm the experimental evidence with observational data, for instance from a
panel where respondents are asked before and after a (landmark) decision takes place.
Furthermore, future studies should take into account different salient and non-salient
public policies, the role of the media as a mediator of how the public learns about a
decision or how individuals form their attitudes when they have access to competing
arguments. Finally, further research is required to disentangle the causal mechanisms of
how public support and institutional legitimacy translate into the legitimacy-conferring
capacity of constitutional courts.
46
CHAPTER 3
The Automatic Detection of Vague Language in
Constitutional Court Decisions
3.1 Introduction
Vague language is a common phenomenon in political communication. It is used as
a communicative strategy in the relationship between the mass public and political
actors. For instance, vague language can be strategically used to increase the flexibility
of future policy actions (see Alesina and Cukierman, 1990; Marschall and McKee,
2002; Meirowitz, 2005; Eichorst and Lin, 2019). Moreover, vague language may be
used in contexts where information verification is costly, and being incorrect might
be connected to paying reputation costs (e.g. Chortareas, Stasavage and Sterne, 2002).
Third, and most important for this chapter and this dissertation, vague language can
be used as a strategic tool to influence the behavior of other (political) actors.
The argument of vague language as a strategic tool also appears in work on judicial
politics (Staton and Vanberg, 2008; Owens and Wedeking, 2011; Owens, Wedeking
and Wohlfarth, 2013; Corley and Wedeking, 2014; Cross and Pennebaker, 2014; Black
et al., 2016a,b). Staton and Vanberg (2008) for instance argue that judges use vague
language strategically to leverage the policy expertise of other actors or hide likely
legislative non-compliance from the public. Others argue that judges strategically vary
the clarity of their decisions when they rule contrary to public opinion in an effort to
maintain public support as best as they can (Black et al., 2016a). Related to this, other
authors show that judges strategically obfuscate their opinion language to circumvent
unfavorable responses from political branches (Owens, Wedeking and Wohlfarth, 2013).
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Unfortunately, although vague language plays an important role in (theoretical)
political science literature in general and research on judicial politics in particular, the
discipline lacks the appropriate tools to automatically1 detect vague language in applied
work. The reason for this situation is mainly the lack of appropriate data and that
computer linguists only recently became interested in interdisciplinary work on this
topic.2
Motivated by this gap, the goal of this chapter is to develop a measure for vague language
in written decisions of the German and French constitutional court. I propose two different
methodological approaches. The first approach is a dictionary approach and relies
on word embeddings to expand a widely used general vagueness dictionary (the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary, hereafter LIWC) to the legal domain.
In the second approach, I benchmark a set of machine learning algorithms to develop
a binary sentence classifier that is able to classify sentences of GFCC decisions into
vague and not vague. For the training, I use a novel self-collected data set consisting
of over 3,500 sentences. I find that both approaches are able to automatically detect
vague language in written court decisions and provide valid and robust measures of a
decision’s linguistic vagueness. Moreover, my benchmark tests show that both methods
outperform the generic LIWC dictionary approach. My results thus have implications
for both scholars of social science and computational linguistics.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first discuss the concept of linguistic vagueness in
the legal context and provide a brief overview of related work on linguistic vagueness
detection in both the social sciences and the computational linguistics literature. I
then propose two different methodological approaches for measuring vague language
and apply them to decisions of the German and French constitutional court. I finally
demonstrate the validity of the new measures and discuss several avenues for further
research.
3.2 Related Work and Challenges
This section gives a brief overview of the classification task by defining the concept
of linguistic vagueness in the context of constitutional court decisions. In particular, I
introduce the concept of judicial policy implementation vagueness and provide an overview
of the detection of linguistic vagueness in the field of social science and computational
linguistics.
1Automatically here refers to methodological approaches which require little or no direct human
intervention for the vagueness classification.
2Notable exceptions include Štajner et al. (2016), Štajner et al. (2017) and Theil, Štajner and Stucken-
schmidt (2018b).
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3.2.1 Linguistic Vagueness in Judicial Decisions
The computational linguistics literature distinguishes between ambiguity and vagueness.
These two concepts are not equivalent. An expression is ambiguous if it has two or
more distinct denotations – that is, if it is associated with more than one region of a
meaning space. A standard example is the word “bank”, which can denote the rim of a
river or a financial institution (Poscher, 2012, 2). By contrast, an expression is vague
if the region it denotes does not have perfectly well-defined boundaries. A simple
example of a vague word is “tall”. It is unclear what exactly constitutes a “tall” person.
Someone who might be considered “tall” on the street might not be considered tall in a
basketball team. Even if you state that a person of 185 centimeters is considered tall,
then would a person of 184 centimeters not be considered tall?
As noted in Štajner et al. (2017), when social scientists speak about vagueness, they
actually mean linguistic hedging. Linguistic hedging is an umbrella term for the use of
speculative, uncertain or vague language3, and is defined as “any linguistic means used
to indicate either a) a lack of complete commitment to the truth value of an accompany-
ing proposition, or b) a desire not to express that commitment categorically” (Hyland,
1998, 1). These so-called “hedges”4 are words “whose job is to make things fuzzier
or less fuzzy” (Lakoff, 1973, 471). Put differently, hedges related to the intentional
use of certain words or terms to modify the information content or range of possible
interpretation in a sentence. Eichorst and Lin (2019) refer to this as the “intentional
feature of word choice that modifies and scales this range” (Eichorst and Lin, 2019, 17).
In consideration of the definition of hedging and the particular context of constitu-
tional court decisions, I introduce a new concept called “judicial policy implementation
vagueness”. I define judicial policy implementation vagueness as a particular form of
hedging in the context of court decisions and as the intentional choice of words or terms
that give the legislator a wide decision leeway and room to maneuver in how it can implement a
court decision. The following two statements in court decisions illustrate how judicial
policy implementation vagueness appears in the context of court rulings (German
original below):
The decision leeway of the legislator allows for different regulatory mechanisms.5
(1 BVL 1/98, GFCC in the context of unemployment benefits 2000; own translation)
3The terminology of linguistic hedging is not used consistently even in the computational linguistics
literature. For instance, in the context of academic writing and the biomedical domain, sentences with
hedges are referred to as speculative sentences.
4Hedges are also called “weasel words”, e.g. in the context of Wikipedia articles. Contributors and
editors of Wikipedia are encouraged to tag these weasel words in articles for further improvement.
5Original quote in German “Der gesetzgeberische Gestaltungsraum lässt hier verschiedene
Regelungsmöglichkeiten zu.”
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It is the responsibility of the legislator to differentiate the cases of medically indicated
and not medically indicated abortion.6
(BVerfGE 39, 1, GFCC in the context of the abortion decision 1974; own translation)
Both statements contain several hedges (shown in bold), for instance: it is the
“decision leeway of the legislator” that allows for “different regulatory mechanisms”,
and it is the “responsibility of the legislator” to differentiate cases of medical indicated
and not indicated abortion. In both cases, the GFCC attributes the legislator a wide
room to maneuver and gives it large freedom in how the actual implementation of the
decision could look like.
Court decisions are different to other (political) text data such as Tweets, party
manifestos or speech texts. Three properties are important regarding the measurement
of vagueness. First, court decisions are, in general, rather long texts with a complex
structure. Decisions of the GFCC, for instance, have an average length of 5,232 words
(embedded in 316 sentences) and decisions of the French CC have an average length of
2,234 words (in 36 sentences). This makes it challenging to detect hedges or sentences
with hedges given these long texts. Second, any measurement strategy must consider
that the probability of observing judicial policy implementation vagueness is not the
same across different text sections in a decision. Often, a considerable part of a decision
body contains a detailed summary of a decision’s context (e.g. the different stages of
appeal), the legal framework of a law, and a description of the plaint. In these text
sections, it is rather unlikely to observe judicial policy implementation vagueness. This
is why they must be excluded from the measurement. Third, hedges that are common
in other domains such as Wikipedia articles or scientific abstracts might not be a useful
indicator of hedging in court rulings. This is because different domains often use
domain-specific language, and any measurement strategy must account for that.
3.2.2 Linguistic Vagueness in Social Sciences and Computational Linguis-
tics
In this section, I will discuss related work in the social sciences, legal scholarship
and the computational linguistics literature and demonstrate that the appropriate
measurement of judicial policy implementation vagueness requires new and innovative
methodological approaches.
Related Work in Social Science and Legal Scholarship
The systematic and automatic detection of vague language in (written) texts is still
in its infancy in the social sciences. The majority of studies, for instance in political
6Original quote in German: “Es ist Sache des Gesetzgebers, die Fälle des indizierten und des nicht
indizierten Schwangerschaftsabbruchs näher voneinander abzugrenzen.”
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discourse analysis, rely on qualitative approaches, extensively studying the use of vague
language in specific events or certain situations (Gruber, 1993; Fraser, 2010; Giuseppina
Scotto di Carlo, 2013). Most of the legal scholarship is mainly engaged in a normative
or philosophical discussion of the meaning and value of vague language in certain
domains of law (Post, 1994; Waldron, 1994; Jónsson, 2009; Poscher, 2012; O’Rourke,
2017). None of these approaches are beneficial for the automatic detection of vagueness
in judicial decisions.
The bulk of quantitative work of social scientists on vague language uses dictionary-
based approaches, with varying degrees of complexity. Dictionaries use the frequency of
the occurrence of key words in a text to classify documents into categories. The simplest
of these dictionary methods count how often modal auxiliaries such as “may, might,
can, should” appear in certain texts (e.g. Rabab and Rumman, 2015). In the political
science literature, vague language is primarily identified using such dictionaries. In
this context, recent scholarship mostly relies on the dictionary of vague words from the
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) platform (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010).
LIWC simply counts the frequency of vague words which are defined in a pre-specified
dictionary. Vague words of this dictionary are, for instance: possible, or, some, unclear,
and perhaps. Due to its simplicity and availability in multiple languages, LIWC and its
collection of dictionaries are currently the state-of-the-art measure for vagueness (or
similar concepts) in political science (e.g. Owens and Wedeking, 2011, 2012; Cross and
Pennebaker, 2014; Black et al., 2016b; Wedeking and Zilis, 2018; Eichorst and Lin, 2019).
I will elaborate on the usage of dictionary-based approaches in the context of judicial
politics in the next section.
These dictionary based approaches suffer from at least two limitations with respect
to the measurement of judicial policy implementation vagueness, which I will highlight
in the following. I focus my discussion on LIWC, although my critique in principle also
applies to other dictionaries.
1. Many dictionaries originate from the field of psychology. LIWC, for instance,
was developed to identify cognitive properties of human individuals from experi-
ments about expressive writing in English language (Tausczik and Pennebaker,
2010). The validity and reliability of the vagueness dictionary of LIWC and its
translations to other languages have been extensively tested (Wolf et al., 2008;
Piolat et al., 2011; Pennebaker et al., 2015). However, it remains unclear how
LIWC performs when being applied to different domains, and judicial decisions
in particular. The problem of using dictionary methods for different domains is
also discussed in Grimmer and Stewart (2013) in the context of political texts.
2. Dictionaries only employ simple counts of words which define a particular
dimension. LIWC and related programs cannot detect semantic relationships in
texts, for instance whether the meaning of a word changes in different contexts.
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They can also not measure negations or latent traits of human language such as
sarcasm or irony.
Due to these shortcomings, I argue that LIWC (or any other general vagueness dictio-
nary) is not a reasonable choice to measure judicial policy implementation vagueness.
However, due to its popularity in the discipline I will use it as a baseline to compare
my own approaches with. In summary, the (quantitative) detection of linguistic vague-
ness in the social sciences and legal scholarship mainly relies on the use of general
dictionaries, which raises concerns about the quality of these measurement.
Related Work in Computational Linguistics
In the natural language processing (NLP) and computational linguistics literature, the
detection of linguistic vagueness has attracted considerable scholarly interest. Extensive
work exists on how to properly identify and classify linguistic vagueness. This work
often relies on large data sets and uses different unsupervised and supervised machine
learning approaches to detect linguistic vagueness.7 Moreover, computer linguists can
draw on established, annotated data sets which often serve as benchmarks for new
methods (e.g. Farkas et al., 2010; Vincze et al., 2008).
Most of the work on linguistic vagueness in the NLP literature deals with two types
of texts: scientific texts from the (bio)medical domain (Light, Qiu and Srinivasan, 2004;
Medlock and Briscoe, 2007; Vincze et al., 2008; Szarvas, 2008), and Wikipedia articles
(Ganter and Strube, 2009; Farkas et al., 2010). These classification approaches reach
accuracies between 80% and 95%, depending on the classification task. Other NLP
applications include the detection of linguistic vagueness in website privacy policies
(e.g. Reidenberg, Breaux and Norton, 2016; Liu, Fella and Liao, 2016). Only recently,
the attention of computer linguists has turned to the domain of social science. This,
often interdisciplinary, work includes studies on speculative sentences in transcripts
of monetary policy meetings on the U.S. central bank (Štajner et al., 2016, 2017) or the
detection of uncertain statements of stakeholders in the financial market (Theil et al.,
2018; Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt, 2018b).
Although computer linguists increasingly work on social science problems, there are
at least three major obstacles that circumvent directly adapting these approaches to
measure judicial policy implementation vagueness in court rulings:
1. Most of the existing algorithms and methodological approaches are only devel-
oped for texts in English language.
2. The existing algorithms and approaches are not specifically developed (and
therefore, not directly applicable) to the judicial domain. The work of Theil et al.
7However, also dictionary-based approaches are used (for a dictionary-based approach in the financial
domain see e.g. Loughran and Mcdonald, 2011).
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(2018) and Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt (2018b) shows that the performance
of NLP classifiers suffers if models designed for one domain are applied to others
without adaption.
3. No large data set of court decision texts exists that are annotated with respect
to linguistic vagueness that could be used to train NLP classifiers. The lack of
training data is not only a problem of German or French texts, but also generalizes
to English.
In summary, although computer linguists traditionally have a long history and
extensive experience with the detection of linguistic vagueness, there is not much
prior work that I could rely on when trying to detect judicial policy implementation
vagueness in constitutional court decisions. In the next sections, I will therefore propose
two approaches that break new ground from both a social scientist and computational
linguistics perspective.
3.3 Method 1: Exploiting Word Embeddings for Domain-Specific
Dictionaries
The first method I use to automatically detect judicial policy implementation vagueness
in court rulings is a dictionary-based approach. In particular, I show how word
embeddings can be used to find meaningful word analogies to expand a general
dictionary to a specific domain. In what follows, I briefly discuss the role of dictionary-
based approaches in NLP and introduce word embeddings, a popular method in NLP
to map words from a given vocabulary to vectors of real numbers. I then demonstrate
that it is straight forward to use these embeddings to tailor a general dictionary such
as LIWC8 to the specific domain of court rulings.
3.3.1 Dictionary-Based Approaches in Judicial Politics
Dictionary based approaches are a popular approach in text sentiment analysis and
opinion mining. A dictionary (also called lexicon) contains a collection of words which
are mapped to certain categories or dimensions. The Dictionary of Affect in Language
(DAL) for instance is a dictionary which is designed to measure the emotional meaning
of words and texts (Whissell et al., 1986). The LIWC dictionary (Pennebaker and King,
1999) is another popular dictionary which contains a collection of words belonging
to over 70 predefined dimensions. Most often, these dictionary simply count the
occurrences of words belonging to a certain dimension relative to the overall amount of
8I want to thank Dr. Markus Wolf for providing me with the German LIWC dictionary (Wolf et al.,
2008).
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words in a text. Such dictionary-based methods are also increasingly used in the context
of judicial decisions (e.g. Owens and Wedeking, 2011, 2012; Cross and Pennebaker,
2014; Black et al., 2016b; Wedeking and Zilis, 2018). Dictionaries are used, for instance,
to measure the “cognitive complexity” of Supreme Court justice’s opinions (Owens and
Wedeking, 2012), the “legal clarity” of Supreme Court decisions (Owens and Wedeking,
2011) or the “textual readability” of Supreme Court rulings (Black et al., 2016b, Chapter
3).
I argue that these dictionaries should be used with caution or at least with detailed
validation, because “applying dictionaries outside the domain for which they were
developed can lead to serious errors” (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 268). A dictionary-
based approach only works when the meaning (e.g. vagueness) associated with a word
is closely aligned with how the word is used in a certain context. Unfortunately, this
is not always the case when e.g. dictionaries originating from the field of psychology
are applied to judicial decision texts. A dictionary developed for a certain domain
that is then applied to another often lacks discriminative capacity in most contexts.
Therefore, they need to be adapted to the specific domains to which they are desired
to be applied to provide valid results (see Loughran and Mcdonald, 2011; Young and
Soroka, 2012). Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) provides a clear example for this in an
analysis of the tone of corporate earning reports in the accounting literature. They show
that many words that have a negative connotation according to widely used sentiment
dictionaries are words typically not considered negative in the financial context. For
instance, the word “cancer” has not necessarily a negative connotation if it is mentioned
by a health-care company. Although the “off-the-shelf” usage of general dictionaries
is at least questionable, there are several examples in recent judicial political research
where dictionaries are used without any domain adaption. The consequence is that
most of these analyses are built on “shaky foundations” (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013,
275).
Wedeking and Zilis (2018) for instance use the aforementioned DAL and LIWC
dictionaries to measure disagreeable rhetoric in Supreme Court majority opinion. In
almost the same manner, Owens and Wedeking (2012) collapse ten LIWC indicators
into one measure which they say to capture a judge’s cognitive complexity. Both
dictionaries have originally emerged from the field of psychology, and it is questionable
whether such dictionaries can be carelessly applied on other specific contexts such as
written opinions of judges. Wedeking and Zilis (2018) for instance discuss a couple
of examples to demonstrate the face validity of their approach, whereas Wedeking
and Zilis (2018) just refer to the overall internal and external validity of the LIWC
approach demonstrated elsewhere (Owens and Wedeking, 2012, 493). I argue that more
elaborated methods are necessary to demonstrate the validity of their measurement,
for instance the agreement of their measures with human-based annotations or the
correlation with other vagueness scores.
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Researchers interested in domain-specific dictionaries have to devote considerable
time and resources into a manual expansion of dictionary terms using the domain-
specific texts. This means that researchers and domain experts have to manually work
through the texts and identify the domain-specific terms which are semantically similar
to the entries in the general dictionary. This procedure is also known as finding word
analogies or expansion candidates.
With recent advances in NLP and neural networks and the increase in computational
capacities, an alternative to the manual expansion became available: dictionary expan-
sion using word embeddings. The idea behind this approach is simple: automatically
identifying domain-specific words which are semantically related to the words in the
general dictionary. Stated differently, an algorithm takes over the task of finding word
analogies for which usually human researchers and experts are required. Such an
approach is currently the state-of-the-art in terms of automatic dictionary expansion.9
Tsai and Wang (2014) automatically expand a set of sentiment dictionaries containing
vocabulary specific to the financial domain by training word embeddings on a corpus
of financial texts and adding the 20 most similar terms to each original dictionary
entry. Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt (2018b) follow a similar strategy and use word
embedding models for automatically expanding a financial dictionary of uncertainty
triggers. Both studies show that the expanded dictionaries improve the detection of
uncertainty triggers in the financial domain. In a similar fashion, Setiawan, Widyantoro
and Surendro (2017) employ word embeddings to address the problem of vocabulary
mismatch in Tweets. Nonetheless, while the idea of using word embeddings to expand
a general dictionary is a well-established methodology in the NLP community, to the
best of my knowledge it is not commonly used in political science research to date.10
3.3.2 Introducing Word Embeddings
Word embeddings are continuous high-dimensional vector space models based on
shallow neural networks to learn vector representations of each word in a background
corpus, such that similar words are close to each other in the word embedding space.
In this geometric space, the geometric relationships between word vectors reflect the
semantic relationships between these words. In a reasonable embedding space, for
instance, you would expect synonyms to be embedded into similar word vectors.
Moreover, the geometric distance between any two word vectors should relate to the
semantic distance between the these words. This allows for simple algebraic operations
on these vectors: “King - Man + Woman” results in a vector very close to “Queen”
9Word embeddings are also increasingly used in NLP because they provide more powerful word
representations than other approaches such as Bag-of-Words.
10Word embeddings in general are new to political science. Only few research studies have begun
to take advantage of them. For instance Rheault and Cochrane (2018) use word embeddings for the
estimation of ideological placements in a parliamentary corpora.
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(Mikolov, Yih and Zweig, 2013, 747). Word embeddings have recently become popular
as a text representation, since the vectors produced can be compared to find semantically
(rather than textually) similar words using similarity metrics (e.g. cosine similarity).
This makes them useful for finding semantically similar words analogies given a list of
input words. This list of input words is usually called “queries” or “seeds”.
Although there exist already pre-trained word embeddings,11 there are two reasons
not to use them for developing a domain-specific dictionary. First, most of the popular
and validated embeddings are in English language, and thus not useful for expanding
the dictionary to German and French. Second, the pre-trained embeddings are trained
on general large corpora such as the Google News dataset (Mikolov, Yih and Zweig,
2013) or different Wikipedia corpora (Pennington, Socher and Manning, 2014). However,
what makes a good word-embedding space strongly depends on the task: the perfect
word embedding space for a costumer rating analysis model may look different from
the perfect embedding space for a financial-document-classification model, because
semantic relationships might vary from task to task (Allaire and Chollet, 2017, 171). In
the next section, I explain the estimation of word embeddings in further detail.
The word2vec CBOW Architecture
In general terms, a word embedding can be described as a mapping V → RD : w→ −→w
that maps a word w from a vocabulary V to a real-valued vector −→w in an embedding
space of dimensionality D. There exist multiple embedding methods, but here I focus
on one the most popular techniques, the continuous bag of words (CBOW) approach
proposed by Mikolov, Yih and Zweig (2013). This method, commonly referred to as
word2vec, is a probabilistic prediction approach. Given a number of context words
around a target word w, these models try to predict w using the context words w
around it.
Figure 3.1 shows the general network topology of the CBOW model.12 There are only
three layers in this network: an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer. The
input layer is represented by a one-hot13 encoded vector x of context words x1, x2, ..., xC
for a word window of size C and a vocabulary size V. C is a hyper-parameter and often
a window size between five and eight is used. This window is usually symmetrical to
the left and the right. An alternative way of imagining this is to think about a sliding
window over the text, that includes the central word currently in focus, together with
11The pre-trained word2vec model of Google developed in the original word2vec paper of Mikolov, Yih
and Zweig (2013) is trained on roughly 100 billion words from a Google News dataset. Other popular
pre-trained word embeddings are GloVe embeddings (Global Vectors for Word Representation) developed
by Stanford researchers (Pennington, Socher and Manning, 2014).
12In the original paper of Mikolov, Yih and Zweig (2013), another word embedding architecture is
introduced. This architecture is called skip-gram, and actually reverses the logic of CBOW: the surrounding
words of w are predicted given w.
13One-hot encoding means that for the input vector x = {x1, x2, ..., xV}, xk = 1 and all other xk′ = 0 for
k 6= k′.
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Figure 3.1 – General Network Topology of the CBOW Model
Note: This figure shows the general topology of the CBOW model. Figure taken from Rong (2014, 6).
the C preceding and C trailing words. The central word in the middle of the sliding
window is the target word we like to predict in the output layer. The output layer y is a
one-hot encoded vector of length V.
The hidden layer h is an N dimensional vector, where N is the number of dimensions
chosen to represent the words. It is arbitrary, which means the researcher can set it
prior to training. The one-hot encoded input vectors are connected to the hidden layer
via a V × N weight matrix W and the hidden layer is connected to the output layer via
a N ×V weight matrix W ′.14 Interestingly, in word2vec we are not interested in actually
using the neural network for the task we trained it on (predicting a word based on its
context). Instead, the goal is to learn the weights: the weight matrix W ′ is the final
embedding matrix that encodes the meanings of words as context that is used to find
the semantically similar candidates later. The forward propagation in this simple neural
network works as follows. The first step is to evaluate the output of the hidden layer h:
14Note that W ′ is not the transpose of W, but stands for a different matrix.
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h =
1
C
WT · (x1 + x2 + ...+ xC)
=
1
C
(vw1 + vw2 + ...+ vwC)
T
(3.1)
where C is the context window, w1, ..., wC are the words in the context, and vw is the
input vector of a word w. In other words, given C input word vectors, the activation
function for the hidden layer h sums up the corresponding rows in W, and divides by
C to take their average. The hidden layer is connected to the output layer via another
weight matrix W ′. Using these weights, it is possible to compute a score uj for each
word in the vocabulary:
uj = v′wj
T · h (3.2)
where v′wj is the j-th column of the output matrix W
′. These are the inputs for the
output layer. The output of the output layer is obtained by passing uj into the so f tmax
function to obtain the conditional probability of words using so f tmax15:
yj = p(wj|w1, ..., wC) =
exp(uj)
∑Vj′=1 exp(u′j)
(3.3)
where yj is the output of the j-th unit in the output layer. In the next step, the
weight matrices W and W ′ are learned. In the beginning, W and and W ′ are randomly
initialized. Training examples are sequentially fed into the model and the error is
observed. The error is defined by a loss function of the difference between the expected
output and the actual output. The training objective (for one training sample) is to
maximize 3.3, namely the conditional probability of observing the actual output word
wO given the input context words wI,1, . . . , wI,C regarding weights in weight matrix W
and W ′. The loss function L is defined as:
15So f tmax is known as multinomial logit in the political science context.
58
CHAPTER 3. MEASURING VAGUE LANGUAGE
L = − logP(wo|wI,1, . . . , wI,C)
= −uj∗ + log
V
∑
j′=1
exp (uj′)
= −v′wO
T · h + log
V
∑
j′=1
exp (v′wj
T · h)
(3.4)
here j∗ is the index of the actual output word wO in the output layer. The loss
function is minimized finding the values for W and W ′ that minimize the loss via back
propagation using stochastic gradient descent methods.16 Readers interested in more
details about updating the weights are directed towards the excellent introduction
paper of Rong (2014).
3.3.3 Application to German and French Court Decisions
In what follows, I apply a three-step procedure to obtain a measure of judicial policy
implementation vagueness for all French and German court rulings. In the first step,
I employ a corpus of decision texts of the German and French constitutional courts
to train judicial decision-specific word embeddings. In the second step, I use the
words from the LIWC dictionary as seeds to obtain the top-n most similar terms to
the seed words. These are called the top-n candidate terms. Finally, I utilize these
top-n candidate terms to expand the list of vague words from the LIWC dictionary
and to obtain a domain-specific vagueness dictionary. This allows me to measure the
judicial policy implementation vagueness in German and French decision texts with
dictionaries tailored to the judicial domain.
Step 1: Training Word Embeddings
I train judicial decision-specific word embeddings on two corpora of decisions of the
French and German constitutional courts. As with most deep learning algorithms,
learning improves with the amount of data provided. For the German case, I use all
Senate decisions available in the Constitutional Court Data Base17 (2,006 documents)
plus all so-called chamber decisions18 (6,415 documents) available on the website of
16There exist several efficiency optimization tricks to train the model faster, such as hierarchical softmax
and negative sampling. These are beyond the scope of this short introduction.
17The Constitutional Court Database (CCDB) (Hönnige et al., 2015) contains data on all decisions of the
German Federal Constitutional Court between 1972 and 2010. This database is part of the research project
entitled “The German Federal Constitutional Court as a Veto Player” funded by the German Research
Foundation, and is located at the University of Hannover and the University of Mannheim.
18Chambers are panels of three judges, which help the GFCC to make timely decisions for a large
number of cases that are deemed to be not sufficiently important or controversial to be deliberated among
all judges on the bench.
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the GFCC as of August 2018. The final training data includes a vocabulary size of
148,465 (unique) words and terms (uni-grams, bi-grams, tri-grams), overall more than
5.1 million words.
For the French court, the training data contains 1,343 decisions obtained via the
Conseil Constitutionnel’s website.19 The final training data includes a vocabulary size
of 56,301 (unique) words and terms, overall accounting for more than 3.7 million words.
Although these corpora might look small compared with the corpora used in the
original word2vec implementation (where billions of words where used), several studies
suggests that the specificity of a corpus has much stronger influence on the quality of
the embeddings than its size (Lai et al., 2016; Dusserre and Padró, 2017). Moreover,
when the goal is to automatically find word analogies, it is more important to have a
corpus that correctly represents the usage of these specific words than to have huge
amounts of text data unrelated to the targeted context (Dusserre and Padró, 2017, 2).
Text preprocessing was kept at a minimum because its has proven to have a significant
influence on the results obtained (Denny and Spirling, 2018). For this reason, the texts
are mainly left untouched: I did not remove punctuation, numbers or stopwords.20
Also, I applied no lowercasing of words. Especially the removal of stopwords would
not be meaningful in the context of my application, because modal words such as
“can” or “should” are considered to be stopwords (for instance in the most popular
list of stopwords of Porter (1980)), but are in fact of high relevance for the informative
structure of a sentence (Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt, 2018b, 6), and therefore, for
my analysis.
As unique terms I considered uni-grams, bi-grams, tri-gram. This is because some
words have a highly ambiguous meaning when taken out of context. For instance, the
word “sun” has substantially different interpretations when used in the expressions:
“sun spider” (an order of animals in the class Arachnida) and “sun bath”. N-grams help
to capture these context dependent differences, where formally a n-gram is defined as
a contiguous sequence of tokens of length n (Manning and Schütze, 1999). For example,
the multiword expression “a contiguous sequence” from the previous sentence would
be referred to as a trigram. In order to train the word2vec model, I use the R word2vec21
19I only use QPC (question prioritaire de constitutionnalité) and DC (Contrôle de constitutionnalité
des lois ordinaires, lois organiques, des traités, des règlements des Assemblées) decisions. Other types
of decisions, such as LP (Loi du pays de Nouvelle-Calédonie), LOM (Compétences outre-mer) or FNR
(Fins de non-recevoir) do not meet the requirements of my definition of judicial policy implementation
vagueness in court rulings: these decisions are not directed at governmental laws, and are often very
context specific.
20Stopwords are frequently appearing words such as “the”, “of”, “in”.
21The package is called WordVectors created by Benjamin Schmitt. The package can be found at Github:
https://github.com/bmschmidt/wordVectors.
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implementation with standard parameters.22 The result is a high-dimensional (100
dimensional) vector representation, where each unique word is embedded in a word
vector.
Before moving to Step 2, the identification of the top-n expansion candidates, it
is important to check whether the trained embeddings capture useful information
about the word’s representations and their contexts. There is no clear agreement in the
computer linguistic literature about how to evaluate the results of word embeddings
(Schnabel et al., 2015; Jastrzebski, Les´niak and Czarnecki, 2017), nor is there a simple
goodness-of-fit measure. I use a dimensionality reduction technique called t-Distributed
Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) (van der Maaten and Hinton, 2008) to reduce
the dimensionality of the embeddings. In short, t-SNE is a non-linear dimensionality
reduction algorithm used for exploring high-dimensional data.23 The output is a two-
dimensional “map” where semantically similar words are close to each other. Figure 3.2
shows a two-dimensional reduction of the word2vec model for Germany using t-SNE
based on the 300 most frequently occurring words or terms in the rulings.24
Similar to a Principle Component Analysis, the dimensions of the map are not
identified. Nonetheless, we see that the word2vec model successfully learned to group
similar words closely together. In the lower right, for instance, all of the names
of months like August, January etc. are grouped together. Furthermore, on the
upper left, there is a cluster of numbers. In the top left of the map, often appearing
numbers of paragraphs are clustered, with the corresponding laws and norms next
to it (such as “SGB” (Sozialgesetzbuch), “StGB” (Strafgesetzbuch) or the “BVerfGG”
(Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz)). These laws appear often in the context of these
numbers that are close. § 90 SGB for instance is a paragraph of the SGB that appears
very often in the context of social legislation, which is, in turn, often part of the GFCC
jurisdiction. Furthermore, semantically very similar words such as “Auffassung” and
“Rechtssprechung” are grouped together (top middle). Given this visual inspection, it
appears that the trained judicial decision-specific word embeddings are meaningful
and can be used to find the top-n candidate terms in the next step.
Step 2: Find the Top-n Candidates for Expansion
In the second step, for each word in the list of vague terms from LIWC, I consider the
top-20 most similar words according to cosine similarity as new candidates for the
expanded dictionary. In the context of word2vec, word A is said to be similar to Word B
22N = 100, C = 5, min count = 5, negative sampling = 0. Different values for N were tried (100, 150, 200,
500). N > 100 did not lead to better representations, but increased the computational burden. This is why
N = 100 was used.
23The output of t-SNE is comparable with the output of a simple Principal Component Analysis (PCA),
but shows better separation between different groups in the data in some cases.
24A similar graph for the French embeddings is in Appendix B.1
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Figure 3.2 – Two Dimensional Reduction of the German word2vec Model Using t-SNE
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Note: This figure shows a two dimensional reduction of the German word2vec model using t-SNE for the 300
most frequently occurring words in the German court rulings. Although the dimensions are not identified, it is
evident that the word2vec model successfully groups similar words closely together.
if “1) A could be used interchangeably for B, or 2) A appears in a similar context as B”
(Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt, 2018a, 6). Cosine similarity is a common measure
to find similar words (Mikolov, Yih and Zweig, 2013, 749), and is defined as:
similarity(w1, w2) =
−→w1 · −→w2
||−→w1||||−→w2||
(3.5)
for all similarity calculations in the embedding space, where w1 and w2 can be
any word from the vocabulary. The following list gives some exemplary similarity
candidates in the trained GFCC25 embeddings for different seed words according to
close cosine similarity:
• Regierung: tragende Mehrheit, Exekutive, Koalition, Antragsgegnerin, politische
Parteien
• Richter: Anwalt, Rechtsanwalt, Verteidiger, Notar, Spruchkoerper
• Gestaltungsraum: Gestaltungsspielraum, Spielraum, Ermessensspielraum, Entschei-
dungsspielraum, Beurteilungsspielraum, Entscheidungsraum, Einschätzungsraum,
25A French example would be the seed term “juge”, with close candidates such as “pro-
cureur”(prosecutor) or “avocat” (lawyer).
62
CHAPTER 3. MEASURING VAGUE LANGUAGE
Ausgestaltungsspielraum, Einschätzungsspielraum, Gestaltungsfreiraum, Typ-
isierungsspielraum
Especially the last term is a good example of how word embeddings can support
human expert judgment. The GFCC typically uses a term like “Gestaltungsraum” to
indicate that the legislator has a large leeway:
“Der Gesetzgeber wird unter Nutzung seines weiten Gestaltungsspiel-
raums zu entscheiden haben, auf welche Weise er den verfassungswidrigen
Zustand beseitigt. (BVerfGE 110, 33)26”
However, the GFCC not always uses the term “Gestaltungsspielraums”, but rather
many very similar word analogies. An expert might have identified a couple of these
similar terms by manually reading through a large number of decisions. Nonetheless,
it is questionable whether all related terms, often just different by nuances, would have
been found. However, a good domain-specific dictionary must capture all of these
terms, and word embeddings provide all of these similarity candidates on an objective
basis.
In order to expand the initial LIWC dictionary I use the twenty most similar words
as expansion candidates according to cosine similarity. Twenty is an arbitrary value,
although it ensures that a sufficient number of candidates is considered. Using a n > 20
reduces the quality of the candidate terms as they become less similar to the seed.
These candidate terms are then manually filtered and added to the list of seed terms to
obtain the expanded dictionary.
The original German LIWC dictionary contains 57 vague words in their inflicted form,
and 49 candidates terms are added.27 The original French LIWC dictionary contains 48
vague words, and I added seventeen candidate terms. The expanded German judicial
policy implementation vagueness dictionary now contains legal domain-specific terms
such as “auslegungsfähig” (open to interpretation, discretionary), or “Ermessensspielraum”
(latitude of judgment, discretion), which have not been in original LIWC dictionary
before. Word embeddings are also able to find semantically similar terms consisting of
more than a single word. The French expanded dictionary now contains words such as
“d’une façon générale” (generally speaking), or “interprétation large” (wide interpretation),
while the original French LIWC dictionary only includes terms consisting of single
words. The full list of words for both dictionaries can be found in Appendix B.1.
Figure 3.3 shows a two-dimensional mapping using t-SNE of the terms of the original
LIWC dictionary (black) and the expansion candidates (gray) for the German appli-
26Own idiomatic translation: “The legislator will have to decide, using its wide leeway in decision-
making, how to eliminate the persisting unconstitutionality”.
27I removed fourteen terms of the original LIWC dictionary because these terms are not meaningful in
the context of judicial decisions, and also had no reasonable expansion candidates. Such words are, for
instance, “Vorahnung”, or “Glueck”.
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Figure 3.3 – Two-Dimensional Mapping of Original LIWC and Expansion Terms, GFCC
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irgendein
Zufaelle
vorsichtig
hoffen
gezweifelt
ziemlich
irgendwo
Ausgestaltung
Moeglichkeiten
gegebenenfalls
Einschaetzung
ausreichend
Gestaltung
Differenzierung
ueberlassen
Ermessen
Gestaltungsfreiheit
Spielraum
unterschiedlich
Gestaltungsspielraum
Typisierung
verschieden
genuegend
annaehernd
zweifelhaft
unbenommen
einen_weiten angemessener
Entscheidungsspielraum
differenzieren
Einschaetzungs
Gestaltungsraum
Disposition
Gestaltungsspielraums
Ermessensspielraum
zureichend
generalisierende
Einschaetzungsspielraum
auslegungsfaehig
besonders_weiten
Gestaltungsbereich
Gestaltungsraums
Gestaltungsfreiraum
politischen_Ermessens
Generalisierung
bedarfsgerechten
tragfa hig
Typisierungsspielraum
Weisungsrechts
weiten_Gestaltungsraum
Einschaetzungs_Wertungs
Prognosespielraums
freistehen
eingeraeumte _weiten
Note: This figure shows a two-dimensional reduction of the German word2vec model using t-SNE for terms of
the initial LIWC dictionary (black) and the expansion terms (grey).
cation. Note that the dimensions are not meaningful nor identified, but can be used
to investigate how close or distant the original seed terms and expansion terms are
positioned to each other. The smaller the distance between two words in the graph, the
more similar they are semantically. The graph illustrates that using word embeddings, I
am indeed able to identify semantically similar words. In the bottom right, for instance,
the word “eventuell” (possibly) from the original LIWC dictionary is complemented by
the similar word “gegebenenfalls’ (if applicable), what makes intuitively sense. The very
legal word “auslegungsfaehig” is close to “freistehen” and “angemessen” (center of the
figure), and is a good example of how the expansion approach helps to incorporate
more domain-specific terms.
Step 3: Applying the Judicial Domain-specific Dictionary to Court Rulings
Now that I have the judicial domain-specific list of vague words, I apply these to the
decision texts of the German and French constitutional court. Before, I lemmatized the
terms in the expanded dictionary and the decision texts.28 Lemmatization refers to the
process of grouping together the inflected forms of a word into a single item using
the lemma or lexeme of a word (Manning and Schütze, 1999, 132). For example, the
28Lemmatization was carried out using Python and the library spacy (https://spacy.io/models/de).
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English verb “to decide” appears as “decide”, “decided”, “deciding”, “decides” etc.,
but all inflected forms have the same lemma, which is “decide”. In my application,
lemmatization is superior to simple stemming (cutting words to their root) because
lemmatization also takes into account the context of a word; the word “meeting” for
instance can be either the base form of a noun or it can be the verb “to meet”. Unlike
stemming, lemmatization attempts to select the correct lemma depending on the context
by using a dictionary-lookup and rules obtained from pre-trained models. Moreover,
in my application to the French decisions, stemming would lead to fundamentally
incorrect matches and biased measures. The reason for this is that the French LIWC
dictionary contains the word “questionner” (to call something into question), which
becomes “quest" when being stemmed. In the CC decisions, they often use the word “la
question” (the question), which has the same stem: “quest". Hence, using the stemmed
version of dictionaries and decision texts would lead to a bias measurement of the text’s
vagueness, because every “question" would be matched as a term of the vagueness
dictionary.
I restrict the application of the dictionaries to all decisions dealing with the revision
of governmental laws or statutes. This case selection is guided by theory, as there is no
reason to believe that constitutional courts use judicial policy-implementation vagueness
in decisions which, for instance, deal with formal mistakes of a lower court or related
issues. For the German court, I therefore use all 875 decisions dealing with a federal- or
state law29 available between 1972 and 2010. I did not apply the expanded dictionary to
the complete decision body, but only to the part of the decision where judges actually
justify their decision and therefore, where judicial policy implementation vagueness
might appear. This section is the so-called “B.Part” in a decision body. All other text
passages before this section are dropped (including the header of the decision and the
parts where the context of a decision is described). Separate opinions are also removed,
as they do not reflect the language of the court but of individual judges. The GFCC
often groups multiple proceedings with a similar issue in one main decision, with only
one decision text. This means that it is, therefore, not possible to obtain vagueness
scores on the proceeding level, but only for each of the decisions.
For the French court, I only score decisions of the type DC (Contrôle de constitution-
nalité des lois ordinaires, lois organiques, des traités, des règlements des Assemblées).
These are the only decisions that directly deal with laws (Hönnige, 2007, 2009). The
data was automatically collected from the website of the Conseil30 and contains 1,286
decisions decided between 1974 and 2018. The year 1974 is chosen because the Conseil
only became a fully developed constitutional court after this point in time. In order to
29This data was obtained from the CCDB. I only use decisions which deal directly (unmittelbar) with a
law; I do not use decisions which only indirectly concern a law (mittelbar).
30https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/, accessed 15.04.2019.
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clean the French decision texts, I only dropped the header where the decision contexts
is summarized, and kept the remaining text body. This is because the French judges
can give policy implementation recommendations in every section of their decision.
The processed texts of the German decisions finally contain 2,167 words on average,
and 2,422 words for the French ones. In both text data, I did not lowercase the words
since capital letters carry semantic meaning in both German and French.
In order to obtain the vagueness scores for each decision text, I split the texts into a
set of sentences, and each sentence into a set of word tokens. Sentences with five tokens
or less were dropped, because they are often noisy. A word token is deemed vague if it
is included in the list of vague terms of the expanded dictionaries. The final vagueness
measure is then on the word-level: it is the proportion of words matching one of the
terms in the expanded dictionary proportional to the overall number of words in a
decision,31 where a higher percentage of vague words indicates a more vague decision.
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the proportion of vague words for decisions of
the GFCC (left side) and the CC (right side). The average vagueness score for the GFCC
texts is 0.36%, with a standard deviation of 0.21. The average vagueness score of the
CC’s decision is 0.43% with a standard deviation of 0.25. For both courts, there is also
a number of decisions where not a single word of the vagueness dictionary appears.
Although this numbers appear relatively small, they are yet meaningful: as Eichorst and
Lin (2019) highlight, measuring vague language requires “counting specific, individual
words within large documents of language”, and that “although a single modifier can
shift interpretation [...], its empirical approximation will be relatively small and difficult
to discern absolutely” (Eichorst and Lin, 2019, 24). The overall small proportion of
vagueness is also comparable with the findings from other studies (see Liu, Fella and
Liao, 2016; Theil et al., 2018; Eichorst and Lin, 2019).
31One could also use the proportion of vague sentences of a decision, namely the proportion of sentences
containing at least one vague token proportional to the overall number of sentences of a decision. However,
this method is sensitive to outliers (very short or very long sentences), and also harder to compare with
the French findings due to difference in writing style. This is because the French court, uses only a few
but very long sentences, hence producing relatively high percentages of vague sentences. The proportion
of vague words and the proportion of vague sentences of a text are significantly correlated with .84 using
Pearson’s r, p < 0.01.
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Figure 3.4 – Distribution of Proportion of Vague Words, GFCC and CC Decisions
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Note: Kernel density estimation of the proportion of vague words/vague sentences in GFCC decisions.
In order to illustrate how the word choice modifies the informative structure of a
sentence, Table 3.1 provides some examples of how vague words are used by the GFCC.
Vague words in each sentence are boldfaced. It is evident how vague words shape
the decision leeway of the legislator, and thus reflect judicial policy implementation
vagueness.
Table 3.1 – Vague Text Examples from German Decision Texts
Vague Text Examples
Auf dieser Grundlage darf er [der Gesetzgeber]
generalisierende, typisierende und pauschalierende Regelungen treffen, ohne
wegen der damit unvermeidlich verbundenen Härten gegen den allgemeinen
Gleichheitssatz zu verstossen. (BVerfGE 112, 268)
Es liegt insoweit im Gestaltungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers, ein für gesetzliche
wie private Versicherte im Grundsatz einheitliches, alle wesentlichen
Krankheitsfälle befriedigend abdeckendes Versorgungsniveau festzulegen.
(BVerfGE 123, 186)
Vielmehr hat der Gesetzgeber einen weiten Gestaltungsspielraum, welche
Pflichten zur Sicherstellung von Gemeinwohlbelangen er Privaten im Rahmen
ihrer Berufstätigkeit auferlegt. (BVerfGE 125, 260)
I want to emphasize again that the original LIWC dictionary would not have identified
the vague terms in these sentences. Terms such as “Gestaltungsspielraum” are judicial
domain-specific words and do thus not appear in the original LIWC dictionary. In
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Figure 3.5 – Scatterplot of the Proportion of Vague Words, LIWC versus Expanded Dictionary,
GFCC
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Percentage Vague Words, Original LIWC Implementation
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 V
a
gu
e 
W
o
rd
s,
 
Ex
pa
nd
ed
 D
ict
io
na
ry
order to illustrate how the measurement of the expanded dictionary diverges from the
original LIWC approach, I scored the same decision texts but this time using the original
LIWC-implementation. The measurement level of LIWC is also the same as for the
expanded dictionaries, namely the proportion of vague terms in a text. Figure 3.5 shows
a scatterplot of the expanded dictionary scores on the y-axis and the original LIWC
scores for the same German decision texts on the x-axis. Using the expanded dictionary
yields, for the same text, to quite different vagueness scores than the original LIWC
dictionary (indicated by a rather low correlation coefficient of 0.32 using Pearson’s r).
The expanded dictionary finds less vague words than the LIWC implementation.32
Consequently, research solely relying on LIWC would miss-classify a large proportion
of the court decisions, and thus potentially draw incorrect inferential conclusions. Later
in this chapter, I will further elaborate on the validity of the expanded dictionaries in
comparison with LIWC.
3.3.4 Method 1 Summary
In this sub-chapter, I have demonstrated how word embeddings can be used to create
a judicial domain-specific dictionary of vague terms. For this purpose, I trained
32There is also a number of decisions where the expanded dictionary measures zero vague terms, while
the LIWC dictionary measures up to 2.8%. This is because I removed some of initial words in the LIWC
dictionary because they are neither meaningful in the context of judicial decisions nor did they have
reasonable expansion candidates.
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word embeddings on all decision texts of the GFCC and the CC, used the words
of the original LIWC dictionaries as seed terms to find word analogies, and finally
applied them to a corpus of German and French decision texts. Because the expanded
dictionaries are tailored to the legal context, they are better suited to identify judicial
policy implementation vagueness in texts where general dictionaries fail.
3.4 Method 2: Training a NLP Vagueness Classifier
In this section, I develop a binary sentence classifier designed to automatically detect
vague sentences in GFCC decisions.33 In particular, I draw on recent advances in
machine learning to train and evaluate the predictive performance of different popular
NLP classifier on a corpora of over 3,500 manually annotated sentences randomly
drawn from published decisions of the GFCC. I make three contributions: first, I collect
a novel data set and evaluate whether and how good the classification of vague terms
works via an algorithmic procedure. Second, I benchmark the predictive performance
of different standard machine learning and deep learning classifiers on this data set and
compare their predictive performance. Third, I compare the performance of Method
1, the expanded dictionary, with the best machine learning classifier and discuss the
strengths and pitfalls of both approaches.
To foreshadow, I find that overall machine learning classifiers perform considerably
well in classifying the latent concept of judicial policy implementation vagueness.
Deep learning classifiers do not perform distinguishably superior in terms of the raw
performance metrics, but are better able to classify unseen text instances than standard
machine learning classifiers.
3.4.1 Corpus Construction and Annotation Procedure
No annotated data set exists that I could use to train the different classifiers. For this
reason, I collect a new vagueness data set consisting of 3,581 sentences which were
randomly sampled from all published decisions of the GFCC from 1972 to 2010, and
then manually annotated. Only the text sections where judicial policy implementation
vagueness can appear (the “B. Part”) are used to sample from. Introductory sentences,
habitual utterances and sentences shorter than four words are excluded from the
sampling process, as they would dilute the results of the classification task.
The annotation was performed by three German native annotators. All of them
possess domain-specific knowledge of law and social science.34 A more detailed
33Due to the large effort it requires to gather the necessary training data, it was not possible to develop
a similar classifier for the French application.
34One of them has a minor in public law. The other two annotators have had at least two public law
classes in their undergraduates.
69
3.4. METHOD 2: TRAINING A NLP VAGUENESS CLASSIFIER
description of the annotation task with annotations instructions and more examples
can be found in Appendix B.2. Each of the annotator had to manually classify all of
the 3,581 sentences as either a vague sentence or a not-vague one. The following two
sentences again highlight the difference between the two types:
• Vague: ‘Denn der Gesetzgeber hat, wie aufgezeigt, mehrere Möglichkeiten, um den
verfassungswidrigen Zustand zu beseitigen.’35 (BVerfGE 121, 175)
• Not Vague: ‘Der Gesetzgeber hat sowohl den datenerhebenden als auch den datenempfan-
genden Behörden eine Kennzeichnungspflicht aufzuerlegen.’36 (BVerfGE 100, 313)
Additionally, the annotators also had to highlight the words or expressions that
triggered their decision-making. I use this information to check whether there are
frequently-occurring terms that the expanded dictionary does not yet contain.
3.4.2 Inter Annotator Agreement
The pairwise inter-annotator agreement (IAA) for labeling sentences as vague or not
vague is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 – Pairwise Inter-Annotator Agreement
Annotators Agreement κ
1 & 2 96.95 0.63
2 & 3 98.5 0.79
1 & 3 98.45 0.84
Average 97.97 0.75
Note: Agreement = percentage of cases in which both annotators assigned the same class; κ = Cohen’s
Kappa.
Cohen’s Kappa (κ) (Cohen, 1960), is between 0.63 ≤ κ ≤ 0.84, depending on the
annotator pair. The average κ of 0.75 can be, depending on the source, considered as
“substantial” (Landis and Koch, 1977, 165) or “excellent” (Fleiss, Levin and Paik, 1981,
609). This is similar or better to the IAA achieved in related annotation tasks.37 The
achieved IAA suggests that the task of marking vague or not vague sentences in court
rulings is equally difficult for humans as the same task on Wikipedia sentences, but
seems to be more difficult than marking sentences in biomedical texts. Here, human
35Own translation: “The legislator has, how illustrated, multiple options to remediate the unconstitu-
tional state.”
36Own translation: “The legislator has – for the data receiving and the data collecting agencies – the
obligation to label them.”
37Štajner et al. (2016) for instance classify sentences of central bank transcripts using three annotators,
and achieve a 0.56 ≤ κ ≤ 0.61. Theil et al. (2018) achieve a κ of 0.73. (Ganter and Strube, 2009) achieve a
0.45 ≤ κ ≤ 0.80 on the Wikipedia data set.
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annotators achieved a κ = 0.98 (Medlock and Briscoe, 2007). For the final classification
of a sentences, the majority vote was taken. This means that if two annotators disagreed
on the classification, the third annotator’s coding was pivotal. Overall, from the 3,581
annotated sentences, 4.2% (154) were annotated as vague. This strong class imbalance
is comparable with other vagueness data sets (e.g. Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt,
2018b; Liu, Fella and Liao, 2016).
3.4.3 Experimental Set-up
I randomly divide the annotated data set into two smaller data sets: one training set
(2,864 sentences, 80% of the total data) and one test set (717 sentences, 20% of the total
data). Stratified sampling is used to ensure that all data sets contain the same ration of
sentences marked as vague and not vague. Ignoring the strong class imbalance would
negatively affect the quality of the classifiers. The test set is never used in the training
or any other validation procedure, and is strictly hold out-of-sample.
In my experimental set-up, I use two different sets of algorithms. The first set
contains a wide range of different “conventional” NLP classifiers, namely support
vector machines (Cortes, Vapnik and Saitta, 1995), naive bayes, random forests (Breiman,
2001), extreme gradient boosting and logistic regression. All of these algorithms have
shown their value in various NLP tasks. The second set of algorithms draws on recent
advances in deep learning, where particular types of neural networks for sequence
classification have shown promising results for text classification.
For the first set of algorithms, the conventional NLP-classifiers, I follow standard
NLP practice and use Bag-of-Words38 vectors of sentences with the commonly used
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (tf-idf) term-weighting as training features.39
Tf-idf uses the raw count of a term in a document, and then weights this count by the
number of occurrences of this term in other documents. More formally, the final weight
wi for a term i in document j is defined as:
wi,j = t fi,j × log( Nd fi ) (3.6)
where t fi,j is the number of occurrences of a term i in document j, d fi is the number
of documents containing i and N is the total number of documents. Accordingly, less
weight is given to very frequent (and thus, probably not very discriminative) terms and
more weight to rare terms. Before tf-idf is applied, I use the Porter-Stemmer (Porter,
38Bag-of-Words is a simple way of representing text data by encoding the term frequency of a certain
word of a vocabulary in a sentence into a vector.
39Only the 15,000 most frequently occurring terms (including uni-grams, bi-grams, and tri-grams) are
used to improve computational efficiency.
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1980) and removed stop-words.40 Both increases the computational efficiency of the
training because text redundancies are removed. For each of the algorithms, the hyper-
parameters are optimized with respect to the area under the precision recall (AUC-PR)
curve41 via grid-search using stratified five-fold cross-validation on the training set.
The model with the optimal hyper-parameter performance on the training set was then
evaluated on the test set.42
It is important to note that hyper-parameter tuning and cross-validation in one
procedure requires an out-of-sample test set to measure the so-called true error. The
true error is a measure of how well a model can predict outcomes of previously unseen
data (Efron and Hastie, 2016; Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017). An estimate of true error
is important in practice, as it allows one to check whether a model generalizes well
to unseen data or just memorizes the patterns in the training data (i.e. over-fitting).
Using out-of-sample data to evaluate the predictive performance of a model allows me
to obtain an estimate of true error despite cross-validation is used for hyper-parameter
tuning. Hence, the procedure outlined here does not suffer from a problematic cross-
validation described in Neunhoeffer and Sternberg (2019).
The second set of algorithms I explore originate from the family of deep learning
algorithms. Specifically, I use two different types of deep learning classifiers, a Gated
Recurrent Unit, a particular type of a Recurrent Neural Net, and a Convolution Neural
Network. Both neural network types have recently shown impressive performances
in sequence classification tasks and have outperform conventional NLP algorithms in
several binary sentence classification.43 (Kim, 2014; Tang, Qin and Liu, 2015; Wu et al.,
2015; Lee and Dernoncourt, 2016; Yin et al., 2017). Because deep learning algorithms are
still relatively unknown in the field of social sciences, I will give a very brief summary
of both network’s architecture in the following. A more detailed description of the
architecture of both network types can be found in Yin et al. (2017) and Allaire and
Chollet (2017, Chapter 6), or in the two excellent overview papers of Lopez and Kalita
(2017) and Young et al. (2018).
A Gated Recurrent Unit, introduced by Cho et al. (2014), belongs to the family of
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). These types of networks have proven to be particular
efficient with sequential data, and text analysis in particular (Tang, Qin and Liu, 2015;
40For both I used the Python 3.6 NLTK 3.3 implementations. Classification did not improve by not
removing the stopwords and stemming. Classification did also not improve using lemmatization instead
of stemming.
41Cranmer and Desmarais (2017) recommend using the AUC-PR in imbalanced classification scenarios
(Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017, 154).
42The Python Scikit-learn 0.20 (Pedregosa et al., 2011) machine learning library was used to train and
evaluate the models.
43As of end-2018, these are the two most popular deep learning algorithms for binary sentence
classification. The R tensorflow keras implementation was used. Computation was carried out on a Nvidia
1060 GTX GPU.
72
CHAPTER 3. MEASURING VAGUE LANGUAGE
Figure 3.6 – Simplified Architecture of a Recurrent Neural Network
Note: A simple RNN as a network with an internal loop. Figure taken from (Allaire and Chollet, 2017, 180).
Dauphin et al., 2017; Rosenthal, Farra and Nakov, 2017). In order to understand the
architecture neural networks for text classification, it is first necessary to explain the
notion of sequential data and why it needs a particular network architecture.
Sequential data refers to data types such as time series data (e.g. stock markets,
sensor data, weather forecast), but also to texts as a sequence of words or characters.
Densely connected networks (standard neural networks), called feed-forward networks,
have no “memory”. Each input is propagated straight through from the input layer
over the hidden layer to the output. In other words, the order of the data, namely
the notion that related things follow each other, is completely ignored. Therefore, in
standard neural networks the data is assumed to be iid (independent and identically
distributed). By contrast, readers of this dissertation do not read every written word
independently. While reading, every word is processed one after another, such that the
meaning of a word is the result from the words read before.
RNNs are designed to deal with sequential data. A recurrent neural network is
called recurrent because it performs the same computation for every element of a
sequence, where the output is dependent on the prior computations. Put differently, a
RNN iterates over the sequence elements (like an internal loop) and maintains a state
containing information relative to what it has processed before (Allaire and Chollet,
2017, 180). This is illustrated in Figure 3.6 again. Another way of thinking about
an RNN is to think about an “unfolded” network, where unfolding refers to writing
out the network for the complete sequence. A sentence consisting of three words, for
instance, would be unfolded into a three-layer network, with one layer for each word.
Stated more generally, a RNN can map an input sequence with an arbitrary number
of elements xt at time t into an output sequence O with elements Ot, with each Ot
depending on all of the previous xt′ for t′ < t (Lecun, Bengio and Hinton, 2015, 442). I
included a more detailed description of the network’s architecture and the necessary
computational steps in Appendix B.3.
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The network is trained and optimized via a variant of backpropagation suited for
sequence data, the so-called backpropagation through time using stochastic gradient
descent. Because the weights in a RNN are shared by all time steps in the network, the
calculation of the weights at time step t depend on the weights of time step t− 1). This
is why the gradient at each output depends not only on the calculations of the current
time step, but also the previous time steps. This often causes vanilla RNNs to suffer
from a problem called vanishing gradient problem (Bengio, Simard and Frasconi, 1994;
Hochreiter, 1998). Put simply, the vanishing gradient problem refers to the problem
that while conducting back-propagation, the gradients tend to becoming increasingly
smaller the more one moves back in the network. This negatively affects the learning
of the early layers in a network, which only learn very slowly. In a word sequence
classification example, this would mean that it is difficult for the network to memorize
words from far away in the sequence.
For this reason, I follow the current NLP state-of-the-art and use a Gated Recurrent
Unit (GRU), a special type of RNN. GRUs are designed to combat the vanishing
gradient problem through a gating mechanism, namely an update gate and a reset
gate. This gating mechanisms allows the GRU to decide whether the current time-step
information matters or not, and to control the information inflow from past steps. In
short, the reset gate determines how much of the past information the network should
forget. The update gate defines how much of the past information (from previous
time steps) should be passed along, and how to combine this information with new,
incoming information from the current time step. The special thing about GRUs is
that using these gating mechanisms, the networks are able to adaptively remember
and forget. A short introduction to the network’s architecture is in Appendix B.3.
Interested readers should also be hinted to the original paper of Cho et al. (2014). In
order to illustrate why these gating mechanisms are so powerful, consider the following
example (toy) sentence:
The German Federal Constitutional Court, given the prevailing case law
and weighting to the respective interests of the public and of the parties
concerned, decides that the legislator has a considerable decision leeway in the
organization of the inheritance tax.
In this case, the important information for the classifier, namely whether the legislator
has discretion or not, is contained in the last part of the sentence. In that case, the
network can learn to set the reset gate such that it “washes out” early and redundant
information. By contrast, consider another example (toy) sentence:
The legislator has a considerable decision leeway in the organization of the inheri-
tance tax, accordingly, the German Federal Constitutional Court, given the
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prevailing case law and weighting to the respective interests of the public
and of parties concerned, rejects the complaint.
Here, the important information is at the beginning of the sentence. In such a case, the
GRU can learn to set the update gate such that a majority of the previous information is
kept when continuing to iterate of the sequence of words of the sentence. These gating
mechanisms thus help to deal with the vanishing gradient problem, because at every
single time step the network can decide to keep relevant information and forward it to
the next step. I decided to use a GRU rather than other popular RNN variants such as
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) networks because GRUs are computationally more
efficient to train and, more important, have shown to exhibit better performance on
small data sets such as I use (Chung et al., 2014; Jozefowicz, Zaremba and Sutskever,
2015). The final GRU used for the classification of my data set comprises of three
stacked GRU layers, with 64, 32 and 16 units each and a drop-out rate of 0.544 and
recurrent drop-out rate of 0.2. The input features are the training sentences encoded
into a 256 dimensional word embedding space.
The second type of neural network architecture used in the experiment is a so-called
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). While originally used in the context of computer
vision for image recognition, CNNs are increasingly used in the NLP context (see
Kim, 2014). Such CNNs can be competitive with RNNs and GRUs on certain sequence
classification problems, but usually come at a lower computation cost (Allaire and
Chollet, 2017, 209). The main idea behind a CNN is that it extracts local patches
(convolutions/sub-sequences) from a text sequence. This can be imagined as sliding
a “window” of a certain size over an input sequence.45 A CNN with a convolution
windows of size five is able to learn word sequences of length five or less, and it can
recognize these words in any context in an input sequence. In other words, a pattern
learned at a certain position in a sentence can be recognized at a different position
in another sentence. This is called translation invariance (Allaire and Chollet, 2017,
209). I provide an overview of a simple CNN architecture for sentence classification in
Appendix B.3. For a more detailed description of CNNs for sentence classification see
the original paper of Kim (2014). The final CNN used for the classification is similar to
Kim (2014) and comprises three convolutional layers with a kernel size (window size)
44Over-fitting is a serious problem of deep neural networks, as usually hundreds of thousands of
parameters are estimated and only a limited number of training data available. Drop-out in neural
networks describes the process of randomly dropping out (setting to zero) a number of units from the
neural network during training. Drop-out has shown to significantly reduce over-fitting and be superior
to other regularization methods (Srivastava et al., 2014). Recurrent drop-out is a particular drop-out for
recurrent layers, and specifies the drop-out rate of the recurrent units (Gal, 2016).
45In praxis, this sequence (e.g. a sentence) is encoded into an embedding matrix. A five word sentence
using a 100-dimensional embedding matrix would result in a 5× 100 input matrix (see Figure B.5 in the
Appendix.).
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of 3, 4 and 5 with 100 feature maps each, and a drop-out rate of 0.5. The input features
consist of each sentence encoded in a 256-dimensional word embedding space.
3.4.4 Classification Results
I evaluated all algorithms using the overall accuracy (i.e. the percentage of correctly-
classified instances), precision, recall, F1-score (harmonized mean of precision and
recall) and receiver operating characteristic area under curve (ROC AUC). Such an
extensive set of performance measures is necessary because using accuracy alone in
cases with highly imbalanced data leads to miss-leading performance evaluations
(Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017, 152). A definition of these performance measures is in
Appendix B.3.1. The baseline to compare each algorithm against is a naive classifier
that always assigns the majority class, namely a classifier that classifies each sentence
as not vague. Therefore, by definition there are no true positives (correctly classified
vague sentences), which is why precision46 and recall47 of the majority classifier are
zero. A TruePositive is a vague sentence that is correctly classified as vague, and a
TrueNegative is a not vague sentence which is correctly classified as not vague. The
accuracy of the naive classifier is the percentage of not vague sentences.
The results of the experiment are presented in Table 3.3, together with the majority
class baseline. The reported predictive performance is strictly evaluated out-of-sample
on the test set. None of the test set observations have been used at any point in the
training process. The corresponding confusion matrices for each of the classifier are in
Appendix B.3.2.
Table 3.3 – Results of the classification task for the test data. The best results are presented in
bold. The majority class (baseline) is always classifying not vague.
Precision Recall F1 Accuracy ROC AUC
Support Vector Machines 0.76 0.29 0.42 94.98 64.15
Random Forest 0.67 0.13 0.22 94.1 56.44
Naive Bayes 0.31 0.24 0.27 91.1 60.44
Logistic Regression 0.50 0.53 0.52 93.72 74.88
XGBoost 0.24 0.73 0.36 83.4 78.71
Convolutional Neural Net 0.27 1.00 0.42 95.4 63.33
Gated Recurrent Unit 0.27 0.71 0.39 94.7 62.96
Expanded Dictionary 0.60 0.20 0.29 82.01 71.74
Majority Class (not vague) 0 0 0 95.68 50.0
The highest precision is achieved by the SVM, albeit at the cost of relatively low recall.
The highest recall (maximum score of 1.0) is achieved by the CNN, which means that
the CNN does not classify one truly not vague sentences as vague (zero false negatives).
46Defined as TruePositiveTruePositive+FalsePositive .
47Defined as TruePositiveTruePositive+FalseNegative .
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However, this comes at the cost of a relative low precision. Furthermore, it is interesting
to note that the simple logistic regression achieves the best F1 score48, resulting from
balanced precision and recall scores. In order to investigate the classification results in
further detail, consider the following obviously-vague sentence:
Denn der Gesetzgeber hat, wie aufgezeigt, mehrere Möglichkeiten, um den verfas-
sungswidrigen Zustand zu beseitigen.49 (BVerfGE 121, 175)
Both types of classifiers (the conventional classifiers like random forest and the neural
networks) correctly assign high probabilities that this sentence belongs to the vague
class. By contrast, all classifiers have problems of correctly classifying less obvious
vague sentences with a complex structure such as:
Der Gesetzgeber kann die Vielfalt der Faelle, die er mit seiner Regelung erfasst, nicht
im vorhinein erkennen und muss sich deswegen mit Einschaetzungen zufriedengeben.50
(BVerfGE 97, 186)
Both types of classifier assign rather low probabilities of this sentence being vague.
This sheds light at one broader result of the classification task with respect to the
positive class: even the best model only correctly identifies 33 out of 45 vague sentences
(the Xgboost model, which also produces a large number of false positives, indicated
by the low precision) in the test data. It is important to note that the sentences that
are difficult to classify for the algorithms are also the same sentences with which the
human coders had the largest disagreement on, meaning that different annotators
labeled the same sentences differently. Given the sentence above, for instance, one of
the human annotators disagreed with the other two and annotated this sentence as not
vague, because it lacks a clear vagueness indicator. If even trained human annotators
disagree on the classification, then an algorithm will most likely also have difficulties
predicting the correct label.
Overall, when comparing the predictive performance of the traditional NLP classifiers
with the deep learning algorithms, there is no large difference between the predictive
power of both. Why are the neural nets not considerably better than most of the simple
Bag-of-Words classifier, although they come at a much larger computational cost? The
reason for this is that for classifying judicial policy implementation vagueness, there are
certain trigger words (like those used in the expanded dictionary) which often indicate
whether a sentence might be vague or not. Thus, the Bag-of-Word approaches (which
48F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
49Own translation: “The legislator has, how illustrated, multiple options to remediate the unconstitu-
tional state.”
50Own translation: “The legislator cannot anticipate the diversity of all possible cases with its regulation
in advance, and must therefore come up with an assessment."
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ignore the order of the words in the sentences) perform remarkably well because the
information whether a trigger word is in a sentence is already sufficient for identifying
certain vague sentences, not where exactly the trigger word is located in the sentence.
However, the deep learning classifiers are superior in capturing the semantic context
of a sentence. Table 3.4 shows two toy sentences in the first column. The first sentence
includes a negation and is not vague and the second does not contain a negation but
is vague. The second column shows the probability of this sentences belonging to the
vague category as classified by the GRU. The third column shows the same probabilities
but for the logistic regression classifier.
Table 3.4 – Vague Text Examples from German Decision Texts
Sentence GRU probability
vague
Logit probability
vague
Der Gesetzgeber hat keinen weiten
Gestaltungsspielraum.
0.05 0.41
Der Gesetzgeber hat einen weiten
Gestaltungsspielraum.
0.86 0.27
Table 3.4 illustrates that the GRU is capable of capturing the semantic meanings of
sentences, such as simple negations. Although both sentences only differ in one word
(in fact, only one character), the GRU correctly assigns are very low probability of being
vague to the first sentence and a very high probability for the second one. By contrast,
the logistic regression assigns rather low probabilities of being vague to both sentences.
It even assigns a higher probability of being vague to the first, not-vague sentence.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the expanded dictionary correctly identifies
27 out of 45 vague sentences. However, the bad news is that the dictionary also
produces a large number of false positives (111) on the test set. This means the
expanded dictionary classifies sentences which are not annotated as vague incorrectly
as vague. The reason for this is that the dictionary cannot capture any semantic
meaning, but simply checks whether a sentence contains a certain pre-specified word of
the dictionary or not. For instance, consider the following sentence (which is annotated
as not vague):
Der Gesetzgeber hat bei der Einführung von Sonderabgaben Kompetenzschranken zu
beachten, die seinen Gestaltungsspielraum im Verhältnis zur übrigen Regelungsbefugnis in
der jeweiligen Sachmaterie deutlich verengen. (BVerfGE 67, 256)
The dictionary correctly identifies that the sentence contains the trigger word “Gestal-
tungsspielraum” (room to maneuver), which generally implies a certain decision leeway
of the legislator. However, it cannot consider that this decision leeway is “deutlich
verengt” (clearly limited). The deep learning classifiers, for instance, do not wrongly
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label this sentence as vague (the GRU assigns a probability of zero that this sentence is
vague).
Classification Result Comparison With Similar Studies
My experimental results are comparable with those of similar classification tasks
using related methodological approaches. First, I compare my results with other
classification studies on domains that are also understudied by the NLP community.
Theil, Štajner and Stuckenschmidt (2018b) classify uncertain statements in financial
disclosure documents and achieve F1 scores between 0.59 and 0.41. However, they
leverage a much richer corpus and use an expanded dictionary containing over 4,100
trigger words. Štajner et al. (2017) achieve an F1 score of 0.5 using a Bag-of-Words
SVM classifier in the detection of speculative sentences in the monetary policy domain.
These two examples show that my experimental results are comparable with the results
of similar NLP applications in understudied areas.
Second, I compare my results to traditionally well-studied domains such as the
classification of uncertain statements in Wikipedia entries (the CoNLL-2010 shared task,
(Farkas et al., 2010)) and abstracts from the (bio)-medical domain (e.g. Light, Qiu and
Srinivasan, 2004). These two areas are well-studied, a large set of different classification
approaches exist and there are even yearly competitions on these data sets. The best
classifier in the Wikipedia domain achieves a F1 score of 0.6, whereas the best system
for the abstracts achieves a F1 score of 0.86. This shows that my classification results
are at least comparable with those of the Wikipedia data set. It is unsurprising that
on average, I do not achieve the same impressive performance scores of these studies,
given the sheer amount of training data and prior research available in these areas.
3.4.5 Application to GFCC Court Decisions
In the last step, I used the CNN to predict all texts from the same data set used in the
application of the expanded dictionary, e.g. all decision texts of the GFCC dealing with
the revision of governmental laws or statutes. I chose the CNN due to its excellent
recall and its superiority in classifying unseen sentences, although for instance the
logistic regression has a higher F1 score.
Because the classifier is trained to identify vague sentences, the classification of the
texts is undertaken at the sentence level. The final measure obtained by the CNN
classifier is then the proportion of vague sentences in a decision, calculated as the
number of vague sentences divided by the overall number of sentences. Figure 3.7
shows the distribution of the proportion of vague sentences. Again, the score is rather
low with a mean of 1.8% vague sentences, a standard deviation of 0.65, a minimum of
zero and a maximum of 6.
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Figure 3.7 – Density Plot of the Proportion of Vague Sentences per GFCC decision, CNN
Classification
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Note: Kernel density estimation of the classification based on the Convolutional Neural
Network, measured as the percentage of vague sentences of all sentences in decisions of
the GFCC. Thicks on the x-axis show the allocation of all observed/actual percentages.
3.4.6 Method 2 Summary
In this sub-chapter, I have used used two different sets of popular machine learning
algorithms for the classification of judicial policy implementation vagueness. In partic-
ular, I evaluated the predictive performance of a set of traditional machine learning
classifiers and two deep learning algorithms (Gated Recurrent Units and Convolutional
Neural Networks) in a binary sentence classification task on a novel, manually an-
notated corpus of randomly sampled sentences of written decisions of the German
Federal Constitutional Court. The best classifier (the CNN) achieves a performance of
0.42 in terms of F1 score in a strict out-of-sample prediction. This shows that although
judicial policy implementation vagueness is an abstract, latent concept, staofte-of-the-
art NLP classifier can capture this phenomenon. Furthermore, this study is the first
application to judicial texts in German language, and the first which uses machine
learning algorithms to classify and predict the occurrence of vagueness in constitutional
court decisions. Moreover, the vagueness scores introduced in this chapter will be used
in Chapter 2 to test a popular game theoretical model on the strategic use of vague
language in court decisions. Therefore, the implications of this classification experiment
go beyond the area of NLP, and have practical implications of our ability to study
linguistic phenomena in political science.
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3.5 Validation
Validity is an obvious concern when new measures are established. This section
evaluates the validity of both the expanded dictionary and the CNN classifier results in
a comparable manner. For my applications on the German court, I rely on two validity
checks. The first validity check uses a data set of Engst (2018) on vague directives51 in
GFCC decisions. The data of Engst (2018) codes directives according to their level of
detail, namely how specific or vague these directives are.52 A vague directive according
to Engst (2018) is a directive that, for example, only depicts some minor short-comings
of the legislation under review, or can be understood as a reminder for the legislator
to keep track on a certain issue (Engst, 2018, 109). In contrast, directives are not
considered as vague if they contain a request for the legislator to modify a certain law
or even present the legislator different alternatives or suggestions on how a revision
could look like. I test the convergent validity of the German vagueness measures by
using the expanded dictionary and the CNN classifier to obtain the judicial policy
implementation vagueness scores for the texts of these directives. The observable
implication is as follows:
• Directive texts that were classified as vague by Engst (2018) should receive a
higher vagueness score than decisions classified as not vague.
This validity check allows me to compare the extent to which the automatic vagueness
detection is comparable with human judgment. Such a validation procedure in the
context of machine coding is also recommend by Grimmer and Stewart (2013) as the
human gold standards of validation: if my measures are performing well, they will
replicate the hand coding; if they perform bad, they will fail to replicate the human
coding and introduce error (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, 279).
My second validity check evaluates the German measure’s face validity. The study of
Staton and Vanberg (2008) explicitly labels certain GFCC decisions as prime examples
of a either very vague decisions or very specific decisions. In this regard, the observable
implication is as follows:
• Decisions which Staton and Vanberg (2008) describe as prime examples of vague
decisions should receive a high vagueness score, whereas decisions depicted as
very specific should receive a low vagueness score.
51A directive is defined as “a judicial directive is a statement by the judges included in a court’s decision,
directed at political actors to request an action by those actors to respond to a constitutional issue.” (Engst,
2018, 109). I would like to thank Benjamin Engst again for providing me that data.
52Engst (2018) distinguishes between implicit directives, explicit directives or explicit directives with a
guideline for implementation. In line with Engst (2018), I consider implicit directives as vague directives,
and the other categories as not vague directives. The classification in Engst (2018) was carried out by a
student assistant with expertise in political science and law.
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My next check concerns the expanded dictionary and evaluates the robustness of my
measure to idiosyncratic features of both German and French. For this, I use bridging
observations (decisions available in both languages) to show that the vagueness scores
of these decisions are independent of the language they are written in. The implication
is as follows:
• If a decision written in French obtains a similar vagueness score using the French
expanded dictionary than the same decision written in German using the German
expanded dictionary, then the obtained vagueness scores are not an artifact of the
language they are written in.
My final check assesses the validity of the original LIWC dictionary. At the beginning
of this chapter I argue that using the original LIWC dictionaries can lead to biased
measurements. To evaluate this claim I conduct the same validity analyses than for
the expanded dictionaries, but this time I use the original LIWC implementation. The
implication is as follows:
• If the original LIWC dictionary is not suitable for analyzing judicial policy imple-
mentation vagueness, then it should provide poor results in the validity checks.
For decisions of the French Conseil there is, unfortunately, no comparable data set
available as the one of Engst (2018). For this reason, I have to limit my validation to
an extensive discussion of the face validity of the decision which scored highest in
vagueness according to the expanded dictionary. The results of all validity checks are
again summarized in Table 3.5. Put simply, I find that my measures of judicial policy
implementation are valid and robust, but that the LIWC implementation fails all of the
checks.
3.5.1 Convergent Validity of the German Application
I follow the validity check procedure outlined before and leverage data set of Engst
(2018). The first validity check evaluates whether directive texts of the GFCC which
are coded as vague53 according to Engst (2018) contain a higher proportion of vague
words/vague sentences than directives coded as not vague. For this, all directive texts
are scored using the expanded dictionary and the CNN classifier. In fact, using a t-test
I find that for both measurement approaches, directives coded as vague by Engst (2018)
contain a statistically significant (p < 0.05, two-sided test) higher proportion of vague
53Of 2,006 decisions in the data, 1,725 contain no directive, 114 contain a directive coded as vague,
and 165 contain a directive coded as not vague. Only decisions which contain a directive at all are used.
Otherwise, the decisions without a directive would lead to highly imbalanced groups, and biased test
results.
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words/vague sentences than directives which are coded as not vague. The convergent
validity is therefore confirmed.
Note that in the above two validity checks, the skewness of the measures (they contain
a large number of zeros, namely zero percent vague words/vague sentences) could be
an issue since the t-test relies on the assumption of normality. In order to check the
robustness of the validation checks, I re-run the same analyses but this time I use the
Mann–Whitney-U test, which is a non-parametric hypothesis test that does not require
the assumption of normality. The findings remain robust and yield to similar results.
3.5.2 Face Validity of the German Application
To demonstrate the face validity of the German application, I use three decisions
discussed in Staton and Vanberg (2008). In their paper, Staton and Vanberg (2008)
mention three decisions of the GFCC which either stand, in the context of their paper,
for very specific or very vague decisions. This allows me to formulate expectations
about where these papers should be located on the vagueness continuum.
The first decision is a decision on party financing (BVerfGE 24, 300). In this landmark
decision, the GFCC declared existing eligibility requirements for receiving public
subsidies of small parties such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) as
unconstitutional instructed the legislature to revise the party financing law such that
any party receiving at least 0.5% of the votes in an election receives public subsidies.
Staton and Vanberg (2008) quote this decision as a prime example of a specific, namely
a non-vague decision.
The second and third decision are both concerned with pension benefits of civil
servants. In 1980, the GFCC ruled about the pension benefits of civil servants who
argued that the taxation of their pension benefits is a violation of the equal treatment
clause of the constitution because other pensions are not taxed in the same manner
(BVerfGE 54, 11). The court declared that this is indeed a violation of the equal
treatment clause, but that all necessary steps towards a correction are in the hands
of the legislator. Afterwards, no legislation was initiated. In a follow up decision in
1992, civil servants appealed again (BVerfGE 86, 369) and argued that the legislator has
evaded the court’s decision. Again, the court stated that in this case “legislative delay”
was not ”unreasonable” given the complexity of the issue (English translation taken
from Staton and Vanberg (2008, 513)). Staton and Vanberg (2008) use both of these
decisions as a prime example of a vague decision. Therefore, if the measures for the
judicial policy implementation vagueness are valid, we would expect both decisions on
civil servant benefits to score rather high on the vagueness measure, and the decision
on party financing to score rather low.
83
3.5.
VA
LID
A
TIO
N
Figure 3.8 – Distribution of Proportion of Vague Words/Sentences in GFCC Decisions
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(b) Proportion of Vague Sentences,
CNN Classification
Note: Kernel density estimation of the proportion of vague words/vague sentences in GFCC decisions. Dashed lines indicate the vagueness scores of the party finance decision
and the civil servant decisions described in the text.
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Figure 3.8 shows the density of the proportion of vague words/vague sentences in a
decision, with dashed lines indicating the position of each of the three decisions on the
vagueness continuum scored by the expanded dictionary (left side) and the CNN (right
side). Both decisions concerning the civil servant’s pension benefits are located on the
right-hand side of the continuum (indicating a rather vague decision), whereas the
party financing decision is on the left side (indicating a rather not vague, ergo specific
decision). This is in line with the placement outlined in Staton and Vanberg (2008), and
thus confirms the observable implications.
3.5.3 Face Validity of the French Application
In order to assess the validity of the expanded dictionary for the application on the CC,
there is, unfortunately, no comparable data set available like the one of Engst (2018). For
this reason, I manually inspect the scoring of decisions which received high vagueness
scores and assess whether these scores are in line with what one would expect based on
the topic and the decision text. I want exemplarily highlight two decisions which have
high vagueness score: the “Décision 2017-634 QPC” and the “Décision 2001-444 DC”
(plotted and highlighted in Figure 3.9). Both demonstrate the usage of vague language
in decisions of the Conseil.
Decision “2017-634 QPC” is among the most vague decisions in the data with
a vagueness score of 1.32% vague words. In this decision, the Conseil examines
governmental laws on the modernization of the economy and banking and financial
regulations. In particular, it investigates whether certain sanctions mentioned in these
laws are covered by the constitution and whether they are justifiable or not. The
Conseil decided that the laws and their wording are constitutional. In their decision,
the French judges write that the sanctions are justifiable because “the legislator pursued
the objective of preserving the economic public order”. In this context, the Conseil
further remarks that “the Conseil does not have to the right to question the intentions of
the legislator, but only gives it jurisdiction to decide on the conformity of the legislative
provisions under its consideration with the rights and freedoms that the Constitution
guarantees”54 (own translation).
In decision “Décision 2001-444 DC” (revision of the electoral calendar in 2001), the
self-resistance of the Conseil is even more evident. This is the decision with the second
highest vagueness score (1.66%) according to the French expanded dictionary. Some
quotes from the decision highlight why this is the case. The Conseil writes first that
“the legislator [...] can freely modify the durations” and, as an even a more explicit sign
for judicial policy implementation vagueness, that “the Constitutional Council does not
54French original: “la Constitution ne confère pas au Conseil constitutionnel un pouvoir général
d’appréciation de même nature que celui du Parlement, mais lui donne seulement compétence pour se
prononcer sur la conformité des dispositions législatives soumises à son examen aux droits et libertés que
la Constitution garantit.”
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Figure 3.9 – Distribution of Proportion of Vague Words According to the French Expanded
Dictionary
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Note: Kernel density estimation of the proportion of vague words/vague sentences in Conseil Constitutionnel
decisions. Dashed lines indicate the vagueness scores of the respective decisions.
have a general discretion of the same nature as that of Parliament; It is therefore not up
to it to inquire whether the desired objective of the legislature could be achieved by
other means [...]”55 (own translation). Both of these decisions show that the automatic
vagueness detection through the expanded dictionary identified these vague decisions.
3.5.4 Bridging Observations: Scoring the Same Decisions in Two Languages
One serious challenge of the expanded dictionary approach is that judicial policy
implementation vagueness is measured across two different languages. Thus, it is
important to show that the obtained results are independent of idiosyncratic features
of French and German, and not just an artifact of the language they are written in. I
use bridging observations to show that language is not an influential factor behind my
vagueness scores. Bridging observations in my application are decisions which are
available in both German and French language. Assuming that the meaning and the
nuances of language are not lost in process of the translation, we should observe similar
vagueness scores for the same decisions in two languages. In other words, a decision
in French should have a similar vagueness score than the same decision in German,
and vice versa. Evidence supporting this assumption has recently been published by
55French original: “le Conseil constitutionnel ne dispose pas d’un pouvoir général d’appréciation et
de décision de même nature que celui du Parlement ; qu’il ne lui appartient donc pas de rechercher si
l’objectif que s’est assigné le législateur pouvait être atteint par d’autres voies [...]”.
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de Vries, Schoonvelde and Schumacher (2018) who show that Google Translate works
for Bag-of-Words approaches, to which dictionary classifiers also belong.
In order to obtain the bridging observations, I extracted all officially translated
decisions texts of the GFCC and CC from their websites. For the French application,
there are 20 decisions available which were officially translated from the court into
German. It is important to note that the French Conseil states itself that only the
most important decisions are translated, and thus this sample is not random.56 These
decisions are then scored using the expanded dictionaries in both German and French
language. My analysis shows that both vagueness scores for German and French
decisions are significantly correlated with an r of .41 (p < 0.05). This implies that for
French decisions, the scoring of the dictionaries is not driven by idiosyncratic features
of either language, as the exact same text receives similar vagueness scores independent
of the language it is written in.
Unfortunately, the German court does only provide two official French translations
of its rulings (while there are over 289 available in English). I therefore randomly pick
20 decisions and translate them into French using Google Translate machine translation.
This is a common strategy in NLP if no official translation of the same text is available
(see e.g. Banea et al., 2008). My analysis shows that both the scores of the original and
translated decision texts significantly correlated with .39 (p < 0.05).57 In summary, both
analyses confirm that the obtained scores of my dictionaries are not dependent on the
language where the measurement approach is applied to.
3.5.5 Validity of the Original LIWC Dictionary
Finally, I evaluate the original LIWC approach using the same validity checks for the
expanded dictionary than before. Applying the general LIWC dictionaries to domain-
specific texts without a critical evaluation of the result’s validity is – unfortunately –
still common in the field. In order to show the superiority of my proposed methods
(the expanded dictionary and the CNN classifier), I replicate the validity checks, but
this time I use the original LIWC implementation.
Put simply, LIWC fails all validity checks. First, the original LIWC implementation
is unable to detect vague words/terms in the vague directive texts and thus, cannot
statistically distinguish between directive texts coded as vague and texts coded as not
vague (p > 0.10, two-sided test). In fact, LIWC finds that the directive texts which are
vague according to Engst (2018) contain a lower proportion of vague words than the
directive texts coded as specific. Second, when replicating the face validity analysis,
LIWC fails to properly locate the selected decisions on the vagueness continuum. Third,
when replicating the analysis using bridging observations, I find that the same decision
56Descriptive statistics of the data used can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B.3.3.
57Summary statistics can be found in Table B.2 in Appendix B.3.3.
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Table 3.5 – Summary of Validity Checks for Each Court and Methodological Approach
GFCC CC
Validity Check Expanded Dictionary CNN Classifier Original LIWC Expanded dictionary Original LIWC
Directives check check fail not applicable not applicable
Face Validity check check fail check fail
Bridging Observations check check fail check fail
in the different languages also receives different scores, and that these scores are not
significantly correlated (p > 0.10, two-sided test). These findings demonstrate that
LIWC, while it may be useful in some domains, should always be used with caution
and must be carefully evaluated.
All validity findings are again summarized in Table 3.5. While both the expanded
dictionary and the CNN classifier turn out to be a valid measure of judicial policy
implementation vagueness, I also demonstrate that using the general LIWC approach
in comparison yields to poor results. In sum, I am confident that both measures offer a
valid and reliable operationalization of judicial policy implementation vagueness in
constitutional court decisions.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, I have asked how we can automatically measure vague language in written
court decisions? I introduced two methods to automatically detect judicial policy imple-
mentation vagueness in written decisions of the German and the French constitutional
court. The first method relies on word embeddings to create legal domain-specific
dictionaries in German and French. The second method benchmarks several NLP
classifiers on a novel annotated data set consisting of over 3,500 randomly sampled
sentences from GFCC decisions. My results show that both approaches are valid meth-
ods to measure judicial policy implementation vagueness, while dictionary approaches
currently very popular in the field have difficulties measuring this concept.
I make three contributions in this chapter. First, I show that similar measurement
and classification approaches already established in other fields of NLP also work
properly when applied to judicial texts. Second, I make all my data and code used in
this chapter publicly available. Other researchers can use the annotated data set as a
benchmark to test different algorithms, and explore more complex model structures.
In this regard, recent advances in semi-supervised text classification (the combination
of adversarial neural nets to build more training data and supervised classification)
have shown promising results, especially in situations where training data is scarce,
although the classification problem is challenging(e.g. Aghakhani et al., 2018; Chen and
Cardie, 2018). Third, and most importantly, my work provides a blueprint and practical
guidance for other researchers in social science who face the sample hurdles, i.e. data
scarcity and the lack of prior research in a certain linguistic domain. For researcher
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who can rely on an existing general dictionary, I show how word embeddings can be
used to expand this dictionary to a specific domain. For researchers without such an
existing dictionary, I demonstrate how a state-of-the-art machine learning classifier can
be developed to solve a certain classification problem.
Researchers should keep in mind that there is always a trade-off along the two
dimensions of accuracy/quality of a classification approach and the required resources.
An expanded dictionary does not reach the same precision as a carefully-developed
and tuned algorithm, but is easy to implement and at low costs with respect to
computational resources and required time. By contrast, a machine learning classifier
often outperforms a dictionary in terms of accuracy but requires extensive resources
to gather the necessary training data and algorithmic fine-tuning. The implications of
this chapter thus go beyond the methodological application on the judicial decisions
but teach us some important lessons about the general feasibility and applicability of
interdisciplinary approaches.
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CHAPTER 4
Why Do Courts Craft Vague Decisions? Evidence
From Germany and France
4.1 Introduction
Why are judges vague about the policy implications of a decisions in one occasion and
highly specific in the other? In a landmark decision on inheritance tax in Germany
in 2014, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared the existing inheritance
tax law with respect to family-owned companies as unconstitutional.1 In their ruling,
the judges instructed the federal legislature to revise the law, but also stated that how
a revision is implemented is the legislature’s task due to the issue’s complexity. The
Bundestag instituted a committee to study revisions of the inheritance tax code – but no
legislation was initiated. After two years without a legislative response, the President
of the German court wrote an open letter to the German legislators, highlighting that
the court feels obliged to deal with this matter again.2 It was only after this threat that
the government (hastily) adopted a law revision, which is currently discussed to be
appealed to the GFCC again by the opposition.
This decision illustrates two fundamental challenges of judicial policy-making. First,
when reviewing legislation, judges often confront a wide range of issues and usually
do not possess specialized knowledge about it. Second, and the inheritance tax de-
cision illustrates this clearly, judicial decisions are not self-enforcing, and legislative
compliance cannot be taken for granted. How can judges deal with these challenges?
11 BvL 21/12.
2https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/bvg16-
041.html, accessed 12.04.2019.
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In this chapter, I address this question by testing the implications of a game-theoretic
model proposed by Staton and Vanberg (2008). This model is widely cited3 but has not
been empirically examined yet. In essence, the authors argue that decision language
allows judges to hedge against their limited policy-expertise while simultaneously
it can also be used to pressure hostile legislators or mask legislative noncompliance,
depending on the public support of the court. Therefore, their formal model incorpo-
rates both of the arguments that are central to this dissertation: public support varies
across countries, and courts are active actors who strategically use the institutional
tools at their disposal. I put these arguments to test using again a comparative study
on the German and French constitutional court and the judicial policy implementation
vagueness scores established in the previous chapter.
My findings mainly confirm the implications of the formal model: vague decision
language is used by both courts to give discretion to the better informed legislator in
complex cases or reduce the legislative room for maneuver if preference divergence
between court and legislator is high (but only in Germany). More importantly, my
results show that both courts use vagueness differently when legislative noncompliance
is likely: The German Federal Constitutional Court, a court with high public support,
uses specific decision language to strategically pressure a hostile legislature. By contrast,
the French Conseil Constitutionnel, a court with low public support, uses vagueness as
a “defensive mechanism” to hide legislative noncompliance from public view.
4.2 The Challenges of Judicial Policy-Making
The relations between courts and other policy-making institutions generate serious
challenges for judicial policy-making. The first challenge is the limited policy expertise of
judges. Designing the adequate public policies for a given desired political outcome is
often associated with abstract technical issues. Consider the inheritance tax decision of
the GFCC again. Striking down the current inheritance tax law as unconstitutional is
only part of eliminating an unconstitutional public policy. Determining which specific
policies will achieve a fair taxation of family-owned companies of different sizes, and
considering all associated future side-effects of these policies is a difficult problem
requiring specialized knowledge.
Other policy-making institutions such as legislatures do not face the same difficulties.
Legislators usually have access to a committee system and can rely on a reservoir of
staff-experts and other bureaucratic support.4 Therefore, relative to policy-makers with
whom judges interact, they typically have only limited access to technical information
3Google scholar lists 167 studies that cite this paper as of April 2019.
4For instance, every member of the German Bundestag already has, on average, ten employees as
personal staff (https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2015/kw32_finanzierung_buero-
384390, accessed 06.05.2019).
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which would be necessary for evaluating alternative policies.5 In other words, judges
may be in the position to evaluate whether a certain law is unconstitutional or not, for
instance whether the tax inheritance law under review is in accordance with German
Basic Law or not. However, they will typically be in a less advantageous position to
design the specific policies that are necessary to accomplish these outcomes compared
with other policy makers.
The second challenge which judges face is the fear of legislative noncompliance. Because
judicial decisions are not self-enforcing, compliance cannot be taken for granted. Courts
have no coercive means and, as one of the most cited quotes in judicial policy states,
“no influence over either the sword or the purse” (Hamilton 1788, Federalist No. 78).
Moreover, considering support of high courts from a cross-national perspective, Gibson,
Caldeira and Baird (1998) argue that “with limited institutional resources, courts are
therefore uncommonly dependent upon the goodwill of their constituents for both
support and compliance” (Gibson, Caldeira and Baird, 1998, 343). When facing an
undesired policy demand by the court, legislative majorities might be tempted to ignore
the judicial decision. Whether this will happen largely depends on the political costs
of such an evasion attempt. Because courts often enjoy broad public support, open
evasion of a judicial decision can result in a public backlash that could be electorally
costly for governments (Vanberg, 2005; Staton, 2006; Hall, 2014; Krehbiel, 2016).
In summary, there are two main challenges which judges are confronted with when
deciding about policy. On the one hand, many decisions require specialized knowledge
which judges not always do possess. On the other hand, judges fear legislative noncom-
pliance, since judicial decisions are not self-enforcing. In the next section, I discuss how
the strategic use of decision language can help judges to deal with these challenges by
means of the game-theoretic model of Staton and Vanberg (2008).
4.3 The Value of Vagueness
The formal model of Staton and Vanberg (2008) offers some general lessons about
how judges can manage the judicial policy-making challenges they face.6 The author’s
main argument is that decision language, or more precisely, vague or specific decision
language, is a tool that judges can use strategically to deal with the outlined challenges
of judicial policy-making.7
5The information which plaintiffs or interest groups offer might often be biased, therefore not presenting
a reliable information source for judges.
6For space reasons, the formal model and its central implications are only summarized here. A detailed
account of the model, including the game’s setup, the utility functions of both the court and government
as well as the equilibrium and its interpretation is available the original paper (Staton and Vanberg, 2008).
7In accordance with the original paper, vague decision language can be understood as a decision that
does not articulate any specific demand on the legislator about the means necessary to achieve a certain
policy goal (Staton and Vanberg, 2008, 508). By contrast, specific decision language is then understood as
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To foreshadow, their theory follows two different lines of arguments. First, they rely
on the well-established literature on delegation between legislators and bureaucrats
(Bawn, 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999) and argue that judges will a) write vague
decisions when they want to give discretion to the better informed legislator and b)
write less vague decisions the greater the preference divergence between court and
legislator. Second, and this is foreign to standard delegation models and the major
novelty of their model, they show that how judges use decision language in the face of
legislative noncompliance ultimately depends on their level of public support. In what
follows, I will shortly discuss the theoretical accounts of both lines of arguments and
derive testable hypotheses.
Following the standard delegation story, Staton and Vanberg (2008) argue that by
issuing a vague decision, judges can give other policy makers the necessary discretion
to take advantage of their superior policy expertise. In other words, writing a vague
decision allows judges to hedge against their limited policy-making abilities and to cope
with their judicial uncertainty. With a vague decision, the better-informed legislator has
any freedom to choose the appropriate steps to implement an optimal policy outcome.
This argument from the delegation literature is straightforward: the more leeway the
principal wishes to provide to the agent, the more vague that the instructions have to
be such that the agent has sufficient maneuver room. The first implication of the formal
model can thus be summarized as follows:8
Judicial Policy Uncertainty Hypothesis (H1): All else being equal, the higher the judicial
policy uncertainty of the court, the higher the vagueness of the decision.
However, vagueness is not costless. Providing discretion raises the possibility that
the legislator will use its expanded authority to implement an outcome which reflects
its own interests. The court here faces a trade-off: on the one hand, if a decision is too
vague and gives too much leeway to the legislator, the legislator might be tempted to
realize its own policy preferences rather than following the court’s demand. On the
other hand, by crafting a highly specific decision that exactly outlines the means to
achieve a desired policy outcome, judges run the risk of “locking in” an inappropriate
policy due to their limited expertise.
Again, following the literature on delegation, Staton and Vanberg (2008) argue that
judges are sensitive to the divergence of preferences between them and the policy
makers to whom they delegate to resolve this trade-off. If both court and legislator
share the same policy preferences, judges are willing to provide the policy-maker with
a decision that clearly articulates the judicial demands. I discuss the concept of decision vagueness in
further detail in the operationalization part.
8Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are direct implications of the first observation of the formal model
(Staton and Vanberg, 2008, 511).
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adequate discretion. This is because although providing discretion comes at the price
that the policy outcome will reflect the legislature’s preferences, this cost is more than
outweighed by the informational gain the court achieves by giving the better-informed
legislator the necessary room to maneuver. The more the preferences begin to diverge,
however, the higher the price that the court has to pay, since the legislator will use its
freedom to implement outcomes that are increasingly disliked by the court. In such
a scenario, the court will write less vague decisions to ensure that the final policy
outcome is close to its own ideal point. This second implication of the formal model
can be summarized as follows:
Preference Divergence Hypothesis (H2): All else equal, the higher the preference diver-
gence between the court and the legislator, the lower the vagueness of a decision.
To sum up the first two hypotheses, increasing judicial policy uncertainty will lead
judges to write more vague decision in order to give discretion to the better-informed
policy-maker, while they will write less vague decisions the higher the preference
divergence between them and the legislature.
The second part of the theory provided by Staton and Vanberg (2008) takes into
account that the judicial context adds an important twist to the usage of vague language
that goes beyond the standard delegation story. As outlined before, judicial decisions
are not self-enforcing, and judges must fear legislative non-compliance. The formal
model of Staton and Vanberg (2008) makes an important contribution by arguing
that the leverage of judges largely depends on the costs that other policy-makers face
for resisting judicial decisions. Here, evading a decision of a very popular court is
more costly for legislative majorities than ignoring a decision of a very unpopular one.
Moreover, these costs depend on how easy it is for others – either other political elites
or the public – to tell that a decision has not (yet) been properly implemented, and
on how easy it is for courts to make a credible case to others that a decision has been
ignored (see Vanberg, 2005). Previous research shows that courts have some control
over the extent to which others can detect non-compliance, and take active measures
to increase the chance that the public becomes aware of a decision and its legislative
(non)-implementation.9
In the formal model of Staton and Vanberg (2008), the authors argue that decision
vagueness is an additional mean which judges can use to control the extent to which
observers can detect noncompliance. The more clearly the court articulates its demands,
the higher the costs for legislative evasion since noncompliance is easier to detect.
Vagueness, on the other hand, reduces the costs of noncompliance: if a decision is
9For example, Staton (2006) finds that courts strategically use press releases to increase public awareness.
Krehbiel (2016) shows that judges strategically use oral hearings to draw attention to a decision.
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vague, it might not be obvious that the legislative majority (or another policy-maker) is
not complying with a decision, even if the final policy differs considerably from the
court’s demand. Specific decisions in turn increase the pressure for faithful compliance
because they increase the chance that an attempt of evasion leads to considerable
political costs. In other words, the more clearly judges state the policy implications of
their decision, the easier it is to verify whether policy-makers have faithfully complied.
This makes it more likely that the mass public becomes aware of any legislative evasion
attempt. Why do judges then not always choose to write clear decisions when fearing
legislative noncompliance?
As Staton and Vanberg (2008) highlight, decision language is a “double-edged sword”
(Staton and Vanberg, 2008, 513). While a clearly written decision can generate high
pressure for compliance, writing specific decisions when legislative noncompliance is
likely is not always the best option for judges. Specific language provides judges with
a tool to increase the costs of policy-makers resulting from noncompliance, but this
strategy can also be unsuccessful and, like a boomerang, turn into costs for the court. If
other policy-makers are willing to openly ignore even clearly articulated judicial orders,
a specifically written decision of a court which is then ignored highlights the relative
lack of judicial enforcement power. Such an open evasion is also costly for courts,
because legislative evasion can have a corrosive effect: noncompliance by a policy-maker
today may begin to undermine the general perception that court decisions must be
respected, thus inducing increasingly more noncompliance tomorrow. Once the evasion
of court decisions becomes “normal”, courts are at risk of losing their institutional
reputation, the only “weapon” against hostile legislative majorities that they have, in
the long run (Carrubba, 2005). In order to prevent such an erosion of authority, judges
may choose to be vague when they expect legislative noncompliance to protect the
court against open legislative resistance. Accordingly, when do judges use language
as a tool for pressure and when do they do so to protect themselves against open
resistance when legislative noncompliance is likely? Staton and Vanberg (2008) argue
that how judges use decision language when they expect legislative noncompliance is a
function of their institutional reputation (and thus, depending on their public support)
and the preference divergence between them and the legislator.
For a very popular court that enjoys generally robust levels of public support,
judges confront a difficult calculus. These courts possess considerable leverage, which
influences how they behave in the trade-off between using specific decision language
to force compliance and using vagueness to hide resistance. When both the court
and the legislator share similar policy-preferences, potential legislative noncompliance
will lead judges to write a vague decision. This is intuitive: if the legislator shares
similar preferences as the court, it is more beneficial for the court to hide potential
noncompliance from the public than trying to pressure the government and move the
final policy outcome closer to themselves. However, this calculus changes when such a
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powerful court is confronted with potential noncompliance from a legislator who is
ideologically distant. In such a scenario, a powerful court will write a specific decision
to apply maximum pressure on the legislator. The intuition behind this is that if a court
is confronted with an ideologically distant legislator, writing a specific decision not
only draws the legislative response towards the court’s ideal point, but it also increases
the chance that the public will take notice of the evasion attempt of the legislature. This
in turn increases the costs of legislative noncompliance. A popular court can behave
in such an “offensive” way for two reasons: first, because it has sufficient leverage to
credibly threat the government due to its high public support; and second, even if the
legislature decides to ignore the specific decision and the public takes notice from the
lack of judicial enforcement power, the court’s institutional reputation is sufficiently
robust to deal with such an open evasion and retain its reservoir of public support
nonetheless. How a popular court uses decision language in the face of legislative
non-compliance can thus be summarized as follows:10
Pressure Hypothesis (H3a): All else equal, decision vagueness will decrease if a popular
court faces a high risk of legislative noncompliance and the preference divergence with the
legislature is large.
The dynamics between preference divergence and risk of non-compliance play out
differently for unpopular courts that only enjoy low levels of public support. These
courts therefore have less leverage when facing potential legislative non-compliance.
This is because the electoral costs for legislative evasion are only small, while the erosive
effect of non-compliance could jeopardize the remaining institutional reputation that
they possess so far. For these courts, the benefits of using specific language to pressure
the legislature are outweighed by the potential costs for appearing as a powerless
institution. Judges in such circumstances will use decision vagueness when they
expect resistance to “mask” noncompliance. In other words, if an unpopular court’s
preferences considerably diverge from the legislature’s and the risk of noncompliance
is high, these courts will try to hide their weak position behind vague language and
use it as a “defensive mechanism” to maintain institutional reputation. As Staton
and Vanberg (2008) put it with respect to these unpopular courts, “because specificity
is a tool with limited effectiveness, vagueness as a mask predominates” (Staton and
Vanberg, 2008, 513). This can be summarized with the following hypothesis:
10Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b are direct implications of the second observation the formal model
(Staton and Vanberg, 2008, 513).
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Defensive Mechanism Hypothesis (H3b): All else equal, decision vagueness will increase
if an unpopular court faces a high risk of legislative noncompliance and the preference diver-
gence with the legislature is large.
In the following, I will outline a comparative research design that allows me to test
these hypotheses.
4.4 A Comparative Application
In an ideal research design, one would be able to analyze the same constitutional court
undergoing considerable ups and downs in its public support, in combination with a
permanent measure of the court’s public support over time. Like this, other institutional
factors or country-specific variations would be fix, and one could isolate the effects of
interest. However, such data is not available. I will, therefore, use a similar comparative
research design than introduced in Chapter 2. In particular, I will again approximate
varying levels of public support via the case selection.
4.4.1 Case Selection
To test the theory, I use a comparative design and selected again the French and
German constitutional courts. The reasons for choosing these courts are similar to
Chapter 2. First, both constitutional courts must possess the right of judicial review,
because otherwise courts cannot decide about governmental policies, and the logic of
the formal model could not be applied. Second, and more important, the theoretical
argument requires two courts that considerably vary in their degrees of public support.
In Chapter 2.3, I explained the institutional setting of both courts and discussed their
policy-seeking role within the political system. Moreover, I also provided evidence from
a recent, comparative survey to demonstrate that the public support for the GFCC is
indeed considerably higher than the public support for the CC. Therefore, all necessary
requirements to test the formal model’s implications are met.
4.4.2 Data and Operationalization
For the analysis of the GFCC, I use a data set originally collected by Vanberg (2005)
and extended by Krehbiel (2016). The data set contains all published decisions of the
GFCC between 1983 to 2010 reviewing the constitutionality of federal and state laws.11
Because the original data set of Krehbiel (2016) excludes decisions in which the court
11I not only include decisions where the status quo of a law is challenged, but also where it is upheld.
This is because Staton and Vanberg (2008) explicitly state that their formal model works in both cases (see
footnote 11 in the original paper for more detail).
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does not have discretion over oral hearings, I also added these cases to the data set.12 I
do not include special decisions such as decisions on provisional orders (Einstweilige
Anordnungen, §32 Act on the GFCC), or requests to exclude a judge from a case
(Befangenheitsanträge, §19 Act on the GFCC). This is because the logic of the formal
model studied here cannot be properly applied to these decision types. Furthermore, it
is important to note that the analysis is conducted on the decision-level. The GFCC
typically groups similar cases (proceedings) together, which could be directed against
the same law(s), but also for instance against rulings of lower courts. A decision is
included in the data set if a least one if its proceeding is directed against a federal or
state law. This is also because the vagueness scores created in Chapter 3 are measured
on the decision-level. This way of aggregating information from the proceeding-level
to the decision-level is also used in similar work on the GFCC (Engst, 2018, Chapter 4).
In sum, the final GFCC data set contains 372 observations.13
For the analysis of the French CC, I use self-collected data obtained from the web page
of the CC on all decisions dealing with the abstract review of laws decided between
1974 and 2010.14 I only use decisions from 1974 onwards because the CC only became
a fully established constitutional court after a reform in 1974 (see Hönnige (2009) for
more information on the choice of this time period). No decisions after 2010 are used
due to the introduction of a new proceeding type in 2010 (QPC, Question prioritaire de
constitutionnalité). QPCs allow the a posteriori control of laws by the CC. This new
pool of litigants and extended power of the CC might have changed the court-legislator
dynamics. For this reason, only decisions after 2010 are excluded. The final data set on
the CC includes 558 decisions.
Measuring Decision Vagueness
Staton and Vanberg (2008) do not provide an exact definition of what makes a vague
decision. All they write is that “in the context of our model, a perfectly vague opinion
is an opinion that attacks the status quo policy as illegitimate, but does not impose any
specific demands on the legislature for reforming that policy” (Staton and Vanberg,
2008, 508).
12Therefore, the final data set includes constitutional complaints, concrete reviews, public law disputes,
election disputes involving the constitutionality of an electoral law, constitutional disputes between the
national and state governments, constitutional disputes within a state, and abstract reviews. It does not
include unpublished chamber decisions. Only decisions which deal directly (unmittelbar) with a law are
used.
13Note that the original data set of Krehbiel (2016) contains 613 observations, but his unit of analysis
is at the proceeding-level. The smaller N in my case is explained by aggregating information on the
decision-level, the exclusion of decisions which only indirectly (unmittelbar) deal with a law and removing
decisions dealing with provisional orders.
14These are decisions of the type “DC”, so called “Contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois ordinaires, lois
organiques, des traités, des règlements des Assemblées”.
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I argue that this concept can be operationalized by my newly introduced concept
of judicial policy implementation vagueness in Chapter 3. Judicial policy implementation
vagueness was defined as a particular form of linguistic hedging in the context of
court decisions and as the intentional choice of words or terms that give the legislator
a wide decision leeway and room to maneuver in how it can implement a court
decision. Chapter 3 also proposed two different approaches to measure judicial policy
implementation vagueness in decisions of GFCC and the CC, namely the usage of an
expanded dictionary and a NLP classifier. Both approaches yield to vagueness scores
that are tailored for the judicial domain, and are thus superior to the usage of general
dictionaries such as LIWC or other approaches commonly used in judicial politics
research.
For the GFCC application, I use the vagueness measure that relies on the NLP
classifier (the Convolutional Neural Network classifier) because it exhibited the best
out-of-sample prediction performance. The German vagueness measure thus describes
the proportion of vague sentences in each decision. The mean of the decision vagueness
in the German data is 0.19 (with a standard deviation of 0.5). This means that 0.19
percent of all sentences across all decisions texts in the German data are vague. For the
CC application, the expanded dictionary measure is used. The French measure thus
describes the proportion of vague words in each decision. The mean of the decision
vagueness in the French data is 0.42 (with a standard deviation of 0.23). This means
that across all words in the French data, 0.42 percent are vague.
At this point, I want to emphasize again that both vagueness scores measure the
occurrence of specific words or sentences within long decision documents in a large
text corpus. This is why the empirical approximation of these terms is relatively small
in absolute numbers. Nevertheless, I have demonstrated in Chapter 3 that even small
changes in the wording of a decision can have a considerable influence on its judicial
policy implementation vagueness.
Measuring Judicial Policy Uncertainty
Judicial policy uncertainty describes a court’s uncertainty about the necessary means
to achieve a desired policy outcome. An ideal measure would be, for instance, the
training background of each judge for each policy field, a judge’s prior experience
with a given topic, or, as a simpler approximation, the policy expertise of at least the
rapporteur responsible for a decision. Unfortunately, data on all of this information
are not available. For this reason, I argue that the judicial policy uncertainty of judges
can be measured by a decision’s complexity. To approximate this complexity, I use
the dichotomous coding scheme for complexity following the measurement strategy
proposed by Vanberg (2005) and recently used by Krehbiel (2016). According to this
coding scheme, decisions involving taxation, budgets, economic regulation, social
insurance, civil servant compensation, and party finance are coded as “complex” with
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a value of 0, whereas those involving institutional disputes, family law, judicial process,
individual rights, asylum rights, and military conscription are coded as “simple” with
a value of 1. In the German data set, this variable is already included in the original
data set of Krehbiel (2016) for most of the decisions. For the decisions I manually
added, I use the data from the CCDB that contains for each decision the information
on the policy area following the Comparative Agenda Project15 (CAP) to classify these
decisions accordingly. The German measure for judicial uncertainty is thus a dummy
variable indicating whether a decision is complex or not.
Although a French version of the policy topic coding for each decision is available
from the French CAP project, I refrain from using this data in the main analysis because
it is only available until 2007. However, I will use it to test the robustness of the
findings later in the robustness section. I approximate the case complexity in the French
application by the number of legal doctrines the CC has to consider in a decision. In
the introduction of the French rulings, the Conseil always quotes the laws, statutes and
legal doctrines it has to examine in this particular ruling. I argue that the more laws,
statutes or doctrines the Conseil has to consider, the more complex the issue of a ruling
is.16 This variable ranges from 1 to 28, with a mean of 5.2 and a standard deviation of
3.7.
Measuring Preference Divergence
Preference divergence describes the divergence between the ideal point of the court and
the policy preferences of the government. I follow the common measurement approach
first proposed by Hönnige (2009) by measuring preference divergence as the absolute
ideological distance between the court and the government on a common left-right
scale using the ideology scores from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Laver
and Budge, 1992). The position of the government is calculated by weighting the CMP
scores by the seats of the governing parties in parliament. This allows for a more
nuanced measurement of the government’s policy position than using the raw CMP
scores without weighting. In the German analysis, the position of each Senate of the
GFCC is measured by assigning each judge the CMP score of the political party that
nominated him or her on the given day this judge entered the court. Subsequently, the
mean position of each Senate is calculated. In the French application, the same method
was applied (but there is only one chamber). Finally, the absolute distance between
the government position and the court position is calculated to obtain the ideological
distance between court and government.
15https://www.comparativeagendas.net/, accessed 12.04.2019.
16A similar line of argument in the context of judicial decisions can be found in Wittig (2016, 103).
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Measuring Risk of Non-Compliance
The measurement of the perceived risk of non-compliance must approximate the appraisal
of the judges whether or not the government will try to evade a decision after the
court has delivered a ruling. I follow the measurement strategy of Vanberg (2005) and
Krehbiel (2016) and measure the risk of noncompliance by examining whether or not
the government whose law is being challenged filed an amicus brief defending the
constitutionality of the statute. Filing such a brief can indicate the level of importance of
a law for the government, because it requires the legislator to invest resources in such a
statement. Furthermore, such a public statement (which will also be published together
with the judicial decision) demands the legislator to position itself publicly, and is
thus risky for the government’s reputation (Krehbiel, 2016, 997). For both applications,
the variable is coded 1 when the challenged government files a brief defending the
constitutionality of the law under review and 0 otherwise.
Confounders
For the German application, I control for two potential confounders, namely the public
awareness for a decision and the deciding Senate. Vanberg (2005) and Krehbiel (2016)
find that the degree of public awareness for a decision affects the behavior of the GFCC.
The court’s decision to write extra vague or specific decisions might be correlated with
the salience of a decision. If the public awareness for a decision is high, the court could
use this to additionally increase the pressure on the government and write even more
specific decisions, because the government’s room for maneuver is smaller than without
public awareness. In the same way, case salience may correlate with the government’s
decision to file a brief. Therefore, failing to control for existing public awareness of
a case could lead to biased results. I use the fact whether the court holds a public
hearing or not as a proxy variable of a case’s salience and thus, as an indicator of
public awareness. This variable is already used in other studies to approximate public
awareness (Vanberg, 2005; Krehbiel, 2016). Unfortunately, the Conseil does not hold
such hearings, nor is another measure available that approximates the salience or public
awareness for a CC decision in the French application.
I also control for the institutional structure of the GFCC. The GFCC comprises two
different Senates with varying persons and jurisdiction. This could result in a systematic
variation of the usage of decision language. I address this possibility with the variable
Second Senate, which has the value 1 if the Second Senate is concerned with a decision
and a 0 if it is the First Senate. Since the French constitutional court only comprises one
chamber, there is no need to control for this factor. Summary statistics of all variables
used throughout the analyses are in Appendix C.1.
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4.4.3 Statistical Model
Because the dependent variable is a continuous measure bounded to the interval [0, 1]
(the proportion of vague sentences in a decision document)17, I employ a fractional
logit regression (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). Fractional logit is a Quasi-MLE (QMLE)
method with the conditional expectation of a fractional response variable:
E(yi|xi) = Λ(xiβ) = exp(xiβ)1+ exp(xiβ) (4.1)
where yi with 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 is the fraction of vague sentences in document i, Λ(.)
is the logistic function and xi refers to the explanatory variables of document i, a
1× K + 1 vector for K independent variables. β is a K + 1× 1 vector of coefficients. The
quasi-likelihood is the same as the Bernoulli log-likelihood used in the ordinary logistic
regression case, with the individual contribution given by:
li(β) = yilog
[
Λ(xiβ)
]
+ (1− yi)log
[
1−Λ(xiβ)
]
(4.2)
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) show that variance misspecification can be an issue
when estimating a fractional logit regression. In my application, such a misspecification
could arise if the number of sentences in a decision document and some of the covariates
are not independent. The usual standard errors from ordinary logistic regression are
then misleading. As a fix for this, Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose to use robust
standard errors based on the well-known sandwich estimator (Papke and Wooldridge,
1996, 622). I follow this estimation strategy in the main analyses, but provide additional
analyses based on bootstrapping as an alternative way to obtain estimates and standard
errors in the robustness section.
In order to test H1 and H2 in the German application, the following model specifica-
tion is estimated (Λ(.) is always the logistic function):
E(ProportionVagueSentencesi|xi) =Λ(β1 + β2 IdeologicalDistancei
+ β3CaseComplexityi
+ β4SecondSenatei
+ β5OralHearingi
+ β6RiskNoncompliancei)
17For the French application, it is the proportion of vague words in a decision document.
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Testing H3a requires an interaction because the behavior of the GFCC in cases of
high risk of noncompliance is argued to be conditional on the ideological distance to
legislator. To test H3 in the German application, the following model is estimated:
E(ProportionVagueSentencesi|xi) =Λ(β1 + β2 IdeologicalDistancei
+ β3CaseComplexityi
+ β4SecondSenatei
+ β5OralHearingi
+ β6RiskNoncompliancei
+ β7 IdeologicalDistancei × RiskNoncompliancei)
For the French application, the following models are estimated for H1 and H2:
E(ProportionVagueWordsi|xi) =Λ(β1 + β2 IdeologicalDistancei
+ β3CaseComplexityi
+ β4RiskNoncompliancei)
The model for H3b in the French applications again contains an interaction term,
because the behavior of the court in cases of a high perceived risk of noncompliance
is conditional on the ideological distance between court and legislator. The following
model is estimated:
E(ProportionVagueWordsi|xi) =Λ(β1 + β2 IdeologicalDistancei
+ β3CaseComplexityi
+ β4RiskNoncompliancei
+ β5 IdeologicalDistancei × RiskNoncompliancei)
Generally, positive coefficients suggest that a court writes more vague decisions
and negative coefficients suggest that a court writes less vague (ergo, specific) deci-
sions. Because the coefficients of fractional logit models are difficult to interpret, I use
simulations to produce quantities of interest for sensible scenarios (King, Tomz and
Wittenberg, 2000).
In the simulations, I use the so-called “observed value” approach (Hanmer and Ozan
Kalkan, 2013). In this approach, only the variable(s) of interest are varied and each of
the other independent variables are hold at their observed values for each observation in
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the data. Then, the relevant quantity of interest is calculated for each observation, and
finally averaged over all observations (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013, 264). Hanmer
and Ozan Kalkan (2013) argue that the observed value approach has multiple advan-
tages compared with the usually-used “average-case” approach18, most importantly that
the obtained results better represent the collected data and that the findings are more
robust to model misspecification. It needs to be emphasized that the expected values of
these simulations are not the predicted probabilities of writing a vague decision, but
the expected proportion of vague sentences in a decision vagueness. I also want to
stress that the dependent variable in the German and French analysis is not the same:
in Germany, it is the proportion of vague sentences, in France it is the proportion of
vague words in a decision. Thus, the expected values are not directly comparable.
4.5 Results
This section shows the results of the fractional logit models for the Judicial Uncertainty
Hypothesis (H1), the Preference Divergence Hypothesis (H2) and the two hypotheses
related to the perceived risk of legislative non-compliance for both analysis in Germany
(Pressure Hypothesis (H3a)) and France (Defensive Mechanism Hypothesis (H3b)). I
only show simulation results in this section, but provide the corresponding regression
tables in the Appendix in Table C.2.
Results of the Judicial Policy Uncertainty Hypothesis
The formal model predicts that decision vagueness will increase as judicial policy
uncertainty increases, because courts want to give discretion to the legislator if they face
decisions which required specialized knowledge they do not possess. Figure 4.1 plots
the effect of judicial policy uncertainty on decision vagueness for Germany (left side)
and France (right side). For all graphs, I scaled the Y-axis such that it ranges from 0 -
100, so that the numbers can be directly interpreted as percentages.19 For continuous
variables, I visualize the inferential uncertainty in a “spaghetti”-style plot instead
of directly summarizing it in confidence intervals. Each line in this plot represents
the expected values based on one draw of the simulation. Confidence intervals are
displayed using dashed white lines. The distribution of the independent variable of
interest is shown by a density plot on the x-axis. This is because the usually used rugs
do not reveal the number of observations in the data represented by each rug.
For both countries, we observe a positive and statistically significant effect of judicial
policy uncertainty on decision vagueness. Just as the formal model predicts, this means
18In the average-case approach, the variable(s) of interest are varied and the values of the other
independent variables are usually set at their mean or median.
19This simply means that the fractions are multiplied by 100.
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Figure 4.1 – Effect of Judicial Uncertainty on Decision Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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Note: Left Side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness for simple and complex cases, with the correspond-
ing first difference using simulations. Simulations are carried out using N = 1, 000 draws using Model 1 of Table
C.3. For the simple and complex case scenario, the complex case dummy was set to zero and one, respectively.
The points represent the point estimates and the bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
Right side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over a range of judicial uncertainty, including 90% con-
fidence intervals using Model 1 of Table C.4. Judicial uncertainty is measured by the number of legal doctrines
considered in a decision.
that the higher the judicial policy uncertainty of the judges, the higher the decision
vagueness. In the German analysis, decision vagueness (percentage of vague sentences)
increases by 0.1 percentage points when judges face a complex case compared with a
simple case. This is a small but significant effect (the corresponding first difference is
statistically significant at the 90% level).
In the French analysis, decision vagueness increases by about 0.36 percentage points
from 0.39 percent (minimum judicial uncertainty) to 0.75 percent (maximum judicial
uncertainty) decision vagueness (vague words per decision) over the range of judicial
uncertainty (measured by the number of legal doctrines examined in a decision). This
is, on average, around a 1.5 standard deviation increase in the predicted percentage of
decision vagueness. Both analyses thus support the predictions of the formal model of
Staton and Vanberg (2008) with respect to the Judicial Policy Uncertainty Hypothesis.
Results of the Preference Divergence Hypothesis
With respect to preference divergence, the formal model predicts that higher preference
divergence, namely less ideological agreement between court and legislator, will lead
to writing less vague decisions. This is because the courts are aware that if they give
the legislator discretion by writing vague decisions, the final policy outcome will less
strongly represent the preferences of the court and more the preferences of the legislator.
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While this is not a problem when the court and legislator share the same preferences, it
is undesirable from the court’s perspective to write vague decisions in cases of a large
preference divergence with the legislator.
Figure 4.2 plots the effect of preference divergence on decision vagueness. We observe
different effects when looking at the GFCC (left side) and the CC (right side). In the
analysis of the GFCC, there is, as expected, a negative effect of preference divergence on
decision vagueness. This means that the higher the ideological distance between court
and legislator, the less vague the decisions become. This is to ensure that the final policy
outcome is not too distant to the GFCC’s ideal point. Therefore, the German analysis
supports the formal model’s predictions. Please note that although the confidence
intervals at the upper and lower end of the curve (minimum and maximum preference
divergence) overlap, the corresponding first difference is statistically significant at the
90% level (see Appendix C.3).
However, when looking at the French court, we observe the opposite effect than
in Germany: an increase in preference divergence leads the French judges to write
increasingly vague decisions. This effect is statistically significant at the 95% level. This
is against the formal model’s prediction. One reason for this finding might be that the
French judges are willing to make more concessions to the legislator because of the
highly political appointment procedure in France (Hönnige, 2009). Another explanation
might be measurement error: the CMP scores used to measure the ideological distance
between court and legislator are criticized with regard to their spatial and temporal
comparability (Lowe et al., 2011; König, Marbach and Osnabrügge, 2013). I will have a
closer look at this possibility in the robustness section. In summary, my analyses of the
Preference Divergence Hypothesis shows that the formal model’s prediction is only
confirmed when looking at the GFCC, but not for the CC.
4.5.1 Results of the Non-Compliance Risk Hypotheses
Both hypotheses with respect to noncompliance argue that public support is a decisive
factor that determines how constitutional courts deal with potential non-compliance
of the legislator. Here, we expect the two constitutional courts to behave differently.
A popular court such as the GFCC is predicted to use decision vagueness to pressure
the government when it is ideologically distant to the government and fears legislative
noncompliance (Pressure Hypothesis). By contrast, the CC is expected to use vagueness
as a “defensive mechanism”: when it is ideologically distant to the legislator and the
risk of non-compliance is high, the CC is expected to mask its lack of enforcement
power with vague language (Defensive Mechanism Hypothesis).
Figure 4.3 plots the effect of preference divergence conditional on the risk of legislative
noncompliance on decision vagueness. When looking at the results for the GFCC, we
observe that the German court writes less vague (-0.14 percentage points) decisions
when facing a high risk of noncompliance in cases where preference divergence is large
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Figure 4.2 – Effect of Preference Divergence on Decision Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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Note: Left Side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over the range of preference divergence, measured
by the ideological distance between court and legislator. 90% confidence intervals are used. Simulations are
carried out using N = 1, 000 draws using Model 1 of Table C.3 in Appendix C.2.
Right side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over the range of preference divergence, measured by
the ideological distance between court and legislator. 90% confidence intervals are used. Simulations are carried
out using N = 1, 000 draws using Model 1 of Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.
compared with cases in which preference divergence is low. The corresponding first
difference is statistically significant at the 90% level (see Appendix C.3). This is exactly
in line what the formal model predicts: If the legislature’s ideal point is already close
to the one of the GFCC, it is better from the GFCC’s perspective to hide the remaining
differences behind vague language than to try to pressure the legislature. However,
when both preferences diverge considerably, the court writes less vague decisions to
apply high pressure for compliance.
If we look at the results for the CC, we observe the opposite behavior. Again, in line
with the formal model, the CC writes more vague (+0.24 percentage points more vague
words) decisions in cases with a high risk of noncompliance and large preference diver-
gence than in cases with a high risk of noncompliance but low preference divergence.
This is because the Conseil is more concerned about its own institutional reputation
(which could be harmed if legislative evasion becomes evident to the public) in cases of
noncompliance than about pressuring the government with specific language (which in
turn also increases the chances that the public takes notice of an evasion). Hence, the
Pressure Hypothesis and the Defensive Mechanism Hypothesis are confirmed in the
empirical analysis.
In summary, the presented evidence on both courts mainly supports the theory
of Staton and Vanberg (2008). Just as the formal model suggests, my comparative
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Figure 4.3 – Conditional Effect of Preference Divergence and Non-Compliance Risk on Decision
Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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Note: This figure shows the conditional effect of preference divergence and the risk of non-compliance (NC)
on decision vagueness. The black points represent the expected decision vagueness for a case with a high
perceived risk of non-compliance and low preference divergence. The white points represent the expected
decision vagueness for a case with a low perceived risk of non-compliance and high preference divergence. The
first difference between these two scenarios is displayed on the right of each graph. The bars represent 90%
confidence intervals. For the scenarios, the risk of non-compliance variable is set to 1 and ideological distance is
set to the minimum (low divergence) and maximum (high divergence). Estimates are based on Model 2 in Table
C.3 and Model 2 in Table C.4 in Appendix C.2.
results confirm that judges strategically vary their decision vagueness depending on
the amount of policy uncertainty they face. However, the second hypothesis can
only be confirmed with respect to the GFCC: German judges write increasingly less
vague decisions the more ideologically distant that they are from the legislator. This
relationship cannot be confirmed when looking at the French CC, where we observe
the opposite effect.
More important, in line with Staton and Vanberg (2008)’s argument, I find that both
courts anticipate the potential future legislative behavior and adapt the vagueness
of their decision accordingly. The GFCC uses extra-specific language to pressure
the legislator to follow its rulings, while the CC uses extra-vague language to mask
potential attempts of evasion.
4.5.2 Robustness Analyses
I check the robustness of my findings when using different measurements for policy
divergence and judicial uncertainty and an alternative dependent variable. A detailed
report of all robustness analyses is in Appendix C.4.
First, a central variable in my analyses is the measurement of the degree of policy
divergence between court and legislator. For the main analysis, I used the scores from
the Comparative Manifesto Project to calculate the ideological position of court and
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legislator. These scores are increasingly criticized regarding their spatial and temporal
comparability (Lowe et al., 2011; König, Marbach and Osnabrügge, 2013). In order to
check whether my findings are robust to the measurement of ideological distance, I
replicate my analyses but use the Manifesto Common Space Scores (MCSS) of König,
Marbach and Osnabrügge (2013) instead of the original CMP scores. My findings
remain robust to the usage of this different ideology measure.
The second robustness check concerns the measurement of judicial policy uncertainty.
For the German analysis, instead of using the complexity of the topic of a decision,
I rely on another complexity measure first proposed by Wittig (2016) that measures
the length of the case facts of a decision. The case facts can be found at the beginning
of a decision of the GFCC and describe the case, the plaintiff’s arguments and other
decision-relevant context. Her measure takes into account how long this section is by
counting the number of paragraphs. Wittig (2016) argues that the longer the case facts,
the more complex the content of a decision is (Wittig, 2016, 102). I repeat my analyses
of the GFCC by using the length of case facts as the judicial uncertainty measure.20 I
find that while the sign of the respective coefficient is in the expected direction (the
longer the case facts, the higher the vagueness of a decision), the coefficient itself is not
statistically significant (p > 0.1). One possible reason for this could be that the length
of case facts is strongly correlated with the overall length of a decision (Pearson’s r is
0.64, p < 0.01). Thus, endogeneity could be an issue since the dependent variable is a
function of decision length and the number of vague sentences.
For the French analysis, I re-run the main analyses but this time I use a dummy
variable indicating whether a case is complex or not (using the same Comparative
Agenda Project coding scheme than in the German analysis) instead of the count of
the numbers of legal doctrines examined as a measure for judicial uncertainty.21 The
results remain unchanged when using this alternative measure.
The third robustness test replicates German main analysis but uses a different mea-
surement of the dependent variable. Instead of using the proportion of vague sentences
in a decision body (the dependent variable based on the CNN classifier), I employ
the proportion of vague words (measured by the expanded dictionary established in
Chapter 3). For all hypotheses, the coefficients are in the expected directions, but
not statistically significant. One reason for this could be that the validation of this
measure in Chapter 3.5 showed that the expanded dictionary produces a number of
false positives. These, in turn, could affect the statistical analysis since some decisions
might be declared as vaguer than they actually are.
20Like Wittig (2016), I cut off the variable at 200 because of an extreme low density above (Wittig, 2016,
104).
21I did not use this measure in the main analysis because not for all decision in my data the CAP coding
is provided (only until 2007), and therefore the overall N is smaller.
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For the fourth robustness check, I apply repeated random sub-sampling validation to
account for unobserved heterogeneity. I re-run my analyses twenty times using only a
two-third subset of the data, collect the results and combine the estimates as outlined
in King et al. (2001). In the French analysis, the results remain unchanged over the
different subsets with respect to size, sign and significance. In the German analysis,
I find that the direction and size of the estimates are robust across different subsets,
but that the combined estimates are no longer statistically significant, as indicated by
larger standard errors. However, this is a result of the rather small N of the German
data (N = 372 decisions), so that the larger standard errors are a result of sampling
variability.
For the last robustness check, I use bootstrapping as an alternative way to obtain
estimates and standard errors (Efron, 1979; Efron and Tibshirani, 1986). In the main
analysis, the robust variance estimator outlined in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) was
used. In this robustness check, I replicate all main analysis and simulations using boot-
strapping. Bootstrapping is a straightforward and easy-to-implement computational
procedure to derive estimates of means and standard errors. The strength of boot-
strapping is that the sampling distribution of a quantity is approximated by repeatedly
taking n samples with replacement from the original data. Like this, less distributional
assumptions are required, because mean and standard error are directly calculated
from the sampling distribution. In my robustness analysis, I use n = 1, 000 where
the size of each bootstrap sample is identical to the original data. These bootstrapped
samples are also directly used as the sampling distributions for the simulations. The
coefficients and standard errors obtained via the bootstrapping procedure are similar
the ones from the main analysis. Also, all simulation results mirror the findings from
the main analysis (see Appendix C.5 for a detailed analysis): how courts use vague
language is a function of their (limited) policy expertise, the preference divergence with
the legislator and the public support of the court. In summary, the evidence of the
robustness analysis mostly supports the findings of the main analysis. Future work,
though, must assess the robustness of the German analysis using alternative measures
and more data in further detail.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the indirect influence of public support on the choices that
judges make. In particular, this chapter is the first one to test the empirical implications
of the game-theoretic model of Staton and Vanberg (2008). In essence, this formal
model argues that courts strategically vary the vagueness of their decisions as a function
of their policy preferences, judicial uncertainty and their fear of potential legislative
noncompliance. Nonetheless, the court’s ability to use vagueness ultimately depends
on their level of public support. Therefore, this chapter considers both the varying
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degrees of diffuse support of different courts and the perception of courts as active
actors that use the institutional tools at their disposal to manage legislative resistance.
In a comparative study of two constitutional courts in Germany and France using
the judicial policy implementation vagueness measure established in Chapter 3, I find
mostly support for the central implications of the formal model. Both courts use vague
decision language to give discretion to the better-informed legislator. The German
judges refrain from doing so if the legislator is ideologically distant, whereas the French
judges behave in contrast to the formal model in this regard and write more vague
decisions. I also show that courts use decision language differently depending on
their public support: The German Federal Constitutional Court, a court with high
public support, writes extra-specific decision in the face of potential noncompliance
to strategically pressurize the legislator and to induce higher costs for legislative
noncompliance. By contrast, the French Conseil Constitutionnel, a court with low
public support, uses vagueness as a “defensive mechanism” to hide noncompliance
from public view.
These findings have larger implications for the study of judicial politics. If judges
strategically write vague decisions to manage the challenges of judicial policy-making,
then empirical tests of common separation-of-powers models should take this into
account. Studies only using binary measures of decision outcomes (e.g. a law is
declared as unconstitutional or not), as currently undertaken in many studies, are likely
to underestimate the actual degree of strategic judicial behavior. Therefore, my findings
suggest that judicial politics must overcome the binary coding of judicial outcomes
by using richer and more fine-grained measures of strategic judicial behavior.22 In
addition, considering the language of judicial decisions is an important step to reconcile
legal scholarship with political science, since it takes factors into account that most
often are ignored in quantitative judicial politics.
My results are in line with a growing part of the judicial literature which suggests that
courts and judges take active measures to prevail in the strategic interaction between
court, government, and the public (Staton, 2006, 2010; Krehbiel, 2016; Engst, 2018). It
shows that courts use the institutional tools at their disposal to deal with potential
legislative noncompliance. Finally, because the implications of Staton and Vanberg’s
(2008) model can be applied to many other delegation relationships, the findings of this
chapter have implications beyond judicial politics and open new avenues for further
research. Central banks and other non-majoritarian institutions face the same delega-
tion problems as constitutional courts, but also lack proper enforcement mechanisms.
Further research could thus investigate whether these institutions strategically use
vague language in a similar way as suggested in this chapter.
22A remarkable exception of conceptualizing judicial choices as binary choices is Engst (2018).
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CHAPTER 5
How to Forecast Constitutional Court Decisions?
Legal and Political Context in a Machine Learning
Application
5.1 Introduction
Is it possible to correctly predict decisions of the GFCC with an algorithm? And
which factors are important for the prediction: legal context or political context factors?
Algorithmic forecasting of court decisions is relatively new to the field. However,
building upon recent efforts in applied machine learning, several studies already
achieve impressive forecasting performances predicting US Supreme Court decision-
making (Ruger et al., 2004; Guimera and Sales-Pardo, 2011; Katz, Bommarito and
Blackman, 2017b). Nonetheless, these studies have two important limitations. First,
they exclusively focus on the US Supreme Court, which raises concerns about the
applicability of these forecasts to other courts, and thus, the external validity of their
findings. Second, none of the existing studies explicitly tests the relative contribution
of legal context versus political context factors for the forecast of court decisions.
There is a long-standing debate about which factors influence judicial decision-making.
On the one hand, traditional legal scholars emphasize the importance of the legal
and procedural context of a decision, while social scientists on the other hand also
acknowledge the importance of the political context of a decision. Teasing out the
relative importance of these factors improves our understanding of court decision-
making from a predictive perspective.
The contribution of this chapter is to address these two limitations. First, I investigate
whether it is possible to correctly predict the decision-making of the GFCC using a machine
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learning algorithm? I find that with a widely-used machine learning approach (random
forests), on average it is possible to correctly predict 76.40 percent of the outcomes
of over 2,900 proceedings decided by the GFCC between 1972 and 2010 using out-
of-sample prediction. I also address the second limitation by explicitly teasing out
the importance of variables associated with the legal and the political context of a
decision. The key argument here is that if traditional legal scholars are right, then the
legal and procedural context of a decision should be a sufficient predictor of court
decision-making. However, if social scientists have a point, then including political
context into the forecasting model should increase its predictive performance. For
this reason, in this chapter I also analyze whether political context factors, including public
opinion, contribute to the prediction of court decision-making on top of legal context factors?
The results of my prediction show that the legal context alone is already a good
predictor of court outcomes. However, I find that forecasting performance can be
further improved when the political context of a decision is additionally considered. I
conclude that the ensemble of both legal and political factors is needed to characterize
court decision-making. The results of this chapter therefore shed light at the importance
of public opinion (and other political context factors) for the relationship between court-
public and have important implications beyond the application to the GFCC which I
discuss at the end of this chapter: the value of predictive modeling for the field of social
science.
5.2 Existing Approaches to Forecast Court Decision-Making
Forecasting the outcome of a court decision is a long-standing idea which originates
from the very early stages of judicial politics research. “Legal prophecy”, how Holmes
(1897) termed it, has drawn considerable interest of scholars from various fields. Legal
academics and political scientists have long scrutinized judicial decisions to understand
what motivates courts and judges and how they arrive at a given outcome. These
studies often look at past decisions and historical facts, e.g. individual judges’ voting
patterns, to explain why a certain court decided in a certain way. Most often, the goal
is not to predict the outcome itself, but to use the causal connection between certain
aspects of judicial decision-making to assess the consistency of some explanatory theory.
Most of these studies use classic hypothesis testing, and are not interested in whether
a model correctly predicts the outcome, but rather if certain estimates are statistically
significant or not.
However, with the rise of artificial intelligence over the last decade, a new sub-field
has emerged in judicial politics: the field of quantitative legal prediction1 (Katz, 2013).
1This term was first introduced by Katz (2013). Quantitative legal prediction can be understood as an
umbrella term for all different kinds of non-inferential, predictive approaches that aim at analyzing or
predicting legal outcomes.
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In contrast to traditional causal inference approaches that make – at best – theory
driven predictions about future outcomes, quantitative legal prediction focus entirely
on the forecasting enterprise. Often, machine learning is the preferred method this.
Machine learning in general is defined as “a subfield of computer science concerned
with computer programs that are able to learn from experience and thus improve their
performance over time” (Russel and Norvig, 2016, 693). The main purpose of machine
learning is to detect patterns and correlations in data and derive predictions about
future outcomes. Not the explanatory but rather the predictive power of a variable is
important here.
Over recent years, there has been a sharp increase in studies predicting the outcome
of court decision-making with machine learning. In what follows, I will discuss the
most prominent approaches. However, I will narrow my discussion only to approaches
that actually employ an ex-ante forecasting approach. Ex-ante prediction is defined
here as any prediction performed using information that is available prior to a judicial
decision. Studies that use the texts of a decision to arrive at their predictions (e.g. Sulea
et al., 2017; Medvedeva, Masha and Vols, Michel and Wieling, 2018) are excluded, since
decision texts are typically not available in advance of a decision.
One of the first attempts to use machine learning to make ex-ante predictions about
judicial outcomes dates back to 2004. In a seminal study, Ruger et al. (2004) held
a prediction tournament in which known legal experts competed against a simple
machine learning algorithm, a classification and regression tree (Breiman et al., 1984).2
The goal of their work was straightforward: predict the votes of individual judges as
well as the final decision outcome of cases referred by lower courts to the US Supreme
Court in advance of the release of the Supreme Court’s decision. Their machine learning
model only relied on observable case characteristics such as the type of respondent, the
type of petitioner, or the issue area of a case. Their model was trained on data from the
“Rehnquist Court" (1994 to 2002), and then the predictive performance was tested on
the October 2002 term. Known legal experts have also attempted to predict the same
outcomes. The result of this prediction tournament is impressive: the simple machine
learning algorithm already outperforms the legal experts by correctly forecasting 75%
of all outcomes, while the human experts only forecasted 59% correctly. With respect
to individual judges’ votes, the model was correct in 66.7% of the cases wile human
experts correctly predicted 67.9%.
As a follow up of this work, Guimera and Sales-Pardo (2011) investigate whether it is
possible to make predictions of a justice’s vote based on the other justices’ votes in the
same case by analyzing the voting behavior of each natural court between 1953 and
2A similar approach, but in a much richer setting, is currently undertaken by Katz, Bommarito and
Blackman (2017a), where the authors test the predictive ability of a large crowd (a large group of humans)
compared with experts and algorithms.
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2004. They use the votes of all judges in all previous cases, and the votes of the eight
other judges in the current case to predict the vote of the ninth judge in the same case.
They do not include any variables in their model, but solely rely on voting patterns.
Their approach predicts 83% of the individual justice’s votes correctly, but does not
forecast the case level outcomes directly.
The work of Katz, Bommarito and Blackman (2017b) presents a major advance
with respect to court prediction. The authors predict Supreme Court decisions over
almost two centuries (1816-2015), forecasting 28,000 cases outcomes and more than
240,000 individual justice votes. Using random forests, a popular ensemble machine
learning method and only relying on data available prior to the date of decision, Katz,
Bommarito and Blackman’s (2017b) model correctly predicts 70.2% of the court’s overall
affirm/reverse decisions and correctly forecasts 71.9% at the individual justice vote
level. A recent study builds on their efforts and improves the prediction to about
75%, leveraging an even more powerful algorithm (AdaBoosted decision trees) for the
prediction (Kaufman, Kraft and Sen, 2019).
5.3 Limitations of Existing Forecasting Approaches
All of these studies provide important insights about the predictability of court decision-
making. However, I argue that existing forecasting approaches have two major limi-
tations. First, existing ex-ante prediction models exclusively analyze and predict the
US Supreme Court decision-making. This raises concerns about the external validity
of previous work, and whether a similar prediction model could also be successfully
applied to Kelsenian constitutional courts. In this regard, there are two issues. First,
the US common-law system is guided by the norm of stare decisis, under which judges
are supposed to decide cases based on similar precedents in the past. This leads to
the expectation that just by how the legal system is constructed, there is supposed
to be a high consistency between certain case-fact patterns. This “path-dependency”
potentially facilitates the forecast, and might explain why even simple machine learning
approaches (such as classification trees) already reach a high prediction accuracy (Ruger
et al., 2004; Kastellec, 2010). As most European constitutional courts are under the
civil-law system, there is no such thing as the norm of stare decisis. In other words, a
European constitutional court judge is formally less bound to past case outcomes when
making her decision in a current case. This absence of “path-dependency” should make
it potentially harder for machine learning algorithms to detect and identify patterns
between certain factors and outcomes. Second, some of the previous studies use the
past voting behavior of individual judges to obtain predictions (e.g. Guimera and
Sales-Pardo, 2011). Unfortunately, this rich source of information cannot be leveraged
for most European constitutional courts due to the non-disclosure of individual judges’
votes. Both points raise concerns whether legal prediction models can also be success-
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fully applied to European constitutional courts. The first question this chapter will
answer is, therefore, whether similar predictive approaches already successfully applied to the
Supreme Court also work in the European court setting?
Second, none of the existing studies have explicitly evaluated the relative importance
of the predictors, namely the variables used for the prediction. There is a long-standing
debate about which factors influence judicial decision-making, and thus assist its
prediction. Although nowadays, the traditional divide between the two “camps” of
legalists on the one hand and realists on the other hand is less clear and not as stark as
it has been before, there remains considerable disagreement on which factors exactly
are important for legal prediction. Traditional legal scholarship still emphasizes the
important role of jurisprudence and legal doctrine, and tends to downplay the role
of non-legal factors. According to this notion, judges find the solution to a legal
question or the case outcome by neutrally applying law through legal reasoning and
interpretative methods. To exaggerate, in this regard law works as a set of static, natural,
apolitical rules that can be mechanically applied to decisions. Or, as Dyevre (2008)
characterizes it: “rules + facts = decision” (Dyevre, 2008, 27). This traditional legal
perspective remains strong in the European constitutional court context. The German
legal scholar Ossenbühl (1998) for instance states that the jurisdiction of the FCC is a
decision of dispute by means and guided by methods of law not political judgment
(Ossenbühl, 1998, 85).
By contrast, legal realists and political scientists argue that legal factors alone are
not sufficient to fully explain and predict judicial decision-making. Attitudinalists for
instance argue that judges are single-minded political actors whose decisions reflect
their unconstrained policy preferences (Segal and Cover, 1989; Segal et al., 1995; Segal
and Spaeth, 2002; Baum, 2009). Related, strategic accounts of judicial decision-making
claim that judges are strategic actors who originally pursue policy-goals, but must adapt
their behavior to external and internal constraints from other actors from time to time.
Such constraints are, for instance, following public opinion to maintain their public
support (e.g. Vanberg, 2005; Hall, 2014), or a strategic restraint from their own policy
preferences in a separation-of-powers framework (e.g. Epstein, Knight and Martin, 2001;
Bailey and Maltzman, 2011).
In this chapter, I do not aim to enter this (sometimes still) stylized debate. Instead, I
want to explicitly test and tease out which factors actually contribute to the prediction
of court decision-making. This idea is already noted in Martin et al. (2004), who write
that “the best test of an explanatory theory is its ability to predict future events. To
the extent that social science and legal scholarship seeks to explain court behavior,
they ought to test their theories not only against cases already decided, but against
future outcomes as well” (Martin et al., 2004, 761). Nonetheless, none of the existing
ex-ante prediction models have explicitly teased out and quantified the contribution
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of variables belonging to different strands of argument.3 In this context, predictive
modeling offers an excellent possibility to compare theories that seek to predict the
same outcome (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017, 149). In particular, predictive modeling
“is an exceedingly simple means to highlight the extent to which the theoretically
informed models anticipate reality, and which among those models does a better job of
it” (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017, 149).
For this reason, I will tease out the relative contribution of both political context
factors and legal context factors for the prediction of court outcomes. I conceptualize
political context factors as all factors that relate to the political aspects of court decision-
making. Political context factors include the ideological position of the court, the public
support for the court, the public opinion towards a certain issue upon which the court
will decide, or any other political factor which social scientists have carved out in their
work on judicial decision-making (see above). By contrast, legal context factors describe
all non-political case characteristics associated with a case. These factors include the
issue area of a case, the type of legal question that is raised, or the type of plaintiff or
respondent. In other words, the legal context is rather understood as the legal baseline
of a case in the absence of political factors.
Evaluating the contribution of political and legal context factors for the prediction
of court decision-making can thus help us to gain a better understanding of court
decision-making. The key argument here is that if traditional legal scholars are right,
then the legal context of a decision should already be sufficient to predict a substantial
part of court decision-making. Therefore, according to the pure legalist view, adding
political context to the prediction should not improve the predictive performance of
a forecasting model. However, if legal realists and social scientists have a point, the
observable implication is that including political context into the prediction should
increase the predictive power of the forecast. The second question this chapter thus
addresses is whether political context factors contribute to the prediction of court decision-
making compared with legal context factors?
To sum up, in this section I have discussed several existing ex-ante prediction models
that use machine learning to forecast court decision-making. I have argued that there
are two limitations in prior work: a) the exclusive focus on the US Supreme Court
which raises concerns about the external validity of previous findings; and b) the lack of
evidence that explicitly tests the contribution of both legal context and political context
variables to the prediction of court decision-making. In the next section I present a
research design that addresses these two limitations.
3Katz, Bommarito and Blackman (2017b) use variables belonging to legal and political context, but
neither map their variables to these dimensions nor do they compare the variable’s contribution.
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5.4 An Ex-Ante Prediction Model for GFCC Decisions
In this section, I present a research design for an ex ante prediction of the decision-
making of the GFCC that is able to carve out the relative contribution of legal context
and political context factors for the prediction. My design addresses the two limitations
outlined before. I discuss why the German Federal Constitutional Court is an appro-
priate study object as a European constitutional court, which data and variables I use
to capture the legal context and political context of a case, and why I use the random
forests algorithm for the prediction.
5.4.1 Case Selection: The German Federal Constitutional Court
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a forecasting model that a) predicts the
decision-making of a constitutional court outside the US and b) compares the predictive
contribution of legal and political context factors for the prediction. Here, the GFCC
is analyzed. The case selection is motivated by three reasons. First, the GFCC is the
archetype of the European Kelsenian constitutional court type and is considered as
being one of the most powerful and influential constitutional courts world wide. It has
served as a model for many newly established constitutional courts, e.g. in Eastern
Europe. A prediction model that is suitable for the GFCC could also work as a blueprint
for prediction models of these other courts. Moreover, the GFCC operates in a civil
law system, and the individual votes of judges are mostly confidential. This means
that one cannot simply predict individual judges’ votes and aggregate them to make
case outcome predictions. On these grounds, the GFCC represents a meaningful yet
challenging study object from a predictive perspective. Third, the institutional power of
the German court provides it with a strong institutional independence of other political
actors, for instance with an appointment process of judges which requires a broad
inter-party agreement. This makes it a hard-case scenario to test the importance of
political context for the prediction: if we find evidence that political context matters for
the GFCC, it presumably also matters for constitutional courts where the nomination
procedure is more politicized (for instance, in France).
5.4.2 Data and Analytical Approach
The data used in this study were compiled as part of the Constitutional Court Database
(CCDB) (Hönnige et al., 2015). The CCDB features 38 years (1972-2010) of data on
decisions of the GFCC. Here, I use 2,910 proceedings (referrals) decided in this time
frame. The court often bundles multiple proceedings in one main decision but decides
on each of them individually (Wittig, 2016, 27). Thus, although being reviewed in
the same main decision, the proceeding of petitioner A can be successful while the
proceeding of petitioner B is not. I therefore follow common practice and treat the
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proceedings and their respective outcomes as the level of analysis (Hönnige, 2009;
Sternberg et al., 2015; Krehbiel, 2016).
The GFCC knows over 21 different proceeding types, which differ in the actors entitled
to file an appeal, the possible causes of action, and also in their political importance and
societal relevance. In my analysis, I concentrate on four proceeding types: constitutional
complaints, concrete reviews of statutes, abstract judicial reviews of statutes and Organstreit
proceedings. These proceeding types account for 98 percent of all proceedings decided
by the GFCC. The proceeding types left out appear only rarely or are not a proceeding
in the classic sense. Such proceedings include e.g. the procedure to impeach the Federal
President.4
Constitutional complaints are the most common proceeding type (1941 proceedings in
my data) accounting for around two-thirds of the observations in my data. Constitu-
tional complaints allow citizens to assert their freedoms that are guaranteed by the
constitution vis-à-vis the state, and can be filed by any person directly affected by a
public law or act (after all other legal remedies are used). Specific judicial reviews are
the second most common proceeding type (760 proceedings in my data). They can be
filed by regular lower courts to review laws or statues if they are unsure whether this
law is unconstitutional or not. Abstract judicial reviews5 are typically filed by political
actors such as the parliamentary opposition, often challenging governmental laws or
statutes. Although abstract reviews are relatively rare (121 proceedings in my data),
they often concern matters of political nature and hold great political and societal
importance (Kranenpohl, 2010, 260). These type of proceedings are also called the
“sword” of the opposition (Schneider, 1974, 222). Finally, Organstreit proceedings (88
proceedings in my data) may be filed if high state organs, or actors that are equivalent
to such organs, disagree on their respective rights and obligations under the Basic Law.
Similar to abstract reviews, they often raise questions of fundamental political issues
that are relevant for the political system. Because abstract reviews and Organstreit
proceedings only appear relative rarely, but are both considered as rather political
proceeding types, I group them together in the analysis. Therefore, the final data
contains three distinct data sets for each constitutional complaints, concrete reviews
and abstract reviews/Organstreit proceedings.
Based on this data, I develop a separate prediction model for each of the three
proceeding types, but with the same fixed set of predictors. This strategy is different
to other court prediction models that rely on only one general model (Ruger et al.,
2004; Katz, Bommarito and Blackman, 2017b) for all different kinds of decision types.
4Official annual statistics provided by the GFCC can be found at https://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Statistik/statistics_2018.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=4, accessed 12.04.2019.
5In line with Hönnige (2009), I also code Bund-Länder-Streits, a vertical conflict of competence between
the federal and the state governments, as abstract reviews due to their equivalence as regards content.
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However, I argue that my approach has several advantages. First, using different
proceeding types but the same fixed set of predictors allows me to compare the models
with respect to their predictive performance and the contribution of the same variables
in a different proceeding context. It is thus possible to test whether, for instance,
political context variables contribute considerably more for the prediction of political
proceeding types than for the prediction of proceedings without a political context.
Second, developing one prediction model for all distinct proceeding types requires the
assumption that the data generating process is the same across all types. This would
be a strong (and potentially incorrect) assumption, given that the proceeding types
strongly differ in their character. Finally, using one general model for all proceeding
types would result in a heavy bias towards predictors that best explain constitutional
complaints, as this type account for the majority of the data. The final model would
hence not be a general model for all different proceeding types, but a model that is
good for predicting constitutional complaints. In turn, this would not be beneficial to
tease out the relative contribution of legal and political context factors across different
proceeding types.
5.4.3 Outcome Variable
The outcome variable (dependent variable) is a binary variable indicating the individual
outcome of each proceeding. This variable is coded as a one if the GFCC decided in
favor of the plaintiff and it is coded as zero if it decides against it. In other words,
it indicates whether the plaintiff was successful or not. Following common practice,
I consider a partial success to be a ruling in favor of the petitioner (Hönnige, 2007;
Vanberg, 2005; Hönnige, 2009; Sternberg et al., 2015; Krehbiel, 2016, 2019). This binary
coding scheme also allows me to compare my results with the findings of existing
studies later.
In order to predict the outcome of a proceeding, I employ a number of predictors
which represent the legal and political context of a proceeding. All of these variables
can be used for an ex-ante prediction, since they all can be obtain a priori to a GFCC
decision, and are thus exogenous to the final outcome. In fact, all information used for
the prediction are publicly available the same day the plaintiff decides to submit the
proceeding to the court. The model thus provides a substantial lead time.6
5.4.4 Legal Context Variables
I conceptualize the legal context of a decision as non-political, legal case characteristics
associated with a decision. In other words, these factors should represent the “legal” or
6Lead time can be defined as the amount of time between a forecast is released and the actual occurrence
of the event or outcome that is predicted.
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“procedural” baseline of a case. This baseline can then be used to compare the predictive
power of political context in the subsequent assessment. Representing the legal context
of a proceeding, I include the following variables: the decision type, the issue area a
proceeding, the Senate who is supposed to adjudicate, the legal area a proceeding is
concerned with and whether proceedings are grouped together or not. The decision
type describes whether the decision is, for instance, a main decision or a provisional
order. The issue variable describes the topic of a decision and is coded according to
the Comparative Agenda Coding scheme (e.g. macroeconomic issues, social insurance).
The legal area of a proceeding describes the legal doctrine a decision is related to, for
instance family law or asylum law. However, it does not contain information on the
exact legal norms the court examines in a decision, because from an ex-ante perspective
this information is not available in advance of a court decision. All of those variables
are taken from the CCDB. I did not include information on the petitioner type or
respondent type of a proceeding, because this information is already mostly covered
by the proceeding type itself.7 Table 5.1 provides a more detailed description of these
variables with examples.
5.4.5 Political Context Variables
Political context is conceptualized as all factors that relate to the political aspects of
court decision-making. The following predictors are used to represent the political
context of a proceeding: the ideological position of the GFCC, the salience of a proceeding,
the popularity of the opposition at the time of a decision, and a measure for the perceived
state of the economy by German citizens as a measure of public economic mood. These
political context factors are included because prior research of political scientists have
found them to be important for the decision-making of the GFCC (Hönnige, 2007, 2009;
Sternberg et al., 2015).
The ideological direction of the GFCC is measured on a common left-right scale using
the Manifesto Common Space Scores (MCSS) (König, Marbach and Osnabrügge, 2013).
To calculate the position of the court, I use the same measurement approach already
explained in the previous chapter (Chapter 4.4.2). The importance of the GFCC’s
ideological position is demonstrated in previous work by Hönnige (2007, 2009). The
following predictors are all related to public opinion and public support, and thus
represent the direct effect that the public has on the decision-making of the GFCC.
The salience of a proceeding, namely its importance for the public is measured by a
binary variable indicating whether a proceeding is accompanied by an oral hearing
or not. Vanberg (2005) uses this variable as a proxy measure for the degree of the
7These variables are not supposed to represent all factors that legal scholars or legal traditionalist
consider as being the most important factors of court decision-making. Rather, the legal context factors
should serve as a baseline to compare the political context with.
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public awareness of a case, because “cases involving oral arguments are usually cases
of great significance” (Vanberg, 2005, 103). Therefore, this variable is included as a
political context factor because several studies demonstrate that the decision-making of
the GFCC is affected by a proceeding’s salience (Vanberg, 2005; Krehbiel, 2016, 2019).
The popularity of the opposition captures the difference in the opposition’s popularity
relative to the popularity of the governments. This variable is included as political
context variable because there is evidence that popular oppositions win their cases
more often than oppositions with little public support (Sternberg et al., 2015). The data
for this variable is taken from the German Politbarometer survey (Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen, 2019). Finally, I capture the economic mood of the German public by measuring
the perceived state of the economy. Evidence from the US Supreme Court shows that its
decision-making is shaped by the economic state of the country (Brennan, Epstein and
Staudt, 2009; Staudt and He, 2010). This could also be the case for the decision-making
of the GFCC, although this causal relationship has not yet been tested. The economic
mood variable is also part of the Politbarometer survey.
As an important note, I want to stress that model building and model specification is
undertaken differently in predictive modeling than compared with classical inferential
modeling. In predictive modeling, the inclusion of certain variables into a model is not
guided by theory or expected causal relationships between the outcome variable and the
predictors. Instead, generally all available information that could be somehow relevant
for the prediction is included into a model, and the predictors are only modified to
obtain a better prediction (to avoid over-fitting, for instance) or reduce computational
burden (this process is called feature engineering in the machine learning literature
(Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009)). Following this, I did not make a specific
effort to reduce the list of legal or political context variables, and that there is no doubt
that some of them are correlated. Nonetheless, this (some would call it “kitchen sink”)
approach is not problematic for my analysis. The machine learning method I use
does not suffer from the same problems that conventional regression analysis has with
correlated predictors. Therefore, I am rather over-inclusive in adding predictors to the
model. All variables are once more summarized in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.1 – Legal and Political Context Variables Used for the Forecast
Legal Context Description Example
Decision Type The type of the decision Main decision,
preliminary
ruling
Issue Issue area (Comparative Agenda Coding
Scheme)
Macroeconomic
Issues
Senate Senate dealing with a proceeding Senate I or II
Legal Area Legal area a proceeding is concerned with Labor law
Grouped Whether a proceeding is grouped with
others or not
0 = not grouped,
1 = grouped
Political Context
Salience Whether there was an oral hearing before
the proceeding
0 = no oral hear-
ing, 1 = oral hear-
ing
Popularity Opposition Difference in popularity of opposition rel-
ative to government
1 = very unpopu-
lar, 11 = very pop-
ular
Economic Perception Perceived state of the economy 1 = very good, 5
= very bad
Ideological Direction Ideological direction of the Court (MCSS
scores)
-1 = left, 1 = con-
servative
5.4.6 Method
To build my prediction models I rely on random forests (Breiman, 2001). Random
forests is a popular ensemble classifier and is among the most commonly used machine
learning algorithms for supervised learning (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009).
Although random forests and similar tree-based methods were long neglected by the
field, they become increasingly used in the social science context (e.g. Green and Kern,
2012; Beauchamp, 2017; Montgomery and Olivella, 2018; Jones and Lupu, 2018; Bonica,
2018; Kaufman, Kraft and Sen, 2019). In what follows, I give a brief introduction to
random forests. For a recent, non-technical introduction of tree-based methods for
political scientists see Montgomery and Olivella (2018).
A random forest uses an ensemble of classification and regression trees (CART). CART
is a supervised machine learning algorithm that iteratively divides the outcome variable
observations into increasingly homogeneous groups using the predictor variables
through binary splits (this is called recursive partitioning). CARTs are known to be
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notoriously unstable, meaning that already small changes in the data can lead to
completely different splits. They also tend to be biased towards continuous covariates
(Hothorn, Hornik and Zeileis, 2006). A random forest overcomes these limitations by
using an ensemble of many randomized trees that leverage two forms of randomness:
bagging – short for bootstrap aggregation – (Breiman, 1996) and random substrates of the
predictor variables. The underlying idea is that many uncorrelated trees are constructed
and then aggregated. The procedure to construct one (out of many, typically between
500 and 1,000) tree in random forest is as follows.
First take a random sample with replacement, typically containing about two-third
of the observations, while the remaining (one-third) of the observations are hold “out-
of-bag” (oob). On the bootstrapped sample, construct a decision tree. At each node of
the tree, randomly select m out of p predictors, where m is a hyper-parameter and
is typically chosen by the researcher. Out of these m randomly selected predictors
(random substrates), the one that gives the best classification at this node is used to
partition the data. This process is repeated at each subsequent node, such that at
each node a random substrate of m predictors is chosen. The random selection of
splitting variables allows predictors that were otherwise outplayed by their competitors
to enter the ensemble. This has the benefit of obtaining less correlated and thus, more
robust trees. The model then averages predictions over all trees, whereby the predicted
class of an observation is calculated by majority voting of the oob-predictions for that
observation. In Appendix D.1 I outline the random forest algorithm in further detail.
There are four reasons to use random forests and not another machine learning
classifier. First, random forests has proved to be a strong learner in a comparable study
(Katz, Bommarito and Blackman, 2017b). Second, in an analysis of judicial decisions
and legal rules using a single decision tree, Kastellec (2010) finds that the tree structure
actually mirrors the “hierarchical and dichotomous structure that often seems apparent
in judicial opinions” (Kastellec, 2010, 210). Third, an experiment using several popular
classification algorithms shows that random forests outperforms other algorithms.8
Fourth, random forests is very efficient in detecting non-linearities in the data without
requiring the specification of any functional form and also provides built-in estimates
of variable importance. All of these aspects make random forests the optimal method
choice for my prediction task.
8I test the predictive performance of Classification and Regression Tree (CART), Random Forests,
Support Vector Machines, k-nearest neighbors, extreme gradient boosted trees and regularized logistic
regression on the constitutional complaints data. Predictive performance was assesses using 10-fold cross-
validation without hyper-parameter tuning. Cross-validation was performed such that every algorithm
received exactly the same data slices, to make the model comparison as fair as possible. This constitutional
complaints data set is used because it has the largest N. The classification results are found in the
Appendix D.2.
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5.5 Results
In this section I present the results of the ex-ante prediction of proceedings decided
by the GFCC. The section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I use random
forests to predict the outcomes of each proceeding type in my data using the same fixed
set of input variables. I show that a combined model consisting of legal and political
context variables yields to a higher predictive performance than a model using legal
context factors alone. Moreover, I conduct a simulation that shows that the increase in
predictive power is not just an artifact of adding more variables to the model. In the
second part, I open the black-box of the prediction model by comparing the predictive
importance of the predictors across the proceeding types. The section concludes with a
discussion of the ability of random forests to detect interesting non-linearities in the
data that conventional regression analysis might have overlooked.
5.5.1 Predicting Proceeding Outcomes of the GFCC
In order to tease out the relative importance of legal and political context for the
prediction of GFCC decision-making, I run a series of experiments. For each of the
three proceeding type data sets, two different random forests are developed: a legal
model only featuring the legal context variables, and a combined model featuring the legal
context and political context variables. The legal model here serves as a “legal” baseline
and is used to evaluate the predictive performance one can expect by just using the legal
and procedural context of a given proceeding. The combined model is used to assess
whether and to what extent political context can improve the model’s predictive power.
To repeat, the observable implication with respect to this comparison is that if legal
realists and political scientist are right by arguing that political context matters, then
the inclusion of this context into the prediction model should increase its predictive
capability. If political context is irrelevant for the prediction, then its inclusion should
not change model performance. At this point I want to highlight again that my analysis
does not seek to disentangle the causal effect of legal and political context on judicial
behavior, nor to test whether political context outweighs legal context.
For a fair model comparison, a robust model performance evaluation is of crucial
importance. In predictive modeling, the goal is to obtain an estimate of true error (also
known as generalization error). True error is a measure of how well a model can predict
outcomes of previously unseen data (Efron and Hastie, 2016; Cranmer and Desmarais,
2017). An estimate of true error is important in practice, as it allows one to check
whether a model generalizes well to unseen data or just memorizes the patterns in the
training data (i.e. over-fitting).
With this in mind, I provide two performance evaluations of the models. In the first
performance evaluation, I report the model’s performance based on their aggregated
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cross-validation score without hyper-parameter tuning. Cross-validation, when correctly
applied, can be used to obtain an almost unbiased method of true error without
setting aside additional test data (see Cawley and Talbot, 2010; Efron and Hastie,
2016). However, note that combining cross-validation for model tuning and to estimate
true error at the same time leads to serious misreporting of performance measures
(Neunhoeffer and Sternberg, 2019).
In my experiments, on each of the three data sets9, I perform (stratified) 10-fold
cross-validation and hold only the hype-parameter of random forests fix at m =
√
p,
where p is the number of predictors and m is the number of random substrates. This
value is recommended by Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman (2009) for classification
problems using random forests (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009, 592). In short,
cross-validation refers to randomly dividing a data set into K about equally sized folds,
where each fold contains about NK observations. A random forest classifier
10 is then
trained K times on all but the kth fold, where k runs from 1 to K. In every iteration,
a performance measure is used to evaluated the model performance on the kth fold
(holdout/test fold) that was not part of the training. Finally, the average (across the K
folds) of a performance measure is reported, which is the aggregated cross-validation
score. However, as Cawley and Talbot (2010) show, even if cross-validation is applied
correctly, the variability of such hold-out methods can lead to over-fitting in a finite
sample nonetheless (Cawley and Talbot, 2010, 2084-2086). This, in turn, would lead to
reporting an overly optimistic model performance.
For this reason, I report the results of an out-of-sample prediction as a second evalua-
tion. Out-of-sample prediction is considered as the gold standard to obtain an unbiased
estimate of true error (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009, 220). In out-of-sample
prediction, a model is trained on a training set and then used to predict the observations
of a test set (the out-of-sample data). During the training process, hyper-parameter
tuning can be performed. This is because due to the strict split between training set
and test set, the final model evaluation cannot suffer from over-fitting since the test
set never occurred in the model building process.11 For each of the three proceeding
data sets, I randomly divide the data into a training set, containing 75 percent of the
9I only use the training data sets (see next paragraph) to obtain the cross-validated performance scores.
This ensures that each model only has access to exactly the same amount of information. Taking the
cross-validation scores of the whole data set would constitute an unfair model comparison, because then
models of the cross-validation procedure would have seen more data than the models of the out-of-sample
evaluation.
10The random forests are estimated using the R packages caret (Kuhn, 2008) and ranger, a fast (parallel)
implementation of random forests (Wright and Ziegler, 2015). For each random forests, 1, 000 trees
(ntree = 1, 000) are grown because simulation studies suggest that smaller values can result in unstable
estimates under certain circumstances (Strobl et al., 2007; Strobl, Hothorn and Zeileis, 2009).
11Of course, a model can over-fit the training data, although the over-fit will lead to a poor out-of-sample
prediction.
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observations, and a test (out-of-sample) set with the remaining 25 percent.12 On each
of these training data sets, I train two random forests models: one using only the
legal context variables, and one using both. Tuning is performed to find the best set
of hyper-parameters using five-fold cross-validation and random grid-search. These
models are then used to predict the outcomes of the observations in the test set.
As performance metrics, I report the accuracy and Cohen’s Kappa (Cohen, 1960).
Accuracy is simply defined as the sum of true positives and true negatives divided
by the overall number of observations. The Kappa metric takes into account the class
distributions and is based on the observed accuracy (accuracy of the classifier) and
the expected accuracy (expected accuracy of a random classifier). In Appendix D.3,
I report additionally the receiver operating characteristic area under the curve (ROC
AUC) and the precision recall area under the curve (PR AUC).13 In order to calculate
the accuracy, the conventional threshold of 0.5 is used for positive predictions. The
majority class (baseline) is also reported to compare the performance of the random
forest with respect to a naive learner. A naive learner is defined here as a classifier who
always assigns the majority (most frequently occurring) category of the training set.14
Table 5.2 reports the model evaluations based on the aggregated cross-validation
scores across the three different data sets. All columns labeled as “legal” report the
performance of the legal model and all columns labeled as “combined” report the
performance of the combined model. The corresponding confusion matrices of each
model are provided in Appendix D.4. The best models according to the respective
performance measure are highlighted in bold. We see that the legal model itself
is already sufficiently good to predict a substantial part of all decisions correctly,
outperforming the baseline for all proceeding types. The weighted accuracy across all
proceeding types is 62.55 percent.15 Using the weighted accuracy is important to obtain
the overall percentage of correctly-predicted proceedings, since the proceeding data
sets are of different sizes.
However, and this is the important observation, we also see that for all proceeding
types, the model performance is improved when the political context variables are
added (combined model). Across all proceeding types, the weighted accuracy improves
to 72.16 percent. This means that using the combined model, it is possible to correctly
forecast approximately three out of four outcomes. On average, across all proceeding
12The randomly created training and tests sets are of the following sizes (N of training set, N of test
set): Constitutional complaints 1,455, 486; concrete reviews 570, 190; Abstract reviews and Organstreit
proceedings 156, 53.
13The calculation of all performance metrics is defined in Appendix B.3.1.
14Note that it only makes sense to report the baseline for accuracy. This is because the kappa measure
already takes into account the majority class in its calculation (kappa = 0 means that majority voting takes
place).
15Calculated by weighting the accuracy of the respective proceeding type with the number of observa-
tions of this type.
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Table 5.2 – Model Evaluation Based on Aggregated Cross-Validation Scores
Accuracy Kappa
Legal Combined Baseline Legal Combined
Constitutional Complaints 60.14 68.93 53.47 0.20 0.37
Concrete Review 68.42 80.18 67.02 0.08 0.50
Abstract Review/Organstreit 63.54 73.04 60.26 0.19 0.41
Weighted Performance 62.55 72.16 57.50 0.17 0.41
Note: Model performances of the legal model and the combined model based on the aggregated
10-fold cross-validation scores. The random forests were built with a fixed m. The legal model only
uses legal context variables, while the combined models used both legal and political context variables.
The baseline category for accuracy is a naive classifier that always votes the majority category of the
training set. The best performances are highlighted in bold.
types, adding the political variables to the classifier increases the predictive performance
by about 9.61 percentage points in terms of weighted accuracy and 0.24 in terms of
Kappa. The higher Kappa values of also indicate that the better performance of
the combined model is robust when considering the class distributions. The largest
performance increase is for concrete reviews, where the addition of political context
improves the predictive performance by +11.76 percentage points in accuracy. We can
also see that the performance is considerably increased for the political proceeding
types (abstract review/Organstreit proceedings): here, the addition of the political
context variables improves the prediction from approximately two out of three to
correctly predicting around three out of four outcomes (+9.5 percentage points). This
finding makes intuitively sense from a political science perspective: these proceeding
types often deal with political matters, so that the potential influence of political context
is expected to be strong here.
These results are also confirmed when looking at model evaluation using out-of-
sample prediction in Table 5.3. We, again, observe that for all different proceeding types,
the combined model has a higher predictive power than the legal model. Across all
proceeding types, the weighted accuracy of the combined model is 76.41 percent, and
thus about +7.94 percentage points better than compared with the legal model (68.47
percent weighted accuracy). Here, the performance improvement is the highest for the
political proceeding types (+16.98 in accuracy). Note that both model performances
(the legal and the combined model) have higher scores when using the out-of-sample
prediction evaluation. This is the case because although I split the data randomly
into training set and test set for the out-of-sample prediction, due to random chance
we observe differences between the cross-validation scores and the out-of-sample
scores (different splits of training and test set might result in different scores). These
differences are so strong because the overall N of the data sets is not very large
(the abstract review/Organstreit proceedings data set only contains 209 observations
overall). At this point, I want to emphasize that one should not over-interpret the
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Table 5.3 – Model Evaluation Based on Out-of-Sample Prediction
Accuracy Kappa
Legal Combined Baseline Legal Combined
Constitutional Complaint 66.67 74.49 52.67 0.33 0.49
Concrete Reviews 75.26 81.05 65.79 0.41 0.57
Abstract Reviews/Organstreit 60.38 77.36 58.49 0.17 0.52
Weighted Performance 68.47 76.41 56.52 0.34 0.51
Note: Model performances of the legal model and the combined model based on out-of-sample prediction.
The legal model only uses legal context variables, while the combined models used both legal and political
context variables. The baseline category for accuracy is a naive classifier who always votes the majority
category of the training set. The best performances are highlighted in bold.
exact performance scores, but that my findings rather demonstrate a general tendency
independent of the performance evaluation approach: on average, adding information
about the political context of a proceeding improves the prediction.
5.5.2 The Predictive Power of the Combined Model Versus White Noise
A critical reader might wonder whether the improvement of predictive performance
that we observe when adding the political context variables to the legal model is
due the predictive power of these variables or due to simply adding more variables
(like the expected increase in R2 in the regression context). In order to convince such
critical voices and demonstrate that the political context variables actually improve the
predictions because they are related to the outcome of a decision, I conduct an additional
experiment. In this experiment, I substitute the four political context variables with
randomly drawn variables unrelated to the outcome. I refer to these randomly drawn
variables as “noise features” in the following.
The noise features are constructed by randomly sampling from a multivariate normal
distribution with means equal to the means of the original variables and the corre-
sponding variance-covariance matrix to capture the structure of the variables to each
other. Accordingly, these randomly-sampled variables mirror the distribution and
correlation structure of the original variables, but are not correlated with the other
features or the outcome. For each proceeding type data set, I remove the original
political context variables and replace them by noise features. The final data sets thus
only include the legal context variables and the four noise features. On each of these
data sets, I then run random forests models using the 10-fold cross-validation procedure
without hyper-parameter tuning which has already been used to obtain the aggregated
cross-validation scores reported in Table 5.2. I call these models the “random models”,
due to the four randomly created noise features in it. The observable implication is
that if the performance of the combined models in the main analysis just improves
because more variables are added, then we should also observe an increase in the
predictive performance of the random models, although the noise features should have
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Table 5.4 – Model Evaluation of Legal, Combined and Random Model based on aggregated
cross-validation scores
Accuracy Kappa
Legal Combined Random Legal Combined Random
Constitutional Complaints 60.14 68.93 62.75 0.20 0.37 0.24
Concrete Review 68.42 80.18 68.06 0.08 0.50 0.09
Abstract Review/Organstreit 63.54 73.04 66.58 0.19 0.41 0.26
Note: Model performances of the legal, combined and random model based on aggregated cross-
validation scores. The legal and combined models are the same as in Table 5.2. The “random model” only
contains the legal context variables plus four randomly created noise features. The best performances
are highlighted in bold.
no predictive power by construction. However, if the political context variables actually
contribute to the prediction, we should observe the combined model to perform better
than the random model.
Table 5.4 reports the result of this experiment. We can observe that the combined
model still performs better than the other two models. In fact, the performance scores of
the legal model and the random model are about the same for constitutional complaints
and concrete reviews. Interestingly, for abstract reviews and Organstreit proceedings,
the random model is about three percentage points better than the legal model. For
these proceedings, adding “white noise” improves the prediction, although not as much
as the original political context variables. A possible explanation for this is provided
by Bishop (1995), who shows that adding noise to data can have a similar effect like l2
regularization if the predictive method is over-fitting. However, interestingly Bishop
(1995) describes that the random noise is added by “adding a random vector onto each
input pattern” (Bishop, 1995, 109). In simple terms, this means that for each individual
data point of some features X1, X2, X3, random noise is added like X1 + z, X2 + z, X3 + z,
where X represents the original predictors and z is a random noise vector. By contrast,
what I do is adding extra noise features, so that the data used for the prediction then
is like X1, X2, X3, Z1, Z2, Z3, where each Z represents a randomly created noise feature.
While being beyond the scope of this dissertation, this phenomenon is, to the best of my
knowledge, not well known in the field of political science, and needs to be examined
in further detail in a follow-up study.
In fact, the improvement of prediction by adding white noise for the political proceed-
ings data might be a hint that the legal model in Table 5.2 over-fits, and therefore the
addition of random noise makes it harder for the random forests to over-fit the data. I
obtain similar findings when using out-of-sample evaluation instead of the aggregated
cross-validation scores (Appendix Table D.5) and when replacing the draws from a
multivariate normal distribution with draws from a standard normal distribution (such
that the four added randomly sampled noise features are not related to each other at
all).
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5.5.3 An Alternative Out-of-Sample Prediction
In order to further demonstrate the robustness of my findings, I provide an additional
out-of-sample prediction in Appendix D.6 where I take into account the time dimension
of the data. Randomly dividing the data into training set and test set requires assuming
that the data is iid (independent and identically distributed). The iid assumption might
be violated using data with a clear time dimension (the data set covers 1972 to 2010).
For this reason, I split the data into a training set and a test set where all observations
before 2005 are assigned to the training set and all observations after 2005 are assigned
to the test set. This test set is then used for the out-of-sample prediction. I did not use
this split approach in the main analysis because splitting by an (arbitrary) point in time
results in different train/test set size ratios. To illustrate, due to the split in 2005, the
test set of abstract reviews/Organstreit proceedings contains around 19 percent of all
observations (33 observations of 209), while the test set of the constitutional complaints
contains only 8 percent of all of the observations (150 observations out of 1,941). This is
because the number of proceedings decided by the GFCC is not equally distributed over
time. Accordingly, a fair model comparison is difficult because the information each
classifier has access to differs in terms of percentage of the overall data. Nonetheless,
using the additional out-of-sample prediction the patterns of the main analysis are
confirmed: adding political context improves the prediction of GFCC decision-making.
The results of this section lead to several conclusions. First, the findings for the
US Supreme Court – that a machine learning model can successfully predict judicial
decision outcomes – can be generalized at least to the German Constitutional Court, an
archetype of the Kelsenian European Constitutional Courts. Similar machine learning
approaches can reach similar accuracies. Across all proceeding types, the weighted
accuracy of the combined model is 76.41 percent (out-of-sample prediction) and 72.16
percent (aggregated cross-validation scores). This is very close to the achieved per-
formances of Ruger et al. (2004) with 78% and better than the achieved 70% of Katz,
Bommarito and Blackman (2017b), who use over 95 predictors and heavy feature en-
gineering. The first research question of this chapter – whether a machine learning
classifier can correctly predict GFCC decision outcomes – is thus to be answered with a
clear yes.
Second, I also find evidence that political context (including public opinion) improves
the prediction of all proceeding types, and thus support for the second research question
– whether political context factors contribute to the prediction of court decision-making
compared with legal context factors. This is a strong and interesting finding, because
a part of the German legal scholarship still considers the GFCC’s decision-making as
totally apolitical. (Böckenförde, 1976; Ossenbühl, 1998). I want to emphasize again
that this does not mean that political context outweighs the importance procedural
characteristics or other legal aspects of a proceeding. Instead, just the ensemble of legal
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and political variables collectively contributes to the prediction in the combined model.
To further investigate the role of legal and political context, I look at each variable’s
importance for the forecast in the next section.
5.5.4 The Importance of Legal Context and Political Context
Which of the variables contribute to the prediction? Is there any variation in their
importance across proceeding types? The importance of a variable in random forests can
be obtained via its variable importance. Variable importance (also known as permutation
importance) is a measure for the mean increase in the oob error if the values of a given
predictor are randomly permuted. The idea behind this is straight forward: If the values
of a predictor are randomly permuted and the oob error remains constant, the predictor
is regarded as unimportant. By contrast, the larger the increase in oob error when
a predictor has been permuted, the more important this predictor is for the forecast
(Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009, 593). Figure 5.1 shows the variable importance
of all predictor variables on the horizontal axis with the respective proceeding type on
the vertical axis of the heatmap. The darker a cell in a heatmap, the higher the variable
importance of the given predictor for the respective proceeding type. The forecasting
error of constitutional complaints increases, for instance, by about six percent if the
values of the issue variable are randomly permuted, and thus withheld from the
prediction.16
Figure 5.1 shows a considerable variation in the predictor’s importance across the
proceeding types. There is not a single predictor that is of equally strong importance for
all proceeding types. The issue of a decision is a important predictor for constitutional
complaints and concrete reviews, but not so much for abstract reviews/Organstreit
proceedings. Some issues seem to be especially important in this regard. Not know-
ing whether the issue “education” or “law and crime” is present in a constitutional
complaint proceeding, for instance, increases the forecasting error by about 1.8% and
2.1%, respectively (not shown in the graph). Interestingly, the ideological position of
the GFCC is the most important predictor for concrete reviews, but not so important
for the political proceeding types. In line with what we would expect theoretically, we
also observe that the political context variables contribute more than the legal context
factors to the prediction of these political proceeding types. Again, I want to highlight
that variable importance is not equivalent to a causal relationship between a predictor
and the outcome variable.17 Nonetheless, it can help us to gain a deeper understanding
16For the sake of terminology, it is important to note that oob variable importance does not measure the
increase in forecasting error if a certain predictor is excluded from the model. This is because if the model
was rebuild without this predictor, the model could put more emphasis on other predictors, which then
became surrogates (Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2009, 593).
17In addition, some of the predictors are correlated which can complicate the interpretation of the
variable importance (Strobl et al., 2007, 2008).
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Figure 5.1 – Heatmap of variable importance per proceeding type
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Note: The different predictors are displayed on the horizontal axis. The different types of proceedings are shown
on the vertical axis. Darker fields indicate a higher importance of the respective predictor for the respective
proceeding type. The variable importance is obtained from the combined models from Table 5.3 to enable a
comparison of legal context and political context predictors.
of the factors which drive the prediction, and can hint towards interesting relationships.
In the next section, I will look at how certain predictors increase the winning chances
of the plaintiff, which is something we cannot infer from variable importance plots.
This information is contained in partial dependence plots.
5.5.5 Partial Dependencies and Non-Linear Relationships in the Data
Partial dependence plots are a method to visualize the partial relationship between
predictors and the outcome in forecasting models. In short, such plots give a graphical
representation of the marginal effect of a variable on the predicted outcome, after
accounting for the average effects of the other predictor variables (Hastie, Tibshirani
and Friedman, 2009, 369).
Figure 5.2 shows the partial dependence plot for the interaction between the ideo-
logical direction of the GFCC and the popularity of the opposition on the probability
of a petitioner success. I focus at this interaction because the variable importance plot
in Figure 5.1 shows that these variables are important predictors of concrete reviews.
Moreover, these are political context variables that hold the most importance for pre-
dicting a rather apolitical proceeding type. Thus, it is a surprising finding that warrants
further investigation.
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Figure 5.2 – Partial dependence plot for ideological direction of the GFCC conditional on the
popularity opposition/government on the plaintiff’s success probability for concrete reviews
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Note: Partial dependence plot for the interaction between the popularity of opposition/government and the
ideological direction of the GFCC on the probability of plaintiff success in concrete reviews. The combined
model for concrete reviews from Table 5.2 was used for the calculation. The graph shows a clear non-linear
relationship between the outcome and the two predictors.
We can draw several conclusions from the partial dependence plot. First, there is a
negative association between oppositional popularity and petitioner success, indicated
by the flat surface in lower left part of the figure. However, this effect is conditional
on the ideological direction of the GFCC: the more conservative the GFCC, the higher
the likelihood of a petitioner’s success (indicated by the sharp rise in the upper right).
In other words, the winning chances of a petitioner in this scenario are the lowest if
the opposition is very unpopular and the GFCC is rather left, whereas the winning
chances are the highest if public support for the opposition is low and the court is
rather conservative. This is an important observation, because these results suggest
that the rather apolitical proceeding types such as concrete reviews might not be
per se as apolitical as one thinks. Second, and more important, the effect between
the two predictors on the outcome is clearly non-linear. This non-linearity would
not be captured by conventional approaches such as logistic regression, at least not
without specifically specifying the functional form of this relationship in the systematic
component. Machine learning approaches such as random forests learn these non-
linearities in the data without the need to be pre-specified by the researcher.
Partial dependence plots of other predictors show that the directions of how these
variables are related to other variables or the outcome are largely as one would expect.
The salience of a proceeding, for instance, strengthens the effect of other political
context predictors such as the ideological position of the GFCC. This is in line with
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existing political science research showing that judges behave differently in salient than
in non-salient cases (Vanberg, 2005). Furthermore, the perception of the current state
of the economy by the public plays a greater role if the main issue and sub issue of a
case is an economic one. This is a relationship that makes intuitively sense. One of the
important lessons of this chapter is that predictive modeling can help researchers to
find (non-linear) relationships which conventional methodological approaches might
have overlooked. In fact, most of the relationships between inputs and outcome do
not display the typical S-shaped curve of e.g. logistic regression models, the model
which is most often used to analyze binary outcomes. Machine learning approaches
are, therefore, a fruitful approach to identify interaction effects or other non-linearities
in the data.
5.6 Conclusions and Implications
In this chapter, I highlighted the ability of machine learning to ex-ante forecast decisions
of the GFCC. I demonstrated that it is possible to correctly predict 76.40 percent of all
outcomes of over 2,900 GFCC proceedings decided between 1972 and 2010 using only
data that is available prior to a proceeding. In particular, I did not use any information
which stems from decision texts, court statements or press releases or any other source
that only becomes available after the actual decision outcome is released. Such a
forecasting model is a novelty in European court research, and does not yet exist for
the GFCC or any other European constitutional court.
I make two contributions. First, I confirm the external validity of similar work on
the US Supreme Court and show that the decision-making of a European Kelsenian
Court type can also be correctly forecasted by means of an algorithm. This is an
important result, because the predictive setting for most of the European courts is
more challenging since no individual voting records of justices are available. Second,
and this is unique to my analysis, I explicitly test the predictive contribution of legal
context and political context variables to the forecast. I find that legal context is, on
average, a relatively good predictor proceeding outcomes. Moreover, I find that the
predictive performance is improved when the political context of a decision is leveraged.
Constitutional court decision-making is thus best characterized by the ensemble of
legal and political context factors.
Beyond the application to the GFCC, my findings have other important implications
with respect to legal philosophy and the value of machine learning approaches for
the field of judicial politics and political science in general. What does it mean for
our understanding of law and judicial decision-making if a relatively simple machine
learning algorithm can correctly predict a substantial number of judicial outcomes?
While this might appear alarming first, I argue that in fact, this is a sign of consistent
judicial decision-making of the GFCC. If an algorithm can correctly predict outcomes,
136
CHAPTER 5. MACHINE LEARNING AND LAW
it means that on average, similar proceedings with similar case characteristics are
decided in a similar way. This consistency in judicial decision-making is important
for the basic functioning of the rule of law. Therefore, for the sake of legal certainty,
it is desirable that cases with the same context lead to the same judicial outcomes on
average. Moreover, no algorithm could in any way substitute for the important work
that judges do in their reasonings.
My findings have another implication for an important group beyond academia:
the world of plaintiffs before the GFCC. For lawyers, politicians or ordinary citizens,
the expected outcome of a case, namely the (perceived) probability of winning or
losing, plays a crucial role in a plaintiff’s decision to appeal or not. Given that a
predictive model of GFCC decision-making can be improved over time and with more
and possibly richer data, my results are beneficial for practicing attorneys and their
clients likewise. In fact, such a model would also have consequences for the political
system: for instance, the opposition would not only consider political factors in their
decision to appeal to the GFCC or not, but would also be able to refrain from appealing
cases where the success probability is low.
Finally, my analyses demonstrate the value of predictive modeling for social science:
machine learning can help to identify patterns which conventional methodological
approaches might overlook. This is especially important with respect to non-linearities
in the data. Thus, even when the goal is causal inference, such forecasting approaches
can help to identify undiscovered patterns in the data and therefore, can lead to new
research questions. What is the causal mechanism that links the perception of the eco-
nomic shape in Germany to its outcome? Why is the ideological position of the GFCC
the most important predictor for concrete reviews, a proceeding type most often only
dealing indirectly with political matters. While I do not argue that machine learning
will replace conventional statistical social science methods, algorithmic procedures will
become increasingly common as a supplementary tool in the tool box of quantitative
social scientists.
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Conclusion
6.1 Summary, Implications and Answers
This dissertation began by stating that constitutional review is a key feature of mod-
ern liberal democracy. Nonetheless, despite constitutional review is a hallmark of
democratic governance in both established and newly-formed democracies, legislative
compliance with judicial decisions cannot be taken for granted due to the inherent
institutional weakness of constitutional courts.
The aim of this dissertation was to understand the importance of public support for
effectiveness of constitutional review in context of the relation between court-government
and court-public. I drew on the comparative judicial politics literature on separation of
powers, public support and legislative noncompliance and extended existing theory
in two regards. First, I argued that not all courts possess about the sufficient level of
public support that is necessary to ensure legislative compliance. Varying degrees of
public support strongly affect the leverage that courts posses in judicial-legislative and
judicial-public relationships. Second, I argued that courts will take active measures
in the form of the institutional tools at their disposal when they expect legislative
noncompliance. One such tool is decision language, whose strategic usage allows
judges to pressure the government or hide likely noncompliance from public view if
necessary.
I test these arguments empirically by combining classical inferential methods such as
survey experiments with novel data on court decision-making and methodologies from
the field of machine learning and computational linguistic. Throughout the chapters, I
employ a comparative perspective and test my arguments using data on the German
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Federal Constitutional Court, a court with strong and robust levels of public support,
and the less popular French Conseil Constitutionnel.
My empirical evidence shows that considering varying degrees of public support
and the institutional tools of judges is indeed beneficial to obtain a more accurate un-
derstanding of how judges behave in judicial-legislative and judicial-public interactions.
I draw three main conclusions. First, court decisions can legitimize public policies,
albeit only if the court itself is perceived as a legitimate institution. Second, courts
are more attentive to the political environment of a decision than previously thought:
depending on their degree of public support, they actively adapt the language of their
decisions as a function of the risk of legislative noncompliance and their institutional
support. Third, public support (and other political context factors) is important for
judicial decision-making not only from a causal, but also from a predictive perspective.
These findings emphasize that the institutional setting of courts and country-specific
context are important aspects that must be considered theoretically and empirically.
In what follows, I will provide a brief overview of the examined research questions
and the central findings of each chapter. I also highlight how these are embedded
in the general framework of courts, governments and the public in the context of
constitutional review.
Chapter 2: Constitutional courts as opinion leaders. In Chapter 2, I directly investi-
gated the impact of public support on institutional legitimacy. The research question in
this regard was to what extent constitutional courts can shape public opinion on governmen-
tal policies. Using a comparative survey experiment conducted in France and Germany,
I found that public opinion, even amongst those with strong prior attitudes, is affected
by court decisions. Court decisions can shift public opinion, but only if the diffuse
support, and thus the institutional legitimacy of a court is sufficiently high. The main
implication of this chapter is thus that varying degrees of public support are crucial for
understanding the legitimacy-conferring ability of courts. This chapter, therefore, sheds
light on the court-public relationship and the court’s power to affect public opinion that
comes along with institutional legitimacy.
Chapter 3: The automatic detection of vague language in constitutional court de-
cisions. How can we automatically measure vague language in written court decisions?
Chapter 3 was devoted to the computer-assisted measurement of vague language in
court decisions. I argued that currently used measurement approaches are insufficient
because they ignore the specificity of judicial texts. To overcome the limitation of
existing work, I developed the concept of judicial policy implementation vagueness as
a particular form of vagueness unique to judicial decisions. Based on recent advances
in computational linguistic, I demonstrated that this concept can be measured with a
dictionary-based approach using word embeddings and a machine learning classifier
trained and benchmarked on a novel large self-collected data set. Because both mea-
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surements are tailored to the judicial domain, they outperformed existing measures
of vague language. This chapter indirectly contributes to the study of the relationship
between court-government because it is the central dependent variable for the following
chapter. The main message of this chapter is that researchers must carefully consider
whether methodological approaches developed for one domain can also be applied to
another without domain adaption, and that often interdisciplinary work is promising
to overcome such methodological obstacles.
Chapter 4: Why do courts craft vague decisions? In Chapter 4, I focus on the
relationship between court-government and shed light at the ability of courts to strategically
manipulate the amount of vagueness in their decision texts. The main theoretical argument
with respect to the indirect effect of public support in this relationship is that courts
actively use the institutional tools at their disposal to maximize their utility when
threatened with legislative noncompliance, but how they use these tools ultimately
depends on their public support. I used my novel measures for the judicial policy
implementation vagueness of a decision and found that courts, depending on whether
they are popular or not, either write specific decisions to pressure the legislator or write
vague rulings to hide noncompliance from public view. This chapter thus demonstrated
the importance of my two fundamental arguments: varying degrees of public support
matter, and courts are active actors who use the institutional tools at their disposal to
deal with likely noncompliance.
Chapter 5: How to forecast constitutional court decisions? Chapter 5 left behind
the field of traditional inferential statistics and entered the world of predictive modeling.
The research question answered with this chapter was to what extent political context
factors (including public opinion) contribute to the prediction of court decision-making. This
question is relevant to the study of the relationship between court-public because I test
the direct effect of public opinion on judicial decision-making. I evaluated whether it is
possible to correctly forecast the decision-making of the GFCC using a machine learning
algorithm, and showed that it is possible to correctly predict, on average, three out of
four proceeding outcomes correctly. What is more, I explicitly teased out the predictive
contribution of legal and political context in the forecasting framework and find that the
predictive performance of the algorithm is considerably improved when the political
context of a proceeding is considered. This chapter therefore supports the view of a
multifaceted decision-making of constitutional courts which is best characterized by
the ensemble of both legal and political context. The main implication of this chapter is
that the given predictability, and thus consistency of GFCC decision-making, is actually
a good sign for the basic functioning of the rule of law in Germany, because it means
that on average, similar proceedings with similar case characteristics are decided in a
similar way.
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6.2 Contributions, Implications and Avenues for Further Re-
search
The findings of this dissertation were only possible due to several theoretical and
methodological innovations. In the following, I wish to highlight the contributions and
central implications of my study, as well as how they open new avenues for future
research.
6.2.1 Contributions and Central Implications
In this section, I wish to briefly recap the main contributions of this dissertation and
give a summary of its implications. I would also like to emphasize how they advance
our understanding of judicial behavior and contribute to the field of political science in
general.
Varying Levels of Public Support
My first theoretical contribution is that I relaxed the common assumption that con-
stitutional courts possess about a consistently high level of diffuse support as it is
assumed in many theories (e.g. Vanberg, 2001, 2005; Krehbiel, 2016, 2019). Instead,
I argued that the degree of public support varies across countries, and showed that
this has severe consequences for court’s ability to effectively exercise constitutional
review and their institutional legitimacy. While this argument is not entirely new to
the literature (e.g. Staton and Vanberg, 2008), this is the first time that it has been tested
in a comparative research design in several applications. Moreover, I showed that the
varying degrees of public support not only affect the ability of constitutional courts to
exercise constitutional review in the judicial-legislative relation, but also that it shapes
the extent to which judicial decisions can move public opinion.
Courts Are Not Helpless When Facing Noncompliance
My second theoretical contribution is to demonstrate that courts are not entirely helpless
when they expect legislative noncompliance. Besides other institutional tools, they
can use the language of their decision to maximize their utility when strategically
interacting with the legislature and the public. This is relevant in order to understand
why judges behave the way in which they do. A primary implication of traditional
separation of power models is that courts must strategically uphold governmental laws
when they expect legislative noncompliance (Rogers, 2001; Vanberg, 2001, 2005; Staton,
2006). However, my findings show that they have yet another option available: they
can strike down a governmental policy, but can write a decision where the judicial
policy implementation vagueness is sufficient such that the government can uphold
the status quo policy at little cost. This is an important observation, because standard
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data sets using a binary coding practice would have coded the decision of the judges
to reject a law as a loss of the government. Thus, the binary coding would lead to an
under-estimation of the real extent of strategic judicial behavior.
A Novel Measure for Judicial Vagueness
A further contribution is made with respect developing of a novel measure for judicial
vagueness. I argued that the current usage of dictionary-based methods to measure
latent concepts in political texts is difficult and potentially misleading, because serious
errors can occur when dictionaries from one domain are directly applied without any
adaption to another (see Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). I overcome this problematic
practice by providing two state-of-the-art measurement strategies to automatically
detect vague language in judicial decisions. I rely on recent advances in computational
linguistic to demonstrate a) how a general dictionary can be expanded to a specific
domain using word embeddings and b) how to develop and benchmark state-of-the-art
supervised machine learning classifiers. I also provide an exhaustive validation of both
measures, and demonstrate that my measures outperform commonly-used dictionaries
such as the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary.
More importantly, at the conceptional level my work provides a blueprint and
practical guidance for other researchers in social science who face the sample hurdles,
i.e. data scarcity and the lack of prior research in a certain linguistic domain. I
highlighted that the concept of the phenomenon desired to be measured must be
carefully developed. I have demonstrated that social scientists and computational
linguistics mean different things when they both speak about linguistic vagueness.
With this in mind, I developed the notion of judicial policy implementation vagueness
and defined it as a particular form of vagueness unique to the context of judicial
decisions. Moreover, I illustrated that which of my methods should be applied is
problem-specific. For researchers who can rely on an existing general dictionary, I show
how word embeddings can be used to expand this dictionary to a specific domain. For
researchers without such an existing dictionary, I demonstrate how a state-of-the-art
machine learning classifier can be developed to solve a certain classification problem.
Researchers should keep in mind that there is always a trade-off along the two
dimensions of accuracy/quality of a classification approach and the required resources.
An expanded dictionary does not reach the same precision as a carefully-developed
and tuned algorithm, although it is easy to implement and low in costs with respect to
computational resources and required time. By contrast, a machine learning classifier
often outperforms a dictionary in terms of accuracy, but requires extensive resources
to gather the necessary training data and algorithmic fine-tuning. The contribution of
my work thus extends beyond the methodological application on the judicial decisions,
but teaches us some important lessons about the general feasibility and applicability of
natural language processing approaches to political science problems.
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The Value of Predictive Modeling for the Field of Social Science
In this dissertation, I also demonstrated the value of predictive modeling for the field
of social science. Social scientists from various disciplines still prioritize inferential
modeling over predictive modeling, with the common perception that not much can be
learned from the process of predicting a certain outcome from an inferential perspective.
In this dissertation, I challenge this claim and show with my application on the
prediction of the decision-making of the GFCC that predictive modeling is an excellent
way to compare the predictive power of competing theories and the contribution of
certain variables for the prediction.
I make three contributions. First, predictive modeling allows me to test whether
variables associated with the legal context of a decision are sufficient to predict court
decision-making, or whether political context adds to the prediction. This, in turn, has
implications for our understanding of the predictability of judicial decision-making.
Second, I show that machine learning methods are helpful to discover non-linearities
in the data that conventional regression models often do not detect. Third, my findings
raise new research questions that require novel or refined theories, and allow me to
create the first benchmark of predictive accuracy for decisions of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. I hope to have convinced the reader that even if the ultimate
goal is to make statements of causal nature, predictive modeling is beneficial to gather
new insights from another perspective on a certain research problem. While I do not
argue that machine learning will replace conventional statistical social science methods,
one should be aware that algorithmic procedures will become an increasingly-used
methodological tool in the toolbox of quantitative social scientists.
Beyond the US Supreme Court: A Comparative Perspective on Germany and France
Finally, in the course of my study, I extend beyond analyzing a single constitutional
court. My theoretical arguments were constantly tested in a comparative setting using
two European constitutional courts, namely the German and the French constitutional
court. This design allows me to compare the importance of varying degrees of in-
stitutional support across countries without the need to rely on scarce survey data.
Furthermore, my comparative results have higher external validity compared with
studies that only focus on a single court. This is especially important with respect
to the generalization of my findings of this study. Therefore, my work contributes
to the still under-researched area of comparative research on European constitutional
courts. Moreover, many constitutional courts established after the third wave of democ-
ratization are mainly modeled along the lines of the German constitutional court and
the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Hönnige, 2011, 347). With a similar institutional
design and equipped with the right of constitutional review, my conclusions also hold
implications for these courts.
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6.2.2 Implications and Avenues for Future Research
The findings of my dissertation open up new avenues for future research. In particular,
I wish to highlight five aspects that I consider to hold important implications for a
better understanding of the relationship between the court, government and the public,
as well as how future work should proceed.
The Promises of Computer-assisted Text Analysis for Judicial Politics
Chapter 3 and 4 demonstrated that text contains a lot of useful information about the
motives of courts and their strategic behavior. To arrive at this conclusion, I developed
novel measures of judicial policy implementation vagueness. Although my vagueness
measures outperform commonly-used measurement approaches such as LIWC, there
remains still potential for improvement. Other researchers can use my annotated data
set as a benchmark to test different algorithms and explore more powerful model
architectures. In this regard, recent advances in semi-supervised text classification (the
combination of adversarial neural networks to create more training data and supervised
classification) have shown promising results, especially in situations where training
data is scarce but the classification problem is challenging (e.g. Aghakhani et al., 2018;
Chen and Cardie, 2018).
My application was only a brief glance at the rich source of information that is
available in judicial texts. There are many judicial texts that remain unexplored but
relevant for research on judicial behavior, especially with respect to European courts.
Whereas the document bodies of opinions of the US Supreme Court have already been
subject to scholarly attention (Owens and Wedeking, 2011, 2012; Cross and Pennebaker,
2014; Black et al., 2016b; Clark and Lauderdale, 2010; Lauderdale and Clark, 2014;
Bonica and Sen, 2017; Wedeking and Zilis, 2018), only little work has been done on
judicial texts of European courts (Dyevre, 2015). Building on these efforts, future
studies could try to use the polarity of citations to either locate decisions in a doctrine
space or combine information on the citations and other available information to create
a common space for the court and political elites (e.g. Clark and Lauderdale, 2010;
Lauderdale and Clark, 2014). One has to keep in mind that unfortunately much less
information is available in the European court context compared with that of the
Supreme Court, where scholars can combine various sources of information to develop
elaborate measures of preferences; for instance, the individual writings of judges and
their corresponding votes.
Moreover, vagueness is only one aspect of language. For instance, research from the
US Supreme Court shows that Supreme Court justices strategically vary opinion clarity
when a case’s outcome contradicts popular sentiment. The basic argument in this
regard is that courts that rule against the prevailing public opinion will try to explain
the reasons of their ruling with clear and thus more “readable” language to persuade
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the public of their ruling. Since German judges, for instance, are also affected by the
specific support for their decisions (Sternberg et al., 2015), such a mechanism could
also work with respect to the German court. It would be possible that German judges
also try to use more persuasive language when issuing unpopular rulings, because they
also have to find ways to foster their diffuse support.1 In summary, analyzing other
aspects of judicial language is a promising path for future research to gain a better
understanding of why judges write decisions the way in which they do.
Improving the Prediction of GFCC Decision-making
In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that it is possible to correctly predict a substantial number
of GFCC decision outcomes only using information that is available in advances. This
holds at least three implications for further research. First, my prediction of the GFCC
decisions can be used as a benchmark for future studies to incorporate a much richer
set of predictors. Second, I will start to publish my forecasts on outcomes of the GFCC
in real time on Twitter. This will constitute the reality check regarding whether an
algorithmic procedure is indeed capable of predicting constitutional court outcomes.
Third, it would be interesting to see how the algorithmic forecast performs against
human legal experts; for instance, in the form of a prediction tournament where my
algorithm competes against a crowd of law professors or even a large crowd of interested
novices. Such a tournament was successfully carried out in the work of Ruger et al.
(2004) and recently by Katz, Bommarito and Blackman (2017a). Such an interdisciplinary
approach could help to shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of human-
and computer-based predictive modeling, and could therefore be beneficial to evaluate
the usefulness of crowd-sourced prediction in general. This is not only relevant for
the prediction of court decisions but also for other forecasting problems, such as the
prediction of electoral outcomes.
Advanced Formal Models: Incorporating the Notion of Active Courts and Varying
Public Support
One obvious implication of this dissertation is that future game-theoretic models must
integrate the central findings of this dissertation: not all courts are equally popular,
and courts are more active than previously assumed. This has consequences for the
judicial-legislative strategic interaction, which is central to many models that formalize
the relationship between courts and governments in a separation of powers framework.
Courts like the French Conseil Constitutionnel or the Russian constitutional court
(Trochev, 2002, 2008) cannot rely on the public to threaten the legislator in case of
1A first preliminary analysis shows that there is indeed substantial variation in the textual readability
of separate opinions of GFCC judges. This variation could be systematic because I, for instance, find that
the higher the number of judges writing such an opinion together, the lower the textual readability of
these texts (along the line of the notion that “too many cooks spoil the broth”).
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governmental resistance. However, they might have other tools at their disposal (like
vague language) that help them to deal with this situation. These two aspects in turn
affect the utility functions and pay-offs of the actors involved in these games.
One possible starting point for a formalization of these aspects could be the game-
theoretic model of Krehbiel (2016), which already incorporates a belief about the
probability of the public becoming aware of noncompliance and another belief about
whether an oral hearing increases this probability. In an extension, the court could
hold a third belief about the level of diffuse support that it enjoys, or a second model
could be introduced for unpopular courts that explicitly relaxes the assumption that
a court enjoys high levels of diffuse support. The fact that such a formalization is in
principle possible and useful has already been demonstrated by the model of Staton
and Vanberg (2008), which I empirically tested in Chapter 4.
Disentangling the Role of Constitutional Courts as Opinion Leaders
Chapter 2 showed that if equipped with sufficient institutional legitimacy, constitutional
courts act as opinion leaders and affect public opinion on governmental policies.
Nonetheless, more work must be done to disentangle the causal mechanisms of how
public support and institutional legitimacy translate into the legitimacy-conferring
capacity of (European) constitutional courts. For example, with respect to the external
validity of my findings, follow-up work could use survey panels to measure public
attitudes before and after landmark decisions to assess potential changes in public
mood in a more realistic setting. Furthermore, future studies should take into account
different salient and non-salient public policies, the role of the media as a mediator
in terms of how the public learns about a decision or how individuals form their
attitudes when they have access to competing arguments. Such work would help to
better understand public opinion formation in the context of court decisions, and thus
shed more light on the legitimacy-conferring capacity of courts.
The Value of Vagueness in Different Contexts
In Chapter 4, I examined the strategic use of vague language in the context of judicial
decision-making. However, the central arguments of Staton and Vanberg’s (2008)
model and its implications also apply to other delegation relationships. In the context
of the European Union, for instance, the European Commission must monitor the
faithful compliance of member states with EU law. Here, similar dynamics as in the
judicial-legislative bargaining between national high courts and national governments
play a role in terms of whether the Commission starts an infringement procedure
(Steunenberg, 2010; König and Mäder, 2014; Fjelstul and Carrubba, 2018). Moreover,
akin to constitutional courts, other non-majoritarian institutions such as central banks
are in a similar principal-agent relationship and must rely on other actors for the
implementation of their instructions. Future research could therefore directly apply
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my measurement approaches proposed in Chapter 3 to measure the amount of vague
language in statements or other official records of the European Commission or central
banks, and connect this data with information on the preferences of other actors to
study noncompliance in the context of the European Union or central banks.
6.3 Concluding Thoughts
If courts cannot effectively exercise constitutional review, does this threat the simple
model of checks and balances in liberal democracy? The power of constitutional
courts to constrain legislative majorities is a central hallmark of liberal democracy
and a key feature of the system of checks and balances of modern democracies. The
findings of this dissertation indicate that the public plays a critical role for the efficacy
of constitutional review: in the absence of diffuse support, courts must constrain
themselves when legislative noncompliance is likely. However, if sufficient public
support is given, they are in a much more powerful position and can strategically
pressure the government to force compliance.
The decisive role of the public is also acknowledged by the courts. In Germany, we
can currently observe that the German Federal Constitutional Court shows a tendency
to intensify its work on public relations and its political communication in general. For
instance, the President of the GFCC, Andreas Voßkuhle, has started to give regular
talks about the “GFCC as a citizen’s court”.2 As the first member of the GFCC ever, he
also took part of the Federal Press Conference and publicly gave his legal assessment
to political and societal questions. Voßkuhle also publicly criticized the rhetoric of
the Christian Social Union with respect to their asylum policy as “unacceptable” in
an interview. The German court has also started to translate important decisions into
English to make them available to a wider audience. All of these developments can be
interpreted as an effort to move the GFCC into the center of public attention and as
a strategic signal to politicians that the court is not only aware of its power, but also
willing to use it if necessary.
This strategy is not without risk. On the one hand, these activities increase the
public awareness for the institutional work of the court and draws the attention of the
public to certain rulings or upcoming decisions. Thus, it strengthens the position of the
court in judicial-legislative conflicts. On the other hand, the legitimacy of courts and
their diffuse support is largely based on their perception as an impartial and apolitical
actor. It remains unclear whether the GFCC’s strategy will be beneficial for the court.
Nonetheless, the German court has recognized that public support is a crucial factor
for its ability to effectively exercise constitutional review. It will be very interesting to
see how the upcoming new President of the GFCC, Stephan Harbath, will interpret his
2German original: “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Bürgergericht”.
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role as the head of the court given that he is directly appointed from the Bundestag
and has a pronounced partisan background.
The recent developments in Poland, Hungary as well as in the United States draw
attention to the area of conflict between courts and governments and the role of the pub-
lic. What is the appropriate strategy for courts to deal with legislative noncompliance?
Should constitutional courts become more offensive and actively use their institutional
tools to pressure the other branches of the government for compliance, if their level
of public support allows them to do so? What does this imply for their institutional
legitimacy if they slowly turn to yet another political actor? Finding answers to these
questions is not only relevant from an academic perspective, but it is also crucial for
the efficacy of constitutional review in a constitutional state, and thus the sustainability
of liberal democracy.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter 2
A.1 Question Wording of Institutional Trust Questions GIP
and ENEF
• GIP (asked in Wave 26), exact wording (in German): Geben Sie bitte bei jeder
Einrichtung oder Organisation an, wie groß das Vertrauen ist, das Sie ihr ent-
gegenbringen. Benutzen Sie dazu bitte diese Skala: 1 bedeutet, dass Sie ihr
überhaupt kein Vertrauen entgegenbringen; 7 bedeutet, dass Sie ihr sehr groß es
Vertrauen entgegenbringen. Mit den Zahlen dazwischen können Sie Ihre Meinung
wiederum abstufen. Wie ist das mit dem Bundesverfassungsgericht?
• ENEF (asked in Wave 17), exact wording (in French): Sur une échelle de 0 à 10,
avez-vous confiance ou pas dans chacune des institutions suivantes: Le Conseil
Constitutionnel?
In the ENEF survey, the trust in the CC was originally asked on a 10-point scale. For a
more convenient visualization and to enable a comparative analysis, the values were
recoded the same 7-point scale as used in the GIP. Findings are robust to using the
original 10-point scale instead of the recoded 7-point scale.
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A.2 Original Screenshots of Survey Experiments in the GIP
Figure A.1 shows an original screen-shot of the survey experiment implemented in
Wave 26 and Wave 27 of the German Internet Panel.
Figure A.1 – Actual Screenshot (in German) of the Survey Experiment Implemented in German
Internet Panel
The wording of the French experiment is as follows:
D’après le Ministère de l’Education nationale, la violence scolaire en France est en constante
augmentation ces dernières années. Imaginez le scénario suivant : le Parlement adopte une
nouvelle loi sur la sécurité dans les écoles. Les écoles doivent maintenant garantir un accès
permanent de la police dans les établissements scolaires. Les policiers sont autorisés à porter
des armes à feu et à contrôler régulièrement les cartables des élèves sans suspicion particulière.
Cette loi a pour objectif une augmentation de la sécurité dans les écoles en restreignant la liberté
des élèves.
After this text, the treatment was added in form of: Le [CC, Haut Conseil de l’Éducation]
émet un avis [positif, négatif] sur la loi. More information on the French implementation
are available at https://www.enef.fr/données-et-résultats/.
A.3 Distribution of Attitudes towards School Security Law across
Germany and France
Figure A.2 shows the distribution of attitudes towards the school security law across
the German and French respondents. Only respondents of the control group are used,
so that the experimental treatment does not affect the respondents’ answers. Whereas
in Germany the majority of the respondents (57%) disagree with the school security
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Figure A.2 – Distribution of Attitudes towards School Security Law across Germany and
France
l
l
l
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Note: Comparison of the attitudes of German and French respondents towards the school security law.
Only respondents in the control group are used for the evaluation.
law and only 33% agree with it, the majority of the French respondents supports such
a law (48%) and only 36% oppose it.
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A.4 Estimation Strategy for Ordered Probit Models
Let Yi be the ordered categorical dependent variable for observation i that takes one of
the integer values from 1 to J where J is the total number of categories. In our case,
J = 3 as respondents rate the school security law in three ordered categories: disagree,
indifferent and agree.
• The stochastic component is given by an latent continuous variable Y∗i , defined
by a normal distribution with mean µi and unit variance:
Y∗i ∼ N(µi, 1).
We cannot observe Y∗i , but instead we can only observe the categories of the
response given by the some cut-points τj:
Yi =

1 = agree if (τ0 = −∞) ≤ y∗i < τ1
2 = indi f f erent if τ1 ≤ y∗i < τ2
3 = disagree if τ2 ≤ y∗i < (τ3 = +∞)
In simple words, this means that we observe a particular ordinal response depend-
ing upon what part of the latent distribution a respondent is in. The next “higher”
ordered response is only observed when a respondent crosses that particular
cut-point. More formally, the probability to observe each category is given by:
Pr(Yi = j) = Φ(τj | µi)−Φ(τj−1 | µi) for j = 1, . . . , J
where Φ(µi) is the cd f for the normal distribution with mean µi and unit variance.
• The systematic component is given by:
µi = xiβ
where xi is the vector of independent variables and β is the vector of coefficients.
In the baseline model, the independent variables are dummy variables indicating
whether a respondent belongs to either of the treatment groups (the dummy for
the control group is omitted as the reference category).
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A.5 Ordered Probit Regression Tables of Baseline Analysis in
Germany and France
Table A.1 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression, GIP Survey Germany
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves 0.079
(0.064)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.095
(0.066)
GFCC Approves 0.126∗∗
(0.054)
GFCC Disapproves −0.140∗∗∗
(0.053)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Approves −0.076
(0.065)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Disapproves −0.178∗∗∗
(0.066)
disagree|indifferent 0.195∗∗∗
(0.040)
indifferent|agree 0.426∗∗∗
(0.040)
N 5208
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment group. The
baseline category is the control group (no treatment). Standard errors are clustered by respondent
because of panel design. All regression tables in this project are created with the stargazer package
(Hlavac, 2018).
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GERMANY AND FRANCE
Table A.2 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression, ENEF Survey France
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves 0.093
(0.074)
CC Disapproves −0.118
(0.074)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Approves 0.179∗∗
(0.074)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Disapproves −0.093
(0.074)
disagree|indifferent −0.329∗∗∗
(0.053)
indifferent|agree 0.037
(0.053)
N 2566
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment
group. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment).
172
APPENDIX A. CHAPTER 2
A.6 Ternary Plots of Simulation Results
In this section I provide an alternative visualization of the simulation results of the
main analysis using “ternary plots” (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000, 358). Ternary
plots are triangular plots, and each of the three sides represents the probability of
one of the three-categorical outcome. The tick marks at each side allows reading the
probability of a simulated outcome being either indifferent, or agreeing or disagreeing
with the schools security law. For instance, the right side of the ternary plot provides the
probability of disagreeing for a respondent. The probability of that outcome would be
at 100 percent in the left vertex of the triangle. The closer that the predicted probabilities
are to one of the outcomes at the vertex, the higher the chance that a respondents
favors the respective choice. If a simulated respondent’s choice would be located at the
centroid of the ternary plot, the probabilities would be equal for all three outcomes.
I decided to use the parallel coordinate plots in the main text because they exhibit a
better data-ink ration than the ternary plots. This is because the effect magnitudes of
the experimental manipulations are rather small, and therefore two-third of the ternary
plots are “empty”.
The ternary plot on the left side of Figure A.3 shows 1,000 simulated expected values
for a respondent in the control group (gray dots) and a respondent who received the
endorsement that the GFCC approves the school security law (black dots). For the
simulations, only the respective dummy (control group, GFCC approves) was set to
one and all other dummies of the model were set to zero. The expected values are
predicted probabilities across the three outcome categories (which sum to one).
The simulation results show that even if respondents receive the treatment that the
GFCC approves the school security law, the probability of disagreeing remains high
(the black dots are still located on the left side of the vertex). However, we can also
observe an increase in the probability of agreeing, as the black dots are located to the
right side of the gray control group points. To illustrate, respondents in the control
group have a 57% predicted probability of disagreeing with the school security law, a
9% probability of being indifferent and a 34% probability of agreeing on average. By
contrast, respondents who received the GFCC approves endorsement have on average
a probability of 52% of disagreeing, 9% of being indifferent and 39% of agreeing. The
right side of the figure shows the corresponding first differences (same as in the main
analysis). Figure A.4 provides similar plots for the GFCC disapproves treatment effect.
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Figure A.3 – Pred. Prob. and First Difference of Control Group and GFCC Approves Endorse-
ment
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Note: Left Side: Ternary plot of the simulated predicted probabilities for the school security law. N of simulation
= 1, 000. The probabilities are calculated by setting the respective dummy (control group and GFCC approves)
of the model to one and all other dummies to zero.
Right side: First differences between the predicted probabilities of the control group and the GFCC approves
treatment group from the same simulation. The points represent the first difference point estimates and the thin
and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals.
Figure A.4 – Predicted probabilities and first differences of Control and GFCC Disapproves
Treatment
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Note: Left Side: Ternary plot of the simulated predicted probabilities for the school security law. N of simulation
= 1, 000. Expected values are calculated by setting the respective dummy (control group and GFCC disapproves)
of the model to one and all other dummies to zero.
Right side: First differences between the expected probabilities between the control group and the GFCC ap-
proves treatment group from the same simulation. The points represent the first difference point estimates and
the thin and thick bars represent 95% and 90% confidence intervals.
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A.7 Ordered Probit for Party Affiliation in Germany and France
Table A.3 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for AfD Voters, GIP
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves 0.187
(0.140)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.199
(0.150)
GFCC Approves 0.253∗∗
(0.117)
GFCC Disapproves −0.197
(0.121)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Approves 0.067
(0.144)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Disapproves −0.206
(0.150)
AfD Voter (=1) 1.597∗∗∗
(0.239)
Data Security Official Approves X AfD-Voter −0.476
(0.398)
Data Security Official Disapproves X AfD-Voter 0.022
(0.379)
GFCC Approves X AfD-Voter −0.169
(0.322)
GFCC Disapproves X AfD-Voter −0.502
(0.309)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Approves X AfD-Voter −0.807∗∗
(0.402)
Conference of the Ministers of Education Disapproves X AfD-Voter −0.083
(0.376)
disagree|indifferent 0.620∗∗∗
(0.086)
indifferent|agree 0.991∗∗∗
(0.088)
N 3427
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment group and for the voter
affiliation. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). Standard errors are clustered by respondents.
Smaller N than main analysis because of missing values in the party affiliation question variable.
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Table A.4 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for Green-supporters using GIP data
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves 0.097
(0.137)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.144
(0.145)
GFCC Approves 0.213∗
(0.115)
GFCC Disapproves −0.285∗∗
(0.114)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves −0.143
(0.145)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves −0.271∗
(0.142)
Green Voter (=1) −1.188∗∗∗
(0.259)
Data Security Official Approves X Green-Voter 0.034
(0.433)
Data Security Official Disapproves X Green-Voter 0.034
(0.414)
GFCC Approves X Green-Voter 0.309
(0.327)
GFCC Disapproves X Green-Voter 0.392
(0.359)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves X Green-Voter 0.775∗∗
(0.378)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves X Green-Voter 0.433
(0.440)
disagree|indifferent 0.240∗∗∗
(0.084)
indifferent|agree 0.598∗∗∗
(0.085)
N 3427
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment group and for the
voter affiliation. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). Standard errors are clustered
by respondents. Lower N than main analysis because of missing values in the party affiliation question
variable.
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Table A.5 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for Front National-voters, ENEF
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves −0.015
(0.093)
CC Disapproves −0.188∗
(0.097)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Approves 0.140
(0.095)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Disapproves −0.082
(0.093)
FN-Voter (=1) 0.659∗∗∗
(0.191)
CC Approves × FN-Voter 0.285
(0.283)
CC_Disapproves × FN-Voter −0.110
(0.254)
Haut Conseil d’Education × FN-Voter −0.023
(0.270)
Haut Conseil d’Education × FN-voter −0.103
(0.273)
disagree|indifferent −0.262∗∗∗
(0.067)
indifferent|agree 0.059
(0.067)
N 1830
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment
groups and for the voter affiliation. The baseline category is the control group (no
treatment).
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Table A.6 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for Parti Socialiste-voters, ENEF
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves −0.003
(0.096)
CC Disapproves −0.246∗∗
(0.096)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Approves 0.076
(0.098)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Disapproves −0.140
(0.096)
PS-Voter (=1) −0.682∗∗∗
(0.165)
CC Approves × PS-Voter 0.037
(0.237)
CC_Disapproves × PS-Voter 0.263
(0.270)
Haut Conseil d’Education × PS-Voter 0.405∗
(0.234)
Haut Conseil d’Education Disapproves × PS-Voter 0.263
(0.229)
disagree|indifferent −0.463∗∗∗
(0.069)
indifferent|agree −0.145∗∗
(0.068)
N 1830
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment groups and
for the voter affiliation. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment).
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A.8 High Trust and Low Trust in Germany and France
Table A.7 – Ordinal Probit Regression for Trust Interaction, Germany
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves −0.001
(0.398)
Data Security Official Disapproves 0.850∗∗
(0.428)
GFCC Approves 0.462
(0.351)
GFCC Disapproves 0.136
(0.328)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves −0.812∗∗
(0.400)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves 0.747∗
(0.419)
Institutional Trust GFCC −0.188∗∗∗
(0.047)
Data Security Official Approves × Institutional Trust 0.026
(0.075)
Data Security Official Disapproves × Institutional Trust −0.189∗∗
(0.081)
GFCC Approves × Institutional Trust −0.044
(0.066)
GFCC Disapproves × Institutional Trust −0.070
(0.062)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves × Institutional Trust 0.123
(0.075)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves × Institutional Trust −0.201∗∗
(0.081)
disagree|indifferent −0.619∗∗
(0.251)
indifferent|agree −0.253
(0.251)
N 4760
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). Trust is a numeric
variable ranging from 1 to 7.
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Table A.8 – Ordinal Probit Regression for Trust Interaction, ENEF France
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves 0.081
(0.203)
CC Disapproves −0.239
(0.200)
Haut Conseil d’Education Approves −0.104
(0.205)
Haut Conseil d’Education Approves −0.299
(0.212)
Institutional Trust in CC −0.078∗∗
(0.031)
CC Approves × Institutional Trust −0.009
(0.044)
CC Disapproves × Institutional Trust 0.025
(0.044)
Haut Conseil d’Education × Institutional Trust 0.062
(0.045)
Haut Conseil d’Education Disapproves × Institutional Trust 0.055
(0.045)
disagree|indifferent −0.675∗∗∗
(0.145)
indifferent|agree −0.309∗∗
(0.145)
N 1943
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). Trust is a
numeric variable ranging from 1 to 7.
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Figure A.5 – Distribution of Institutional Trust in the GFCC and the CC over Party Support
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(b) Trust over Party Identification, GFCC
Note: The trust question in France was asked one wave after the experiment took place. Therefore, I used all
respondents to plot the trust in the CC over party support. For the GFCC, I only used respondents of the control
group, because the question for institutional trust was asked in the same wave as the experimental treatment.
A.8.1 Distribution of Institutional Trust in Germany and France over Party
Support
Figure A.5 shows the distribution of institutional trust in the GFCC and the CC of
respondents with different party affiliations. We can see clear differences between the
two countries. In France, the CC only enjoys relatively high support amongst party
members of the En marche!, and to some extent of the Republicans and the Socialist
party members. Across all parties, the middle category (neither distrust nor trust) is
most frequently selected answer. There is a substantial number of supporters of the
Front National and, to some extent, of the Left Party who do not trust the Conseil at all.
In Germany, the picture is totally different. The majority of the respondents of all
parties do have a high or very high trust in the GFCC. It is particularly interesting
that even supporters of the AfD, a party which often attacks the government or other
political institutions, do not hold especially negative views about the GFCC. This is,
once more, an indicator that the GFCC is respected across the entire political spectrum
and additional evidence for the broad public support the GFCC enjoys.
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A.9 Robustness Tests and Diagnostic Checks
A.9.1 Using Another Policy Issue in the ENEF Survey
In the ENEF Wave 16, another policy issue was used to test the legitimacy-conferring
capacity of the CC. This policy issue is about a retirement policy. The issue reads as
follows:
D’après le Ministère des Solidarités et de la Santé, le régime général de retraite et le fonds
de solidarité vieillesse présentaient, en 2016, un déficit de 2,7 milliards d’Euros. Imaginez le
scénario suivant : le Parlement adopte une nouvelle loi sur les retraites. Pour avoir droit à
une retraite à taux plein, la durée minimale de cotisations retraite nécessaire augmente de deux
ans. Cette loi a pour objectif de pérenniser le régime des retraites en augmentant la durée de
cotisations des actifs, compte tenu de l’augmentation de l’espérance de vie.
Respondents were then asked to rate this policy on a 5-point scale. The experimental
manipulation was similar to the prior survey experiment: respondents were told that
the CC either approves or disapproves the law, or that the Conseil d’Orientation des
Retraites (a national expert body) approves the law or not. The dependent variable
was recoded again into three categories (disagree, indifferent, agree). Table A.9 shows
the results of an ordered probit regression using the experimental groups as the
independent variable (included as dummies) and the control group as the reference
category.
Table A.9 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression, Retirement Policy ENEF
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves 0.030
(0.081)
CC Disapproves 0.114
(0.082)
Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites Approves 0.018
(0.082)
Conseil d’Orientation des Retraites Approves 0.021
(0.084)
disagree|indifferent 0.135∗∗
(0.058)
indifferent|agree 0.575∗∗∗
(0.059)
N 2050
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment
groups. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). For this regression, the
retirement policy of ENEF wave 16 was used.
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A.9.2 Ordered Probit Regression Results Estimated Separately for GIP Wave
26 and Wave 27
Table A.10 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression Using GIP Wave 26, November 2016
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
GFCC Approves 0.141∗
(0.073)
GFCC Disapproves −0.116
(0.075)
Minister of Education Approves −0.011
(0.074)
Minister of Education Disapproves −0.149∗∗
(0.075)
disagree|indifferent 0.239∗∗∗
(0.053)
indifferent|agree 0.476∗∗∗
(0.053)
N 2748
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the
treatment group. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment).
Only data from the GIP Wave 26 from November 2016 is used for estimation.
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Table A.11 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression Using GIP Wave 27, January 2017
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
GFCC Approves 0.116
(0.074)
GFCC Disapproves −0.180∗∗
(0.075)
Data Security Official Disapproves 0.042
(0.074)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.131∗
(0.075)
disagree|indifferent 0.162∗∗∗
(0.053)
indifferent|agree 0.385∗∗∗
(0.053)
N 2693
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the
treatment group. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment).
Only data from the GIP Wave 27 from January 2017 is used for estimation.
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A.9.3 Baseline Results of Ordered Probit Using Original Five-point Scales
Table A.12 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression GIP, Original 5-Point Scale
DV: 5-point Scale Rating
of Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves 0.087
(0.056)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.126∗∗
(0.057)
GFCC Approves 0.131∗∗∗
(0.047)
GFCC Disapproves −0.169∗∗∗
(0.047)
Minister of Education Approves −0.069
(0.058)
Minister of Education Disapproves −0.189∗∗∗
(0.060)
1|2 −0.336∗∗∗
(0.0348)
2|3 0.188∗∗∗
(0.0346)
3|4 0.419∗∗∗
(0.0349)
4|5 1.211∗∗∗
(0.0379)
N 5208
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the
treatment group. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). The
original 5-point scale of the GIP survey was used.
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Table A.13 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression ENEF School Security Law, Original 5-point
scale
DV: 5-point Scale Rating
of Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves 0.103
(0.066)
CC Disapproves −0.074
(0.066)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Approves 0.145∗∗
(0.066)
Haut Conseil de l’Éducation Disapproves −0.103
(0.066)
1|2 −1.011∗∗∗
(0.052)
2|3 −0.328∗∗∗
(0.049)
3|4 0.039
(0.049)
4|5 0.946∗∗∗
(0.051)
N 2566
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. All included variables are dummies for the treatment
group. The baseline category is the control group (no treatment). The original 5-point
scale of the ENEF survey was used.
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A.9.4 Individual Heterogeneity - Knowledge about the Court
Table A.14 and A.15 show ordered probit regression results for an interaction of the
experimental groups with an individual’s knowledge. The GIP included two questions
where respondents needed to identify the correct name of a judge currently sitting
on the bench. Respondents who did not correctly identify any of the two individuals
(Susanne Baer, Judge of the first Senate and Chief Justice Andreas Voßkuhle) comprise
the group of not knowledgeable respondents (roughly 77% of all respondents in wave
26). The other respondents were those who were able to answer at least one of the two
questions correctly.
In the German model, the knowledge dummy itself is statistically insignificant. Also,
all the interaction effects are not significant. There is, therefore, no evidence that the
treatment effects are conditional on a respondent’s knowledge about the GFCC.
In France, respondents where directly asked about their knowledge about the CC:
Voici une liste d’institutions de la République. Pour chacune d’entre-elles, dites si...
• 1 Vous la connaissez de nom et vous êtes informé sur ses fonctions
• 2 Vous la connaissez de nom mais vous n’êtes pas informé sur ses fonctions
• 3 Vous ne la connaissez pas
46% of the respondents have heard about the CC and are knowledgeable about its
functioning, whereas 42% have a least heard about it, and 5% do not know the CC
(8% refused to answer). The respondents who have heard about the CC and know its
functioning are coded as respondents with high knowledge (=1), whereas the rest is
coded as not knowledgeable (= 0).
In the model for France (Table A.15), the knowledge dummy itself is statistically
significant and the CC Disapproves endorsement turns out to be statistically significant,
too. However, none of the interactions show a statistically significant effect. I use
simulations to investigate whether knowledgeable respondents are different to not
knowledgeable ones. For this, I compare the endorsement effect (the effect between
the control group and the respective treatment group) for knowledgeable respondents
and not knowledgeable ones. The corresponding first differences show that there is no
statistically significant difference between these two groups.
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Table A.14 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for Knowledge Interaction GIP
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
Data Security Official Approves 0.041
(0.118)
Data Security Official Disapproves −0.122
(0.121)
GFCC Approves 0.168∗
(0.098)
GFCC Disapproves −0.199∗∗
(0.099)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves −0.127
(0.124)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves −0.197
(0.128)
High Knowledge (=1) −0.161
(0.146)
Data Security Official Approves × High Knowledge 0.360
(0.248)
Data Security Official Disapproves × High Knowledge −0.179
(0.258)
GFCC Approves × High Knowledge 0.144
(0.202)
GFCC Disapproves × High Knowledge −0.141
(0.212)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Approves × High Knowledge 0.023
(0.257)
Conference of the Min. of Educ. Disapproves × High Knowledge −0.311
(0.256)
disagree|indifferent 0.271∗∗∗
(0.069)
indifferent|agree 0.647∗∗∗
(0.070)
N 5208
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. High Knowledge is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent is
knowledgeable of the GFCC (=1) or not (=0). Standard errors clustered by respondents.
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Table A.15 – Results of Ordinal Probit Regression for Knowledge Interaction ENEF
DV: 3-Scale Rating of
Likeability School Security Law
CC Approves 0.062
(0.110)
CC Disapproves −0.217∗∗
(0.105)
Haut Conseil d’Education Approves 0.079
(0.107)
Haut Conseil d’Education Disapproves −0.096
(0.109)
High Knowledge (=1) −0.214∗∗
(0.109)
CC Approves × High Knowledge 0.093
(0.153)
CC Disapproves × High Knowledge 0.182
(0.154)
Haut Conseil d’Education Approves × High Knowledge 0.178
(0.153)
Haut Conseil d’Education Disapproves × High Knowledge 0.008
(0.155)
disagree|indifferent −0.409∗∗∗
(0.076)
indifferent|agree −0.063
(0.076)
N 2401
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1. High Knowledge is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent is
knowledgeable of the CC (=1) or not (=0).
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B.1 Appendix with supplementary information for the expanded
dictionary
German seed words from the German LIWC dictionary (Wolf et al., 2008) in their basic
form (inflicted versions to infinitive):
• “angeblich”, “beinahe”, “duerfte”, “eigentlich”, “erscheinen”, “etwa”, “eventuell”,
“fast”, “gelegentlich”, “gezoegert”, “gezweifelt”, “hoffen”, “hoffentlich”, “Hoff-
nung”, “hoffnungslos”, “hoffnungsvoll”, “irgendein”, “irgendetwas”, “irgend-
jemand”, “irgendwann”, “irgendwer”, “irgendwie”, “irgendwo”, “jederzeit”,
“jemand”, “koennte”, “labil”, “manche”, “moeglich”, “mutmaßen”, “mutmaßlich”,
“nahezu”, “probieren”, “provisorisch”, “schaetzen”, “scheinen”, “sozusagen”,
“unbestimmt”, “uneins”, “ungefaehr”, “ungewiss”, “unklar”, “unsicher”, “vage”,
“vermeintlich”, “vermutlich”, “vielleicht”, “vielleicht”, “vorsichtig”, “wahrschein-
lich”, “zeitweise”, “ziemlich”, “zoegerlich”, “zoegern”, “Zufaelle”, “zufaellig”,
“Zufall”
Manually selected similarity candidates based on word embeddings (terms with a “_”
indicate a bi-gram):
• “unbenommen” , “Differenzierung”, “Typisierung” , “annähernd”, “angemessener”
, “gegebenenfalls”, “freistehen”, “ausreichend”, “tragfähiger”, “genügend”, “zure-
ichend” , “Ermessen” , “Disposition”, “Generalisierung”, “Typisierung” , “ausle-
gungsfähig” , “Gestaltung”, “Ausgestaltung”, “generalisierende” , “Möglichkeiten”
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, “unterschiedlich”, “verschieden”, “differenzieren” , “Weisungsrechts” , “Ein-
schätzung”, “bedarfsgerechten,” “zweifelhaft” , “überlassen” , “Typisierungsspiel-
raum”, “Gestaltungsraum”, “Gestaltungsspielraum” , “Spielraum” , “Gestal-
tungsfreiraum”, “Gestaltungsbereich” , “einen_weiten” , “Gestaltungsfreiheit” ,
“Typisierungsspielraum”, “Gestaltungsspielraums”, “Entscheidungsspielraum”,
“besonders_weiten”, “eingeräumten_weiten”, “Gestaltungsraums” , “Ermessensspiel-
raum” , “Prognosespielraums”, “Einschätzungs_Wertungs”, “weiten Gestaltungsraum”,
“politischen_Ermessens” “Einschätzungs” , “Einschätzungsspielraum”
French seed words from the French LIWC dictionary (Piolat et al., 2011) in their basic
form (inflicted versions to infinitive):
• “apparaître”, “apparemment”, “approximativement”,”assumer”, “brouiller”,
“chance”, “déconcerter”, “dépendre”, “déranger”, “désorientant”, “désorienter”,
“embarrasser”, “embrouiller”, “espérer”, “estimant”, “estimer”, “éventuellement”,
“éventuels”, “éventuelles”, “figurer”, “guère”, “hésiter”, “hypothétique”, “imag-
iner”, “à l’occasion”, “occasions”, “paraît”, “parfois”, “parier”, “partiellement”,
“peut-être”, “pouvoir”, “pratiquement”, “presque”, “présumer”, “probablement”,
“projeter”, “quelquefois”, “questionner”, “reconsidérer”, “remarquer”, “repartir”,
“reprendre”, “rétorquer”, “risquer”, “soupçonner”, “suggérer”, “supposer”
Manually selected similarity candidates based on word embeddings (words with a
“_” indicate a bi-gram/tri-gram):
• “rester_à_l’appréciation”, “mesures_nécessaires”,”mesure_le_législateur”, “s’avèrer”,
“cas_échéant_d’autres”, “convenable”, “appropriée”, “convenir”, “traitement_approprié”,
“alternatives”, “imprécis”, “inexact”, “détachement”, “fair_la_part”, “s’il_est_vrai_que”,
“latitude”, “marge_d’appréciation”
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Figure B.1 – Two-dimensional reduction of the 300 most frequently occurring terms, France
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Note: This figure shows a mapping of the 300 most frequently appearing terms in the word embeddings trained
on the French constitutional court decision corpus. The dimensions are not identified. We can see that similar
words or terms are clustered next to each other. QPC, DC and other names for decisions types are, for instance,
grouped next to each other in the upper right corner. The same accounts for different references to law types
(loi de finance, loi déférée, loi organique) that are clustered (right side). Because of the less amount of training
data in the French application, the map is less useful so see word clusters than the German map in the main
text.
Figure B.2 – Scatterplot of Proportion of Vague Words, LIWC versus Expanded Dictionary,
CC Application
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Percentage Vague Words, Original LIWC Implementation
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 V
a
gu
e 
W
o
rd
s,
 
Ex
pa
nd
ed
 D
ict
io
na
ry
Note: This figure shows the proportion of vague words identified by the original French LIWC dictionary on the
X-axis and the French expanded dictionary on the Y-axis when scoring the same decision texts.
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B.2 Appendix with supplementary information for NLP Clas-
sifier in the GFCC application
B.2.1 Annotation procedure and coding instructions
The annotation procedure was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the pre-test
stage, the annotators received detailed project instructions, including a brief explanation
of the project’s purpose and context, and some information about the structure of court
decisions. One of the annotator has a minor in public law. The other two annotators
have had at least two public law classes in their undergraduates, and received detailed
coding instructions and examples. The instructions also included detail information
about the concept of judicial policy implementation vagueness. The annotators then
coded a random sample of over 300 sentences. Afterwards, a meeting was held to
discuss potential issues. In the second phase, the annotators had to label the remaining
3,500 sentences. The following page show the coding instructions that the annotators
received.
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Leitfaden für die Annotation von Vagheit in
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen
Sebastian Sternberg
20. Februar 2019
Kontext des Projekts:
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht ist das Verfassungs-
gericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und unter
anderem dafür verantwortlich, die Verfassungsmä-
ßigkeit von verabschiedeten Gesetzen zu überprü-
fen. Dabei kann das Gericht nicht nur ein Gesetz
als unvereinbar mit dem Grundgesetz und dafür für
nichtig erklären, sondern auch konkrete Vorschläge
machen, wie ein Gesetz ausgelegt oder geändert wer-
den muss, damit es im Einklang mit der Verfassung
ist. Das Gericht legt seine Entscheidung immer in
schriftlicher Form in den sogenannten Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichtsentscheidungen vor.
Ziel des Projekts
Ziel dieses Projektes ist es herauszufinden, unter wel-
chen Umständen sich das Gericht dazu entschließt,
dem Gesetzgeber genau vorzuschreiben wie ein neu-
es Gesetz umgesetzt werden soll und wann es davon
absieht. Der Hintergrund davon ist, dass bestimm-
te Annahmen getroffen werden können, wann das
Gericht strategisch darauf verzichtet, dem Gesetzge-
ber etwas vorzuschreiben (eine vage Entscheidung zu
schreiben) und wann es, ebenfalls strategisch, prä-
zisiert wie ein Gesetz modifiziert werden soll (eine
nicht vage Entscheidung).
Um diese Fragestellung beantworten zu können ist
es notwendig zu messen, wann eine Entscheidung va-
ge oder nicht vage ist. Hierfür soll mit Hilfe dieses
Projekts eine computerbasierte automatisierte Iden-
tifikation von vagen Textstellen erfolgen, die es er-
laubt, Sätze mit vagen Vorschriften zur Umsetzung
von Gesetzen innerhalb einer großen Anzahl von
Texten automatisiert (d.h. ohne menschliche Steue-
rung) zu erkennen. Dies erfolgt mithilfe eines Klassi-
fizierungsalgorithmus, welcher anhand von Beispiel-
sätzen lernen kann, welche Satzeigenschaften einen
vagen oder nicht vagen Satz repräsentieren.
Definition und Motivation des Konzept: Vag-
heit in juristischen Texten
Vagheit ist konzeptionnel nicht äquivalent zu Am-
biguität. Ein sprachlicher Ausdruck wird als ambi-
guitiv (mehrdeutig) angesehen, wenn er zwei oder
mehr klar abgegrenzte Bedeutungen hat. Ein Stan-
dardbeispiel für ein doppeldeutiges Wort ist "Bank",
da es sowohl für eine Sitzgelegenheit aus Holz, Stein
oder Ähnlichem stehen kann oder für ein Unter-
nehmen, das Geld- und Kreditgeschäfte betreibt.
Im Gegensatz dazu wird ein Ausdruck als vage be-
zeichnet, wenn die sprachlichen Grenzen des Begriffs
nicht klar separiert sind. Ein Standardbeispiel für
“Vagheit” ist der Begriff "groß". Es ist nicht eindeu-
tig definiert, was genaue eine “große” Person aus-
macht. Jemand der anhand der Durchschnittsgröße
als “groß” bezeichnet wird muss nicht als groß in-
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nerhalb eines Basketballteams bezeichnet werden.
Weil das Konzept der Vagheit bereits an sich va-
ge ist und stark auf den Satzkontex ankommt, ist
es notwendig eine größere Anzahl an Beispielssätze
manuell als vage bzw. nicht vage zu kennzeichnen.
Dazu ist es notwendig das menschliche AnnotatorIn-
nen entscheiden, welche Sätze vage oder nicht vage
sind, damit später der Computer bzw. der Algorith-
mus lernen kann, welche Eigenschaften eines Satzes
für einen vagen bzw. nicht vagen Satz stehen. Die
Erfahrung aus anderen Projekten hat gezeigt, dass
vage Sätze im Durchschnitt wesentlich seltener vor-
kommen als nicht vage Sätze.
Das Konzept der Vagheit sollte beim Annotie-
ren immer innerhalb des oben erklärten juristischen
Kontextes verstanden werden. Dies bedeutet, dass
Vagheit im Sinne von der Vagheit von Vorgaben des
Gerichts an den Gesetzgeber für die Umsetzung von
Entscheidungen verstanden werden soll. Weitere Er-
läuterungen und Beispiele finden sich im weiteren
Verlauf des Textes.
Erläuterung der Textform:
Die Entscheidungstexte werden von den Richtern
selbst geschrieben und unterschrieben. Die Texte
sind typischerweise sowohl an die juristische Com-
munity als auch die Medien und die Öffentlichkeit
addressiert.
Typischerweise wird in den Entscheidungen zu-
erst der Kontext dargelegt, d.h. um was es in dem
zu beurteilenden Gesetz inhaltlich geht und welcher
Grundrechtsverstoß vom Antragsteller anhängig ge-
macht wird. Danach werden, falls vorhanden und nö-
tig, Expertenmeinungen sowie die Meinungen von
Kläger und Beklagten diskutiert. Danach beginnt
das Gericht mit der eigentlichen Prüfung des Ge-
setzes, in dem es beispielsweise prüft ob die vom
Antragssteller genannten Verstöße einschlägig sind
oder aber andere Grundrechte verletzt wurden. Im
letzten Abschnitt des Textes wird sodann die Ent-
scheidung des Gerichts bekanntgegeben. Hier kann
das Gericht auch, falls es dies als nötig befindet,
konkrete Anweisung für die Umsetzung bzw. Ände-
rung eines neuen Gesetzes geben. In den Entschei-
dungen selbst kann es um eine Vielzahl von The-
men gehen, zum Beispiel Schwangerschaftsabbruch,
Beamtenrente, Numerus Clausus für Medizinstuden-
ten oder die Pleichstellung von gleichgeschlechtli-
chen PartnernInnen. Bundesverfassungsgerichtsent-
scheidungen und deren Sätze sind im Durchschnitt
eher länger und sprachlich auf gehobenem Niveau,
d.h. benutzen viele Fremdwörter oder auch juristi-
sche Fachbegriffe.
Annotations-Aufgabe und Hinweise
Konkret besteht die Annotations-Aufgabe darin,
1500 zufällig aus Gerichtsentscheidungen ausgewähl-
te Sätze als entweder vage oder nicht vage zu klassi-
fiziert. Dabei wird jeweils ein Satz gezeigt, und die
Annotatorienden müssen entscheiden, ob dieser Satz
vage ist oder nicht. Mithilfe dieser sogenannten Trai-
ningsdaten kann ein Algorithmus dann lernen, wel-
che Satzeigenschaften für einen vagen bzw. nicht va-
gen Satz stehen. Hierbei ist es wichtig zu betonen,
dass es ausschließlich auf die Beurteilung des/der
Annotierenden ankommt. Auch gibt es keine falsche
oder richtige Antwort, sondern es zählt ausschließ-
lich die wahrgenommene Vagheit der Sätze. Es ist
nicht möglich, ein und denselben Satz als vage bzw.
nicht vage zu annotieren. An dieser Stelle soll nach
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einmal betont werden, dass vage Sätze im Durch-
schnitt wesentlich seltener vorkommen als nicht vage
Sätze.
Da einzig und allein die Qualität der annotierten
Sätze darüber entscheidet, ob der Algorithmus in
der Lage ist, das Konzept der Vagheit in juristischen
Texten zu erlernen, sollten AnnotatorInnen nie län-
ger als eine Stunde am Stück ohne Pause annotie-
ren. Ansonsten kann es zum sogenannten "fatigue
effect"kommen, welcher die zunehmende Unkonzen-
triertheit und Veringerung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit
über die Zeit einer zu bearbeitenden Aufgabe be-
schreibt, mit der die Qualität der Arbeit stark sinkt.
Die Annotation wird über eine vorprogrammierte
Online-App durchgeführt. Dabei werden nacheinan-
der Sätze eingeblendet, welche anschließend anno-
tiert werden sollen. Um unnötiges Klicken mit der
Maus zu vermeiden, können Tastaturtasten frei be-
legt werden, sodass ausschließlich mit der Tastatur
annotiert werden kann. Wenn ein Satz als vage an-
notiert wurde gibt es darüber Hinaus noch die Mög-
lichkeit in einem Textfeld einzugeben, welches Wort
oder welcher Ausdruck im Satz die Entscheidung zur
Klassifikation als vage beeinflusst hat (sogenannte
trigger terms).
Beispielsätze
Im Folgenden werden einige Beispielsätze für die "va-
ge"bzw. "nicht vage"Kategorie aufgeführt. Vage Sät-
ze können beispielsweise so aussehen:
• Dem Gesetzgeber kommt bei der Erfüllung
dieser Schutzpflicht ein weiter Einschätzungs-
, Wertungs- und Gestaltungsfreiraum zu, der
auch Raum für die Berücksichtigung konkurrie-
render öffentlicher und privater Interessen läßt.
Hierbei betont das Gericht den weiten Entschei-
dungsspielraum des Gesetzgebers, und betont noch
einmal den "Raum"für etwaige Abwägungen. Der fol-
gende Satz ist schon weniger klar:
• Es ist dem Gesetzgeber aber unbenommen, die
Wirkung der vorliegenden Entscheidung auch
auf bereits bestandskräftige Bescheide zu er-
strecken; von Verfassungs wegen verpflichtet ist
er hierzu nicht.
Hierbei zeigt das Wort “unbenommen”, dass der
Gesetzgeber eine gewisse Freiheit hat, wie er die vor-
liegende Entscheidung umsetzt. Dies wird durch den
Nachtrag” von Verfassungs wegen verpflichtet” noch
einmal betont.
Nicht vage Sätze können viele Formen annehmen.
Konkret auf die Umsetzung von Entscheidungen be-
zogen kann dies so aussehen:
• Der Gesetzgeber ist verpflichtet, bis zum 30.
Juni 2001 eine verfassungsgemäße Regelung zu
treffen.
Hier verpflichtet das Gericht den Gesetzgeber, ei-
ne Regelung bis zu einem festgesetzten Datum zu
treffen. Da die Sätze zufällig aus den Gerichtsent-
scheidungen ausgewählt wurden, können es auch
Sätze sein, welche nicht konkret auf Gesetze und de-
ren Umsetzung eingehen, sondern aus anderen Stel-
len im Text stammen.
• In der Regel ermaechtigten diese Gesetze die
Aerztekammern, die Berufspflichten der Aerzte
in einer Berufsordnung zu regeln.
Insgesamt werden solche Sätze die Mehrheit der
zufällig ausgewählten Sätze darstellen. Darüber hin-
aus gibt es Fälle, welche weniger klar und deshalb
schwerer zu annotieren sind:
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• Einen gewissen Spielraum verschafft dem Ge-
setzgeber insoweit nur noch die rechnerische
Einbeziehung der Ertraege, die er als abzieh-
bare Aufwendungen und sonstige Entlastungen
unbesteuert lassen will.
Hier wird zwar der “gewisse Spielraum” durch den
Ausdruck “nur noch” eingeschränkt, jedoch sollte
dieser Satz immer noch als vage annotiert werden.
Folgender Satz ist noch schwieriger:
• Damit ist dem Gesetzgeber allerdings nicht jede
Differenzierung verwehrt.
Auch hier sollte eher als vage annotiert werden,
da dem Gesetzgeber zugestanden wird, ein gewisses
Maß an Differenzierung anlegen zu dürfen.
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B.2.2 Screen-shot of the software used for the annotation task
Figure B.3 shows a screenshot (in German) of the software (an onlineplatform called
dataturks (https://dataturks.com/)) used for the annotation task with an example
sentence. For each of the randomly sampled sentences from the GFCC decisions, the
three annotators had to classify each sentence into vague or not vague. Additionally,
they could add a note when they thought a certain trigger word has shaped their
classification decision.
Figure B.3 – Screenshot of Software used for the Annotation Task
B.3 Brief overview over typical deep learning architectures used
in this study
The typical RNN architecture
Figure B.4 shows an “unfolded” RNN. Unfolded here refers to writing out the network
for the complete sequence. A sentence consisting of three words, for instance, would
be unfolded into a three-layer network, with one layer for each word. Stated more
generally, a RNN can map an input sequence with an arbitrary number of elements
xt at time t into an output sequence with elements Ot, with each Ot depending on all
the previous xt′ for t′ < t (Lecun, Bengio and Hinton, 2015, 442). Unlike traditional
feed-forward networks, which uses different parameters at each layer, a RNN shares
the same parameters (weight matrices U, V, W) across all steps. Together U and W
define how to calculate the new state st of the network given the previous state st−1
and the input xt (together with the function f ). V defines how to map the hidden state
back into the outcome space.
In Figure B.4, xt is the input at time step t, for instance a one-hot encoded vector
corresponding to a word in a sentence. st is the hidden state at time step t, and is the
“memory” of the network. st is calculated based on the previous hidden state and the
input at the current step as follows:
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Figure B.4 – An Unfolded Recurrent Neural Network
Note: Example architecture of a simple RNN, unfolded over three iterations. Figure taken from Lecun, Bengio
and Hinton (2015, 442).
st = f (Uxt +Wst−1) (B.1)
where the function f is typically a non-linearity such as tanh or ReLU, and U and W
are weight matrices. ot is the output at step t. Is the task for instance predicting the
next word in a sentence given a sequence of previous words, ot would be a vector of
probabilities over all words of the vocabulary given by so f tmax(Vst).
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The typical GRU architecture
Note: Gated Recurrent Unit network topology, with a hidden unit (state) that can adaptively remember
and forget. In the above equation, for every time-step, xt is the input vector, zt is the update gate
vector, rt is the reset gate vector, ht is the output vector, and h˜t is the new hidden state as the
combination of new input xt with the past hidden state ht−1. W and U are parameter matrices.
The hidden state ht is calculated using the previous hidden input ht−1 and the new hidden state
generated h˜t considering the update gate. The reset signal rt is responsible for determining how
important the previous hidden state ht−1. The reset gate controls the information flow from the
hidden state and can erase the past hidden state if it finds that ht−1 is irrelevant. The update signal
zt is responsible for determining how much of ht−1 should be carried forward to the next state. For
instance, if zt ≈ 1, then ht−1 is almost entirely copied out to ht. Conversely, if zt ≈ 0, then mostly
the new memory h˜t is forwarded to the next hidden state. Figure and its description including
the notation are based on Jozefowicz, Zaremba and Sutskever (2015, 2344). Note that  is the
element-wise product. For more information on calculation and derivation see the original paper of
Cho et al. (2014).
zt = σ(Wzxt +Uzht−1)
rt = σ(Wrxt +Urht−1)
h˜t = tanh(Whxt +Uh(rt  ht−1)
ht = zt  ht−1 + (1− zt) h˜t
(B.2)
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The typical CNN architecture
Figure B.5 – Example CNN architecture for sentence classification
Note: This figure shows an example Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) architecture
for sentence classification. The toy sentence contains six word tokens, which are usually
encoded in a word embedding space (here the dimension of this space is of arbitrary size
d = 5). Three filter region sizes are depicted with again arbitrary size (2,3 and 4), each
of which has 2 filters, so that overall 6 different filters are applied. Every filter performs
convolution on the sentence matrix and generates (variable-length) feature maps. Another,
more layman way of thinking about this is having six people who independently have to
classify a sentence. Two persons are allowed to looking at four consecutive words at a time
(second column in the graph, where the convolution takes place). Two persons are allowed
to look at three consecutive words and two are allowed to only look at two consecutive
words at a time. It is important to note that even though the same two people look at
the same four words at a time, they will most likely build different intuitions. In neural
network terms this is due to the different random initialization of the feature maps.
Given the filter or region size 2, this means a 2-word filter is applied to the sentence matrix
by sliding over the first two rows the sentence matrix (thus the 2-word filter matrix is of
size 2× 5), then going to the next row and so on. Every time, a feature map is created by
calculating the sum of the element-wise product for all its 2× 5 elements. Then 1-max
pooling is performed over each feature map, which simply means the largest number from
each feature map is recorded. This results in an univariate feature vector that is based on
all six maps. These 6 features are concatenated such that they form the final vector for
the last layer. The final softmax layer then converts this feature vector into probabilities for
classification. In this example, it is a binary classification. Figure and description are based
on (Zhang and Wallace, 2015, 4).
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B.3.1 Definition of performance measures
Generally, the results of a binary classifier (and any other classifier) can be summarized
by a confusion matrix. In the case of binary classification this is a 2× 2 table of the
four possible classification outcomes of a model. The used can all be explained with
the help of confusion matrices. To get class predictions from predicted probabilities
of belonging to the positive class, one has to set a threshold for positive prediction.
Usually, the default value of this threshold for positive prediction is 0.5. However, any
other value between 0 and 1 could be a sensible threshold for positive prediction.
Confusion Matrix
Observed
Positive Negative
Predicted
Positive True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Negative False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
• Accuracy: TP+TNTP+FP+TN+FN
• Precision: Precision is defined as : Precision = TPTP+FP , that is the ratio of correctly
classified positives and all predicted positives.
• Recall: Recall (also called True Positive Rate (TPR)), is defined as Recall = TPTP+FN .
It measures the fraction of positive examples that are correctly labeled.
• F1 score: The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall, and defined
as F1 = 2·TP2·TP+FN+FP .
• Receiver operating characteristic area under the curve: Sensitivity (recall) plot-
ted against 1- specificity ( TNTN+FP ) at various threshold settings.
• Kappa = po−pe1−pe , where po is the observed agreement (analog to accuracy), and pe
is the hypothetical probability of chance agreement, using the observed data to
calculate the probabilities of each observer randomly seeing each category.
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Table 1: Confusion Matrix SVM
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 668 4
true:vague 32 13
Table 2: Confusion Matrix Random Forest
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 669 3
true:vague 39 6
Table 3: Confusion Matrix Naive Bayes
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 648 24
true:vague 34 11
Table 4: Confusion Matrix Logistic Regression
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 648 24
true:vague 21 24
Table 5: Confusion Matrix Expanded Dictionary
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 561 111
true: vague 18 27
Table 6: Confusion Matrix XGBoost
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 565 107
true:vague 12 33
Table 7: Confusion Matrix GRU
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 667 33
true:vague 5 12
Table 8: Confusion Matrix CNN
pred:not vague pred:vague
true:not vague 672 33
true:vague 0 12
B.3. BRIEF OVERVIEW OVER TYPICAL DEEP LEARNING ARCHITECTURES USED
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B.3.2 Confusion matrices of the different classifiers
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B.3.3 Summary statistics of original and translated court decisions
Table B.1 – Summary Statistics for original and translated decisions of the CC
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Word Count German 20 6,445 4,382 455 16,461
Vagueness Score German 20 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.5
Word Count French 20 7,206 4,878 1,154 19,394
vagueness Score French 20 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.8
Table B.2 – Summary Statistics for original and translated decisions of the GFCC
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Word Count French 20 370.2 224.7 38 837
Vaguenss Score French 20 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.4
Word Count German 20 307.5 180.9 35 692
Vagueness Score German 20 0.4 0.6 0.0 1.7
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C.1 Summary statistics of the data used in the analyses
Table C.1 and Table C.2 show summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
Note that the small numbers for the percentage of vague sentences are not erroneous,
but due to the fact that the appearance of vague sentences is more rare than the
occurrence of vague words. Nevertheless, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, even
a single vague sentence can be enough to express judicial policy implementation
vagueness.
Table C.1 – Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the GFCC Analysis
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Percentage vague sentences 372 0.002 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.046
Percentage vague words 372 0.38 0.22 0.00 0.24 0.35 0.48 1.64
Ideological Distance (CMP) 372 13.98 10.07 0.53 6.75 9.81 25.48 32.99
Ideological Distance (MCSS) 372 1.74 0.60 0.01 1.65 1.91 2.17 2.48
Dummy Simple Case 372 0.35 0.48 0 0 0 1 1
Dummy Second Senate 372 0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
Dummy Oral Hearing 372 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 0 1
Dummy Risk Non-Compliance 372 0.87 0.34 0 1 1 1 1
Length Casefacts 372 67.35 44.59 0 39 56 83 200
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VARIANCE ESTIMATOR PROPOSED BY PAPKE AND WOOLDRIGE (1996)
Table C.2 – Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the CC Analysis
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) Max
Percentage vague words 558 0.42 0.23 0.00 0.28 0.40 0.57 1.66
Ideological Distance (CMP) 558 15.06 12.37 0.00 5.00 9.47 24.51 41.45
Number of legal issues 558 5.20 3.70 2 2 4 7 28
Dummy Risk Non-Compliance 558 0.32 0.47 0 0 0 1 1
C.2 Results of Fractional Logistic Regressions Using the Ro-
bust Variance Estimator Proposed by Papke and Wooldrige
(1996)
Table C.3 and Table C.4 show the fractional logit regressions of the main analyses. This
means that the coefficients are directly estimated using the QMLE outlined in section
4.4.3 (the fractional logit regression), and the standard errors are robust standard errors
estimated by the well-known sandwich estimator.
Table C.3 – Results of Fractional Logit Regression, GFCC Analysis
DV: Percentage of Vague Sentences
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance −0.026∗ −0.092∗∗
(0.014) (0.039)
Case Complexity ( = 1) 0.592∗ 0.566∗
(0.325) (0.321)
Second Senat (= 1) −0.553∗ −0.554∗
(0.323) (0.322)
Oral Hearing −0.418 −0.397
(0.313) (0.316)
Risk Non-Compliance (= 1) 0.429 −0.280
(0.905) (0.773)
Ideological Distance × Risk Non-Compliance 0.069∗
(0.042)
Constant −5.923∗∗∗ −5.263∗∗∗
(1.005) (0.802)
N 372 372
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.
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Table C.4 – Results of Fractional Logit Regression, CC Analysis
DV: Percentage of Vague Words
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Case Complexity (Number of Legal Issues) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
Risk Non-Compliance (= 1) −0.035 −0.064
(0.055) (0.071)
Ideological Distance × Risk Non-Compliance 0.004
(0.005)
Constant −5.705∗∗∗ −5.695∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059)
N 558 558
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Robust Standard Errors are used.
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C.3. FIRST DIFFERENCE MINIMUM MAXIMUM IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE,
OBSERVED VALUE APPROACH
Figure C.1 – Distribution of First Difference between Minimum and Maximum Ideological
Distance
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Note: This figure shows the distribution of the first difference between minimum and maximum ideological
distance of Figure 4.2, including 90% confidence intervals (dashed lines) and the corresponding mean (thick
line). The first difference is calculated using the observed value approach and Model 1 of Table C.3. We see that
the first difference is statistically significant different from zero at the 90% level.
C.3 First Difference Minimum Maximum Ideological Distance,
Observed value Approach
Figure C.1 explicitly tests the first difference between minimum and maximum ideolog-
ical preference for the German analysis. For the simulation, the ideological distance
variable was set to the minimum and the maximum. The observed value approach is
used. Because the preference divergence distribution is bimodal, I also tested the first
difference between the 10th and 90th quantile. All these first differences are statistically
significant on the 90% level.
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Figure C.2 – Effect of Ideological Distance on Decision Vagueness, GFCC
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(a) Ideological Distance on Decision Vagueness
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(b) First Difference Minimum Maximum Ideological
Distance using MCSS
C.4 Robustness Checks
Robustness Checks GFCC
Using alternative ideology score (MCSS)
For the main analysis, I used the scores from the Comparative Manifesto Project project
to calculate the ideological position of court and legislator. These scores are increasingly
criticized with regard to their spatial and temporal comparability (Lowe et al., 2011;
König, Marbach and Osnabrügge, 2013). In order to check whether my findings are
robust to the measurement of ideological distance, I replicate my analyses but use
the Manifesto Common Space Scores (MCSS) of König, Marbach and Osnabrügge
(2013) instead of the original CMP scores. My findings remain robust to the usage of
this different ideology measure. Like in the main analysis, I used the observed value
approach and the QMLE of the fractional logit.
Figure C.2 shows that my findings are robust to the usage of the MCSS scores instead
the CMP scores. The higher the preference divergence between court and legislator, the
less vague the decisions of the GFCC become. Also, I tested the first difference between
minimum and maximum ideological distance to evaluate whether the overall effect is
statistically significant. As we can see on the right side of the Figure, the first difference
is significant on the 90% level.
Figure C.3 shows the conditional effect of preference divergence and the perceived
risk of noncompliance on decision vagueness for the GFCC. Again, using the MCSS
scores my findings remain robust. Decision vagueness decrease when the German
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Figure C.3 – Conditional Effect of Preference Divergence and Non-Compliance Risk on Deci-
sion Vagueness, GFCC
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judges face the risk of noncompliance. This is because they know that due to their
robust levels of public support, they can increase the pressure on the government. The
corresponding first difference is statistically significant on the 90% level.
Using alternative dependent variable
Table C.5 shows the fractional logit regression results for the GFCC, using the alternative
judicial policy implementation vagueness score of the German expanded dictionary as
dependent variable. The results show that although all coefficients exhibit the correct
directions, none of them are statistical significant. One reason for this could be that
the dictionary produces a substantial amount of false positives when testing on the
out-of-sample prediction in Chapter 3.4.4.
Using random sub-sampling validation
I apply repeated random sub-sampling validation to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity. I re-run my analyses twenty times using only a two-third subset of the data,
collect the results and combine the estimates as outlined in King et al. (2001). I find
that the direction and size of the estimates are robust across different subsets, but
that the combined estimates are not statistically significant anymore, indicated by the
large standard errors. However, this is a result of the rather small N of the German
data ( N = 372 decisions), so that the larger standard errors are a result of sampling
variability, and therefore to be expected.
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Table C.5 – Results of Fractional Logit Regression, Percentage of Vague Words as Dependent
Variable, GFCC Analysis
DV: Percentage Vague Words
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance −0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.014)
Complex Case ( = 1) 0.086 0.085
(0.064) (0.064)
Second Senate ( = 1) −0.095 −0.095
(0.065) (0.065)
Oral Hearing (=1) −0.073 −0.077
(0.077) (0.077)
Risk Noncompliance (=1) 0.020 0.103
(0.123) (0.227)
Ideological Distance × Risk Non-Compliance −0.006
(0.014)
Constant −5.555∗∗∗ −5.628∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.226)
N 372 372
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Robust Standard Errors are used.
Table C.6 – Combined estimates from repeated random sub-sampling validation, GFCC
DV: Percentage Vague Sentences
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance −0.028 −0.257
(0.018) (0.655)
Complex Case −0.724 −0.665
(0.529) (0.528)
Second Senate (=1) −0.653 −0.668
(0.547) (0.547)
Oral Hearing (=1) −0.502 −0.453
(0.495) (0.500)
Risk Non-Compliance (= 1) 0.101 −0.721
(0.977) (1.235)
Ideological Distance X Risk Non-Compliance 0.232
(0.654)
Constant −5.503∗∗∗ −4.748∗∗∗
(1.094) (1.219)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
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Robustness Checks Conseil Constitutionnel Analysis
Alternative operationalization of judicial uncertainty using CAP coding
First, I re-run the main analyses but this time I use a dummy variable indicating whether
a case is complex or not (using the same Comparative Agenda Project coding scheme
than in the German analysis) instead of the count of the numbers of legal doctrines
examined as a measure for judicial uncertainty. The results remain unchanged when
using this alternative measure.
Table C.7 – Results of Fractional Logit Regression Using Case Complexity as Judicial Uncer-
tainty Measure, CC
DV: Percentage Vague Words
Model 1
Ideological Distance 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
Complex Case (= 1) 0.145∗∗∗
(0.049)
Government Brief 0.057
(0.052)
Intercept −5.632∗∗∗
(0.052)
N 494
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Using random sub-sampling validation
Second, I apply the same repeated random sub-sampling validation to account for
unobserved heterogeneity than in the robustness analysis of the German data. I re-
run my analyses twenty times using only a two-third subset of the data, collect the
results and combine the estimates as outlined in King et al. (2001). My results remain
unchanged: coefficient and the combined standard errors are similar to the ones the
main analysis using the full data set.
Using alternative ideology score (MCSS)
I replicated the main analysis but this time using the MCSS scores instead of the CMP
scores. In Figure C.4 shows the corresponding simulations, which were obtained in the
same way as in the main analysis (observed value approach using the QMLE of the
fractional logit). We observe the same effect than in the main analysis: the higher the
distance between Conseil and legislator, the higher the expected decision vagueness.
This is again in contrast to the formal model’s prediction. Because I obtain the same
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Table C.8 – Combined estimates from repeated random sub-sampling validation, CC
DV: Percentage Vague Words
Model 1 Model 2
Ideological Distance 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Case Complexity (Number of legal issues) 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Risk Non-Compliance (= 1) −0.022 −0.070
(0.085) (0.110)
Ideological Distance X Risk Non-Compliance 0.005
(0.006)
Constant −5.699∗∗∗ −5.686∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.092)
∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .1
Figure C.4 – Effect of Ideological Distance (MCSS) on Decision Vagueness, CC
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(a) Ideological Distance on Decision Vagueness
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(b) First Difference Minimum Maximum Ideological
Distance using MCSS
result using the MCSS scores and the CMP scores, I conclude that this contradictory
finding is not due to measurement error of the independent variable.
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Figure C.5 – Effect of Judicial Uncertainty on Decision Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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(b) CC analysis
Note: Left Side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness for simple and complex cases, with the correspond-
ing first difference using simulations. For the simple and complex case scenario, the complex case dummy was
set to zero and one, respectively. The points represent the point estimates and the bars represent 90% confidence
intervals.
Right side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over a range of judicial uncertainty, including 90% confi-
dence intervals. Judicial uncertainty is measured by the number of legal doctrines considered in a decision.
C.5 Results of the Fractional Logistic Regressions Based on
Bootstrapping
In this section, I replicate the main analysis (see Chapter 4.4.3) but instead of the robust
variance estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), I use bootstrapping to
obtain coefficients and standard errors. In bootstrapping, the sampling distribution
of a parameter is approximated by repeatedly taking n samples with replacement from
the original data. In my analysis, I use n = 1, 000 where the size of each bootstrap
sample is identical to the original data. The bootstrapped samples are then used to
calculate means and standard errors. For the simulation, I use the observed value
approach outlined in Chapter 4.4.3 and the same model specifications. The sampling
distributions obtained via the bootstraps are directly used for the simulations. The
following figures show that I obtain results similar to the main analysis. Overall, the
uncertainty surrounding the estimates is a little smaller than in the main analysis. For
instance in the simulation of the effect of ideological distance on the decision vagueness
in Figure C.6, the lines representing one draw of the simulation in the “spaghetti” plot
are a little closer to the estimated mean than in the main analysis. This demonstrates
that even if no assumptions about the variance specification are made, the results
remain robust.
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Figure C.6 – Effect of Preference Divergence on Decision Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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(a) GFCC analysis
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(b) CC analysis
Note: Left Side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over the range of preference divergence, measured
by the ideological distance between court and legislator. 90% confidence intervals are used.
Right side: Expected percentage of decision vagueness over the range of preference divergence, measured by
the ideological distance between court and legislator. 90% confidence intervals are used.
Figure C.7 – Conditional Effect of Preference Divergence and Non-Compliance Risk on Deci-
sion Vagueness, GFCC and CC
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(a) GFCC analysis
l
l
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f V
a
gu
en
es
s
Low Divergence 
 High NC Risk
High Divergence 
 High NC Risk
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
First Difference
−
0.
2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
(b) CC analysis
Note: This figure shows the conditional effect of preference divergence and the risk of non-compliance (NC)
on decision vagueness. The black points represent the expected decision vagueness for a case with a high
perceived risk of non-compliance and low preference divergence. The white points represent the expected
decision vagueness for a case with a low perceived risk of non-compliance and high preference divergence. The
first difference between these two scenarios is displayed on the right of each graph. The bars represent 90%
confidence intervals. For the scenarios, the risk of non-compliance variable is set to 1 and ideological distance is
set to the minimum (low divergence) and maximum (high divergence).
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Chapter 5
D.1 Outline of the Random Forest Algorithm
Algorithm outline of random forest, directly adopted from (Hastie, Tibshirani and
Friedman, 2009, 558):
1. For b = 1 to B:
(a) Draw a bootstrap sample Z* of size N from the training data.
(b) Grow a random forest tree Tb to the bootstrap data, by repeating the follow-
ing steps for each terminal node of the tree, until the minimum node size
nmin is reached.
i. Select m variables at random from the p variables.
ii. Pick the best variable/split-point among the m.
iii. Split the node into two daughter nodes.
2. Output the ensemble of trees {Tb}B1 .
The final prediction of a new data point x is then in the classification case:
CˆBr f (x) = majorityvote{Cˆb(x)}B1
where Cˆb(x) is the class prediction of the bth random forest tree.
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D.2. COMPARISON OF PREDICTIVE PERFORMANCE OF DIFFERENT
CLASSIFIERS
D.2 Comparison of predictive performance of different classi-
fiers
Figure D.1 – Performance of different algorithms on the Constitutional Complaints Data, Com-
bined Model
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Figure D.1 shows the predictive performance of multiple machine learning algorithms
using 10-fold cross-validation (without hyper-parameter tuning) and the constitutional
complaints data set. Classification and Regression Trees (CART), extremely boosted
trees (XGBTree), regularized regression, support vector machines (SVM), k-nearest
neighbors and random forests. Accuracy and Kappa are reported. Confidence intervals
are just for visualization purposes and are calculated using the standard error of the
respective mean (across the 10-folds).
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D.3 Additional Model Performance Metrics
Table D.1 – Model Evaluation Based on Aggregated Cross-Validation Scores, Additional Per-
formance Metrics
Accuracy Kappa ROC AUC PR AUC
Legal Combined Baseline Legal Combined Legal Combined Legal Combined
Constitutional Complaints 60.14 68.93 53.47 0.20 0.37 0.66 0.76 0.70 0.76
Concrete Review 68.42 80.18 67.02 0.08 0.50 0.66 0.83 0.85 0.83
Abstract Review/Organstreit 63.54 73.04 60.26 0.19 0.41 0.68 0.77 0.73 0.77
Note: Model performances of the legal model and the combined model based on the aggregated 10-fold cross-validation scores. The
random forests were build with a fixed m. The legal model only uses legal context variables, while the combined models used both legal
and political context variables. The baseline category for accuracy is a naive classifier who always votes the majority category of the
training set. The best performances are highlighted in bold.
Table D.2 – Model Evaluation Based on Out-of-Sample Prediction, Additional Performance
Metrics
Accuracy Kappa ROC AUC PR AUC
Legal Combined Baseline Legal Combined Legal Combined Legal Combined
Constitutional Complaint 66.67 74.49 52.67 0.33 0.49 0.73 0.83 0.75 0.83
Concrete Reviews 75.26 81.05 65.79 0.41 0.57 0.75 0.86 0.65 0.82
Abstract Reviews/Organstreit 60.38 77.36 58.49 0.17 0.52 0.66 0.79 0.67 0.82
Note: Model performances of the legal model and the combined model based on out-of-sample prediction. The legal model only uses legal
context variables, while the combined models used both legal and political context variables. The baseline category for accuracy is a naive
classifier who always votes the majority category of the training set. The best performances are highlighted in bold.
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Table 1: Constit. Complaints, Legal Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 147 79
in favor 83 177
Table 2: Concrete Reviews, Legal Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 110 32
in favor 15 33
Table 3: Abstract Reviews/Organstreit Proceed-
ings, Legal Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 23 12
in favor 8 10
Table 4: Constit. Complaints, Combined Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 169 52
in favor 61 204
Table 5: Concrete Reviews, Combined Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 111 22
in favor 14 43
Table 6: Abstract Reviews/Organstreit Proceed-
ings, Combined Model
Predicted/Reference against in favor
against 27 8
in favor 4 14
D.4. CONFUSION MATRICES OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSIFIERS
D.4 Confusion Matrices of the different classifiers
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D.5 Model Evaluation of Legal, Combined and Random Model
based on Out-of-Sample Prediction
Table D.3 – Model Evaluation of Legal, Combined and Random Model based on out-of-sample
prediction
Accuracy Kappa
Legal Combined Random Legal Combined Random
Constitutional Complaints 64.81 76.34 63.58 0.29 0.53 0.27
Concrete Review 75.26 81.05 73.68 0.41 0.57 0.36
Abstract Reviews/Organstreit 69.93 73.58 72.73 0.39 0.44 0.42
Note: Model performances of the legal, combined and random model based on out-of-sample prediction.
The best performances are highlighted in bold.
Table D.3 reports the model performance of the legal, the combined and the random
model using the same out-of-sample data set than used in the main analysis. Again,
the combined model performs best across all metrics. We can also see that again,
although less stark than in the main analysis, the addition of noise features to the
model improves the predictive performance compared to the legal model for abstract
reviews and Organstreit proceedings.
D.6 Model evaluation based on out-of-sample prediction us-
ing the time dimension for splitting
Table D.4 – Model evaluation based on out-of-sample prediction using the time dimension for
splitting
Accuracy Kappa ROC AUC PR AUC
Legal Combined Legal Combined Legal Combined Legal Combined
BvR 59.33 59.33 0.18 0.13 0.65 0.62 0.74 0.76
BvL 75.26 81.58 0.41 0.58 0.74 0.86 0.64 0.82
BvE/BvF 51.51 54.55 -0.03 0.06 0.50 0.41 0.50 0.26
Table D.4 reports the performance measures for the legal and combined model using
out-of-sample prediction. The test data was created by splitting the data set on each
proceeding such that all observation after 2005 were assigned to the test set and all
observations after where assigned to the training set. Note that this, however, results
in unequal train/test splits, such that not all test sets contain the same percentage of
observations. Again, the combined model achieves the best classification performance
across most of the performance metrics.
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